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Abstract 
 
Using partnerships between the public and private sectors to provide emergency 
preparedness and response (EPER) functions has become a useful and necessary tool for 
improving overall emergency management in the United States. Privatization has been 
studied comprehensively in many areas that are ripe for partnerships, but not in the field 
of emergency preparedness and response. Thus, this research fills that gap and advises 
both the architects of EPER partnerships and the policy makers that influence them, how 
to design partnerships based on the experience of former and existing EPER partnerships.  
 
In order to learn from existing partnerships, this research uses a case study 
method. After identifying and interviewing representatives from 16 EPER partnerships, 
this research classifies those partnerships based on several attributes. There are three 
general categories for those descriptive attributes: structural, functional and event. The 
structural attributes represent characteristics of a partnership that an architect has decision 
making power over. Functional and event attributes, on the other hand, are dependent on 
the EPER function being provided and are thus largely pre-defined for an architect. This 
research identifies links between the independent variables—the functional and event 
attributes—and the dependent variables—the structural attributes—that will guide 
architects and policy makers in their decision making processes. 
 
In general, this research found that there are several event and functional 
attributes of successful past EPER partnerships that can inform the structural decisions of 
the architect. Also, this research finds that there are several lessons the policy maker can 
take from past EPER partnerships, including the importance of allowing and encouraging 
flexibility in the partnership design process. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction and Motivation 
 
Ultimately this research strives to guide partnership architects and 
policymakers in the steps they can take to create and encourage partnerships for 
emergency preparedness and response (EPER) services. Partnerships between the 
public and private sectors to provide EPER services have become commonplace. 
These partnerships can resemble a spectrum of structures including those that include 
only public partners, more formal partnerships such as contracts or grants, or 
collaborative partnerships that engage a diverse group of stakeholders. This study 
strives to learn from the history of these partnerships to guide future architects in 
creating partnerships to provide common or emergent EPER services.  
1.1 Research Questions 
By identifying the common characteristics of EPER partnerships, termed 
‘attributes’, this research discovers patterns and trends in those characteristics which 
can inform how future partnerships should be designed. There are three general 
categories for those descriptive attributes: structural, functional and event. The 
structural attributes represent characteristics of a partnership that an architect has 
decision making power over. Functional and event attributes, on the other hand, are 
completely dependent on the EPER service being provided and are thus pre-defined 
for an architect. Thus, this research will identify links between the independent 
variables—the functional and event attributes—and the dependent variables—the 
structural attributes—that will guide architects and policy makers in their decision 
making processes. The research questions this thesis will answer are: 
1. What characteristics of EPER services can inform decisions about 
designing partnerships to provide those services? 
2. What lessons can architects and policy makers learn, from existing 
EPER partnerships, which can guide future partnership 
architectures? 
The primary goal of this research then is to guide decision makers in the 
process of designing and encouraging partnerships for emergency preparedness and 
response activities. 
  12 
 
1.2 Motivation for Research 
Embedded in the research questions is an assumption that partnerships to 
provide emergency preparedness and response services are desirable. It is the belief 
of this author that partnerships for emergency preparedness and response are not only 
desirable, but necessary to capture the expertise and resources of both sectors. 
Effective partnerships can help to optimize the overall emergency management 
efforts in the United States. For example, in the wake of catastrophic disasters—such 
as hurricane Katrina in 2005—both the public and private sectors attempt to help with 
the response effort independently. Often the individual efforts of both sectors can 
actually be working against each other by clogging up critical transportation modes, 
complicating procedures for humanitarian relief, and/ or miscommunicating critical 
information. Therefore, without coordination, the public and private sector often work 
against each other even though they share similar goals. 
In a more visible area, 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned 
and/or operated by the private sector. Critical infrastructure includes any 
infrastructure that is required in order for the economy to operate and citizens to act 
smoothly: roads, the air transportation system, the internet, energy production 
facilities, hospitals and schools, etc. The public sector has a large stake ensuring that 
these facilities and networks are maintained, protected, and resilient after an 
emergency. However, since the public sector does not own or operate the majority of 
them, partnering with the private sector is essential. If there is not a sufficient 
economic incentive to motivate the private sector to participate in EPER services on 
their own, then the government must step in—through partnerships or regulation—to 
ensure those services are provided. Interestingly, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) oversees critical infrastructure in the US yet does not have the 
statutory ability to regulate any of the sectors, except for the chemical industry. Thus, 
the best option available to the policy makers in DHS are partnerships that engages all 
the stakeholders in order to ensure common missions and shared responsibility in 
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure.  
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There has been a lot of academic and professional attention on the concept of 
sharing public and private resources in order to accomplish various services. 
Common areas for partnerships and privatization include the construction and 
operation of public infrastructure (water systems, energy distribution and generation, 
etc…), the provision of public services (trash pick up, park maintenance, etc…), and 
the improvement of previous public monopolies (the post office, AMTRAK, etc…). 
Privatization has been an effective tool in many of these areas in order to reduce 
costs, increase efficiency, share resources and streamline government programs. 
However, in the area of emergency preparedness and response, very little academic 
attention has been focused on how the public and private sector can better partner 
together to provide essential services. Therefore, the motivation for this research 
sprung from (1) the need for better partnerships between the public and private sector 
in providing EPER services and (2) the dearth of privatization literature that addresses 
how EPER partnerships should be structured. 
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
This structure of this thesis is illustrated by figure 1.1. During the 
‘preliminary framing’ cycle, a literature review was performed that helped to refine 
the research questions and the research method used to answer those questions. The 
method and questions evolved until testable and unanswered questions in the area of 
EPER privatization were discovered. The ‘preliminary framing’ cycle is described in 
chapter 2-4 of this thesis according to figure 1.1. Once the method—a case study 
approach through interviews with existing or current partnerships for EPER—was 
defined, the interview instrument was developed, partnerships identified, and 
representatives from those partnerships interviewed over a four month period. This 
‘Data gathering’ process is described in chapter 4. Finally, once all the data gathered 
through the case studies was coded, an analysis of that data was conducted in order to 
identify patterns and trends that would relate attributes to one another. These 
relationships were then 
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In summary, chapter 1 of this thesis serves as a general introduction to the 
research questions being answered in this thesis and the motivation for doing so. Chapter 
2 surveys the privatization literature for general information about partnerships in order 
to begin to understand their characteristics, or attributes. Chapter 3 is also a literature 
review, but for the topic of emergency management. This chapter intends to describe the 
environment that partnerships for EPER operate within. Contained within chapter 3 is 
also a survey of the limited literature that has been written on the topic of using 
partnerships in the area of emergency preparedness and response. Chapter 4 then 
describes the research method used to answer the research questions. This chapter 
describes the development of the interview instrument for the case studies and the 
attribute categorizations. Chapter 5 presents the case study data and explains the patterns 
and trends discovered through the attribute analysis. Chapter 6 then presents how those 
patterns and trends provide lessons for EPER partnership architects and policy makers. 
Chapter 6 concludes with recommendations for future research on the topic of 
partnerships for EPER.  
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CHAPTER 2: Public Private Partnership Literature Review 
 
Privatization theory is a fairly well developed body of knowledge. Many aspects 
of privatization are well understood amongst academics and practitioners, including the 
motivations for partnership, the goals of privatization, and the characteristics of 
partnerships. However, there are still disagreements in terminology and some definitions. 
Thus, this chapter will review privatization literature in order to highlight these 
discrepancies, and then clarify what definitions are adopted for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
2.1 Privatization Definitions 
When a public good that must be provided has been defined, the Government and 
private sector face a decision: how should that good or service be provided? Who should 
deliver the service and who should finance it? How should the relationship be structured 
between the providers? Should contracts be used? When these questions have been 
addressed, the arrangement used to provide the good or service can be specified. 
 The public sector can take on the responsibility themselves, as they do in the 
most part with national defense and the military. On the other hand, the private sector can 
also provide a service absent the Government, such as mail delivery. Between these two 
extremes lies a variety of partnership and privatization options that are available to both 
sectors as well. In general, if the Government “in whole or in part, aims at shifting the 
functions and responsibilities from the Government to the private sector” (Republican 
Task Force on Privatization 46), a privatization process has begun. Privatization can 
occur in many degrees through many structures or arrangements; many of these 
privatization structures are well-defined. One structure however, is not as universally 
defined: Public-Private Partnership (PPP). 
The definition of a ‘Public Private Partnership’ is elusive and varies with context. 
Some privatization scholars refer to PPPs as ‘collaborative governance’ in order to 
differentiate them from other ways of partnering with the private sector. Donahue and 
Zeckhauser define collaborative governance as “the pursuit of authoritatively chosen 
public goals by means that include engaging the efforts of, and sharing discretion with, 
producers outside the Government.”(Donahue and Zeckhauser 430) According to the 
authors, this form of partnership is distinguished from other forms of privatization, such 
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as contracting and volunteerism, because of operational discretion. In pure volunteerism, 
where the private sector provides a service at their own cost, all discretion lies with the 
private sector even though the end goal is shared by both the public and private sectors. 
In contracting, on the other hand, the private sector provides a service that is highly 
specified and the public sector funds. In this arrangement, all discretion lies with the 
Government. Collaborative governance (or PPPs) lies in the middle of these two 
arrangements and thus calls for shared discretion and shared strategic decision making. 
The National Council for PPPs (NCPPP) defines a PPP very differently—a 
testament to its various operational definitions. “A Public-Private Partnership is a 
contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a private 
sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and 
private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In 
addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in 
the delivery of the service and/or facility.”("National Council for Public Private 
Partnerships-Case Studies.") Though this definition hits on many critical reasons for 
partnering with the private sector in the first place—sharing resources, sharing risk, and 
spreading out benefits—the NCPPP makes one assertion that is in direct contrast to the 
Donahue definition: that a PPP requires a contract. The NCPPP uses the term PPP much 
more broadly than Donahue and as a result illustrates the largest problem with defining a 
PPP universally: drawing the boundaries of this privatization option. The boundary 
definition problem has not been resolved in the PPP community (both academically and 
with practitioners) and thus a common definition for the term has not been universally 
accepted. Therefore in any privatization conversation it is critical to define what one 
means by ‘partnership’, and ‘PPP’.  
The definition for ‘partnership’ adopted in this thesis is best annunciated by 
Stratton; “A partnership is a collaboration among business, non-profit organizations, and 
Government in which risks, resources and skills are shared in projects that benefit each 
partner as well as the community.”(Osbourne 11). Therefore, a partnership is anything 
within the privatization spectrum between pure public and pure private provision. 
Partnership is the general term used for any arrangement where the public and private 
sectors work together. This thesis adopts the Donahue/Zeckhauser definition for a Public 
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Private Partnership and acknowledges that ‘PPP’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘collaborative 
governance’ are all interchangeable for the purpose of this study. Therefore, a PPP is one 
type of privatization arrangement that is distinct from other arrangements such as 
contracting and volunteerism. 
 
FIGURE 2.1: Privatization Definitions 
 
2.2 History of Privatization 
Privatization efforts have had upswings and downswings in both the first and third 
worlds over the past half-century. Throughout the end of the twentieth century, especially 
the 1980s, privatization was a popular concept and captured a lot of academic as well as 
practitioner attention. The popularity of privatization—especially with PPPs for 
infrastructure development in the third world—caused many hasty partnerships to be 
established that ultimately failed in the 1990s. Typically these types of partnerships are 
structured as concession contracts, one privatization arrangement option. Infrastructure 
development partnerships failed for the following primary reasons: (1) ignoring political 
constraints when formulating partnerships; (2) underestimating the impact the exchange 
rate would have on paying back debt to lenders; (3) inadequate effort in building up a 
regulatory regime to compliment the prices charged for monopoly services; and (4) 
failing to anticipate opposition that would emerge and ultimately condemn 
sustainability.(Lee) However, much was learned from these failures and today more 
intelligent infrastructure partnerships are designed in order to avoid many of those 
problems.  
Partnership: “A partnership is a collaboration among business, non-profit 
organizations, and Government in which risks, resources and skills are shared in 
projects that benefit each partner as well as the community.”(Osbourne 11). 
 
Public Private Partnership/ Collaborative Governance: “the pursuit of 
authoritatively chosen public goals by means that include engaging the efforts 
of, and sharing discretion with, producers outside the Government.”(Donahue 
and Zeckhauser 430) 
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In addition to infrastructure privatization, partnerships have been utilized in a 
wide variety of service areas as well. In Indianapolis, privatization has been the solution 
for a host of services including street maintenance, trash pickup, and wastewater 
treatment.(Husock) In Buenos Aires, PPPs were utilized in order to improve and maintain 
deplorable parks.(Scott) British Columbia outsourced some of its revenue management 
tasks including tax collection.(Varley) Also, many private sector entities have emerged 
that have tried to create a market for managing public schools.(Dyck and Melito) As 
illustrated by these examples, privatization can be a solution for a diverse set of services 
when certain conditions exist. Also, these services can be provided in a variety of 
different ways. As illustrated in the aforementioned examples, some of those 
arrangements/structures are: managed competition, outsourcing, private management and 
PPPs. These structures will be more fully defined in section 2.3.1. 
Regardless of the arrangement however, there exist several common motivations 
for pursuing privatization in the first place. According to Savas, these motivations can be 
characterized as the forces that have influenced privatization: pragmatism, economics, 
ideology, commerce, and populism. (Savas 6) Privatization is pragmatic because it often 
leads to more cost effective public services. It is economic because as affluence increases 
and people are able to provide for their own needs they become more receptive to 
privatization and dependence on the Government is reduced. Ideologically, some believe 
in small Government and that political decisions are inherently less trustworthy than free-
market decisions. Commerce also pushes privatization due to the business opportunities 
that Government spending opens to the economy as state owned enterprises and assets 
are divested. Finally, the populist force is one of competitive choice. Society should be 
empowered to define and address common needs, and to establish a sense of community 
by relying less on distant bureaucratic structures and more on family, neighborhoods, 
church and ethnic and voluntary associations. 
Ultimately, the world has moved towards acceptance of privatization as a means 
for providing public goods. This is due to (1) the large amount of inefficient services that 
could be provided more effectively through the private sector and (2) a shifting view of 
the role of Government. “Views have changed on how the Government should handle 
‘market failures’. The World Bank concluded that the Government should be a facilitator 
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and regulator instead of a provider and to rely more on citizens, communities and 
markets.”(Savas 37) Furthermore, according to Savas, “a more educated, critical, and 
sophisticated citizenry no longer regards Government actions as synonymous with public 
interest. It has learned to expect unintended, adverse consequences of attempts at social 
engineering, and it recognizes the limits in the state’s ability to define—let alone attain—
the public good.”(Savas 38) Thus, the world has moved towards partnerships between 
sectors to provide many of the essential goods and service requires for life and prosperity. 
 
2.3 Motivations for Partnership 
In addition to the aforementioned drivers for privatization on the whole, the 
private sector enjoys several advantages in providing certain services. In general, when 
partnering with the private sector, the Government is trying to account for some common 
deficiencies and capitalize on private advantages. According to Donahue, these 
advantages can be characterized as: resources, information, productivity, and legitimacy. 
(Donahue and Zeckhauser 17) Osbourne elaborates on why resources and information are 
important motivations for privatization: “In addition to increasing the scale of available 
resources, partnership may bring it different types of resources, such as information and 
expertise not available in an organization. This may include legislative power, land, 
finance, or knowledge, alternative perspectives on the issues and contacts from local 
community participants or the private sector.”(Osbourne 20)  
Productivity often refers to the effectiveness or efficiency with which a service is 
provided. The private sector is often argued to be more productive or efficient based on 
three arguments that Donahue outlines. First, “rationale, technical know-how, proprietary 
intellectual capital and other potentially transferable capacity” can be provided by the 
private sector and not the Government. Second, “productivity advantages are not 
accidental but inherent to the private form of organization”. The profit motive, the 
absence of procedural boundaries, and “procedural flexibility” enable economies and 
scale and scope that are not possible through the organization of the public sector. The 
third argument is based on the high cost of maintaining a Government surge capacity for 
occasional services as compared to the cost of private use. (Donahue and Zeckhauser 
433-34)   
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Legitimacy is a final, but critical motivation for privatization according to 
Donahue. In some services, where the private sector is the known expert, the Government 
may lack the credibility to effectively provide a service. On the other hand, the 
Government may be seen generally as illegitimate and in that case partnering with the 
private sector may raise their credibility. However, as Donahue notes, this factor can also 
reduce legitimacy. Partnerships for certain services—military services for example—can 
reduce the overall legitimacy of the task being performed. Therefore it is important to 
understand whether or not a partnership will increase or reduce the legitimacy of a 
service before formalizing it. (Donahue and Zeckhauser 434-35) 
In addition to the motivations identified by Donahue, cost-reduction and risk-
sharing are also important drivers for privatization. The public sector provides a 
multitude of services to the public. Cost-reduction in the provision of any one service—
while maintaining quality—enables the Government to focus its scarce resources on other 
areas that may need more financial support. Even if costs are not reduced through 
privatization, the private sector is often able to allocate resources more efficiently to 
obtain higher quality. Savas points out that “because capital budgets and operating 
budgets are generally arrived at through separate processes in the public sector, the 
opportunity to make tradeoffs between the two is limited. For example, it is more difficult 
to coordinate an investment in labor-saving equipment with a reduction in the size of the 
labor force.”(Savas 78-9) However, the private sector has more flexibility in making the 
decisions between capital and labor allocation and may be able to achieve higher levels of 
efficiency at the same cost. Optimally, privatization means higher quality at lower cost to 
the Government. 
Risk-sharing is also an important motivation for partnering with the private sector. 
The private sector operates much differently than the public sector and monetizes risk in 
order to determine how much they should charge to bear risks. For large project 
partnerships, risks include: completion risk (delays, cost overruns, site availability), 
project performance (sponsor commitment, technology assurance, equipment 
performance, input availability, management performance, labor performance), market 
risk (demand potential, payment risk), economic risk (funds availability, interest rate, 
exchange rate, inflation), political risk, and force majeure.(Admed and Fang 40-1) 
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However, similar risks also exist in service provision activities: performance risk (labor 
performance), equity risks, and political risks, among others. By partnering with the 
private sector, the Government is able to relieve the burden of carrying all of those risks 
and shed some risks to the private sector who may be more able to bear them more 
effectively. For example, the private sector is often more apt at bearing some forms of 
performance risk since their profit is directly tied to specific performance metrics. The 
degree of risk sharing and how that risk is spread is partially determined by the 
partnership structure selected. 
Many services that are privatized were once provided with a Government 
monopoly.   Therefore according to Savas, “the primary goal of any privatization effort 
is, or should be, to introduce competition and market forces in the delivery of public 
services, in the operation of public enterprises, and is the use of public assets… But in the 
public sector, perversely, we have relied heavily on monopolies to deliver public services 
and to operate the most important public enterprises, those that supply collective 
goods.”(Savas 122) Essentially, public monopolies breed the same inefficiency, 
ineffectiveness and unresponsiveness of private monopolies. “Competition gives 
consumers choice and reduced their probability to be exploited and victimized.”(Savas 
123) Opening up a service to competition also pushes prices down and will often result in 
a cheaper cost of service for all consumers. 
A final motivation for privatization is tying accountability to the service provided. 
“Whereas a private firm generally prospers by satisfying paying customers, a 
monopolistic public agency can prosper even if the customers remain unsatisfied. When a 
private company performs poorly, it tends to go out of business; when a public agency 
performs poorly, it often gets a bigger budget. Paradoxically, the budget can grow even 
as customer dissatisfaction grows; in this respect a rising crime rate is good for a police 
department, a housing shortage is good for a housing agency, and an epidemic is good for 
a health department.”(Savas 78-9) Partnerships with the private sector enable 
performance to be rewarded accordingly. 
Partnerships are formed to gain resources, productivity, information, and 
legitimacy as well as to share risks and reduce cost. Performance is often evaluated 
according to how well partnerships were able to achieve those ends. These are in addition 
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to the theoretical advantages of a competitively supplied service over one provided by a 
monopoly. Though the use of partnerships to provide public goods and services has 
varied over history, the motivations for doing so remain the same. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: Motivations for and Goals of Privatization 
 
2.4 Opposition Arguments 
Despite the motivations for privatization, there are several arguments made 
against sharing public service provision with the private sector. Some of the arguments 
that Savas outlines are discussed now (Savas 301-314). The first reason for opposing 
privatization is a fear of the public sector losing control. Oftentimes this really means loss 
of patronage, loss of power, and loss of budgetary empire for the Government. According 
to mayor Goldsmith of Indianapolis, “the truth is that we posses many more tools to 
control the quality and price of a private contractor or winning public employees than we 
do for those employees acting in a typical Government bureaucracy. As a result of the 
bidding procedure, we can impose fines for poor quality or missed deadlines, more easily 
reward performance, and if necessary simply cancel the contract rather than navigate the 
excruciating procedures required to fire a civil service employee. In each of our 
competitive initiatives, the city retained and even enhanced its control over 
services.”(Savas 301)  
A second opposition argument has a nationalist flavor. Often this argument is a 
last ditch anti-privatization argument to assert that the sale of a state owned enterprise is 
(1) a national security issue (the fear that important services will be taken over by foreign 
Motivations for and Goals of Privatization: 
 
1. Resources 
2. Information 
3. Productivity 
4. Legitimacy 
5. Cost-Reduction 
6. Risk-Sharing 
7. Introduction of Competition 
8. 
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companies and dominate developing countries); or (2) ‘giving away the family jewels’ 
(which are typically performing badly). 
A third common argument is that the profit motive of businesses perverts the 
service provision. Many misunderstand the role of profitability. Since the Government 
often does not profit from services, many believe that the Government can do it for less 
cost than the private sector. This is almost always false because the profit-incentive 
actually motivates the private sector to reduce costs to become more competitive.  
Many are also concerned that privatization will encourage the concentration of 
wealth. The fear is that only the rich will be able to buy shares in private entities and thus 
the rich will get richer if widespread privatization is permitted. But this can be easily 
solved by limiting the amount of shares an individual can purchase.  
A fifth misunderstanding is that a private monopoly will certainty be exploitative. 
It is true that the creation of a private monopoly through privatization is a huge concern. 
If a private natural monopoly is created through privatization, it must be adequately 
regulated to ensure consumers are not exploited with monopoly prices. If adequate levels 
of competition can be maintained, they must and should be to eliminate high monopoly 
rents. 
Corruption can run rampant in awarding contracts as well if the processes in not 
managed transparently. Many fear “crony capitalism” where contracts are be awarded 
unfairly. The awarding of contracts and franchises can be susceptible to bribes and 
corruption. All ‘favors’ that politicians could receive for such unfair treatment must be 
strictly prohibited as well as other broad strategies to reduce corruption.  
Also, critics often cite the risk of reducing social justice. Some fear that 
privatization will badly affect the poor that will have to pay market prices for all the new 
services. This can be avoided if the Government subsidizes those groups with vouchers, 
grants and contract services who could not afford to pay full price for the service. 
Lastly, a common opposition argument is that the private sector will engage in 
‘cream skimming’ to only participate in the profitable opportunities. Savas argues that 
even if the private sector wants the best opportunities this can still be better to society as 
a whole if user charges end up being lower with the private firm than the public firm. 
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Many of these arguments have merit and must be considered when evaluating a 
privatization plan for a specific good or service. Not all goods or services are apt for 
privatization due to these concerns. For example, if equity cannot be addressed if a 
service is privatized, privatization may not be an appropriate way to provide the service. 
Thus it is important not to look at privatization in a vacuum, but instead to understand the 
characteristics of the good or service that is being considering for provision though a 
partnership or full privatization. 
 
FIGURE 2.3: Opposition Arguments for Privatization 
 
2.5 Spectrum of Privatization Structures 
Privatization, or the act of shedding some or all public sector responsibility in 
good or service provision to the private sector, can look very different on a case-to-case 
basis. However, these activities tend to resemble one of a discrete list of partnership 
structures. Savas organized various structures according to a two dimensional 
producer/arranger matrix. In this framework, structures for partnerships are identified 
based on who produces the good or service in question and who arranges for that service 
to be provided (through funding primarily). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arguments Opposing Privatization: 
 
1. Loss of Public Sector Control 
2. Nationalism 
3. Minority Domination 
4. Profitability Perverts Service Provision 
5. Concentration of Wealth 
6. Private Monopolies Result in Exploitation 
7. Corruption in Awarding Contracts 
8. Less Social Justice 
9. Cream Skimming 
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   Arranger 
 
Producer  Public      Private 
 
Public   Government Service    Government Vending 
   InterGovernmental arrangements 
 
Private  Contracts     Free Market 
   Franchises     Voluntary Service 
   Grants      Self-Service 
         Vouchers 
 
TABLE 2.1: Institutional arrangements for Privatization (Savas 66-90) 
 
  These structures are defined by Savas and paraphrased below: 
 
1. Government Service: In this structure, the good or service is produced by and funded by 
the Government. These structures included state owned enterprises and Government 
departments or corporations (AMTRACK, etc…). 
2. Inter-Governmental Agreements: One Government agency pays another for a service. For 
example, often States contract with cities and counties to provide social services. Here, 
one Government unit is the producer and another is the provider. 
3. Government Vending: Here, the private sector is the arranger and Government services 
compete with other private agencies to be the provider. 
4. Contracts: Here, the private sector produces a good or service that is specified 
contractually and funded by the public sector. The Government can ‘contract out’ for 
material goods, output services (refuse collection, ambulance services, etc…) and input 
services. 
5. Franchises: These are similar to contracts, but instead of the Government paying the 
producer for the good or service, the consumer pays the producer for the good or service. 
Franchises can be exclusive (monopoly producing rights) or non exclusive (like taxi 
medallions).  
6. Grants:  A grant is a subsidy given by the Government to a private producer in order to 
encourage the production, and thus consumption, of a particular good or service. Both the 
Government and the consumer thus pay the producer. 
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7. Free Market: In this case the Government may impose regulations (how often trash has to 
be collected), but the consumer selects the producer with no Government subsidies. 
8. Voluntary Service: This structure is often motivated by philanthropy or private gain, but 
ultimately end up benefiting the public. These organizations, such as 90% of firefighters, 
donate time and money to distribute public goods.  
9. Self-service: This involves doing a service yourself, such as home schooling or taking 
care of elderly parents. 
10. Vouchers: These are designed to subsidize the consumption of particular goods by a 
particular group of consumers. Subsidizing the consumer directly enables them to buy 
from any producer (whereas with grants, consumers will only buy from subsidized 
producers). The consumer is the only one choosing the producer (in grants both 
Government and consumer select). Vouchers are better than grants in that they give 
consumers more choice and encourage consumers to shop around more aggressively 
among competitors. This can also target the consumers that need the break: the poor.  
 
There are several other structures, not explicitly acknowledged by Savas, 
highlighted in a 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report on Privatization and on 
privatization.org’s website—a privatization advocate. These structures include: 
 
11. Managed Competition: “Under managed competition, a public-sector agency competes 
with private-sector firms to provide public-sector functions or services under a controlled 
or managed process” (Republican Task Force on Privatization 46) with all competitors 
submitting bids. 
12. User fees: “User fees require those who use a Government service to pay some or all of 
the cost of the service rather than having the Government pay for it through revenues 
generated by taxes.”(Republican Task Force on Privatization 47) Concession contracts 
can be seen as a user fee arrangement since it is the consumers that pay for the service to 
be provided by the private contractor (in electricity distribution for example.) 
13. Management Contracts: “The operation of a facility is contracted out to a private 
company. Facilities where the management is frequently contracted out include airports, 
wastewater plants, arenas and convention centers.” (Reason Foundation) 
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14. Corporatization: “Government organizations are reorganized along business lines. 
Typically they are required to pay taxes, raise capital on the market (with no Government 
backing—explicit or implicit), and operate according to commercial principles. 
Government corporations focus on maximizing profits and achieving a favorable return 
on investment. They are freed from Government procurement, personnel and budget 
systems.” (Reason Foundation) 
 
There is also a 15th type of partnership: A Public-Private Partnership, also known 
as collaboration or collaborative governance. This is a unique form of privatization 
because it is so difficult to classify. PPP’s are often not characterized by properties as 
rigid as other forms of privatization. In contracting, the Government pays a specific 
price—specified in the contract—to the private partner for the service. However, in PPPs, 
financing is often shared between sectors in creative and fluctuating ways.  
For example, in New York City PPPs were used to develop and maintain many of 
the city parks that had fallen into disarray. One such park, Bryant Park, was situated in 
the middle of one of NYC’s most prominent business centers and was stricken with 
crime. In order to fund the renovation of this park, both the local Government and 
businesses came up with creative financing contributions. The city designated the area as 
a Business Improvement District (BID), thus enabling the city to levy an additional tax 
on residents that would go towards local redevelopment. Private contributors built a 
restaurant on site in order to draw local young professionals and additional revenues. The 
Bryant Park Restoration Corporation solicited millions of dollars of private donations 
from foundations and individuals. The park’s operation and maintenance was managed 
by the Corporation, but the ownership ultimately remained with the city. Both the city 
and private funding sources contributed to the redevelopment of the land, but the yearly 
operating expenses were almost completely privately financed. The park was completely 
reinvented and is now no long a center for crime in the city, but one of its’ main social 
hubs. (Donahue and Rosegrant 12-20) This example illustrates the creative financing 
options that PPPs must pursue in order to create public value. In many more structured 
privatization arrangements, the flexibility to use such a diverse set of financial resources 
would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Therefore, it is 
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also difficult to classify PPPs as one type of financing or another since they are often 
unconventional. 
Since PPPs do not usually utilize contracts, the alignment of goals and the 
formation of trust is a critical and continuous process. In formal arrangements, goals are 
aligned and performance determined according to the details specified in the contract; 
often these arrangements are legal arrangements with real consequences if milestones are 
not met. Without a contract and legal enforcement mechanisms, other mechanisms 
become critical to ensure the alignment of goals and success. These mechanisms are 
harder to pinpoint, but often include: self interest, professional ethics, business 
relationships and trust. Thus, PPPs have mechanisms that perform similar tasks as a 
contract; however, these other mechanisms can often evoke more commitment from 
participants since the stake is more than what is specified in a contract. 
Therefore, many partnerships will fall into the PPP category if (1) the partnership 
does not utilize formal mechanisms; (2) financing is complex and changing; (3) 
discretion is allocated to all partners; or (4) multiple partners provide different element of 
the service. 
In order to complete the list of structural options available to partnership 
architects, there are also several types of partnerships that are used exclusively for 
infrastructure development. However, since this thesis does not focus on infrastructure 
construction and operation as an emergency preparedness and response service, these 
structures will not be included in the spectrum. For a table of these types of partnerships, 
please see Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. 
Thus, the spectrum of privatization options studied in this thesis is represented by 
Figure 2.4. This spectrum is meant to generally represent the degree of public and private 
participation in each structure. 
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FIGURE 2.4: Spectrum of Privatization Options 
 
As Savas characterized the structures by arranger and producer in Table 2.1, there 
are several other ways to arrange the privatization structures in a two dimensional space. 
For example, Donahue characterizes the structures using a two dimensional space that 
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allows for the degree of shared financing and delivery to be illustrated as well. (Figure 
2.5) By looking at partnership structures along axes such as financing source and 
delivery, characterization of partnership structures is simplified. Other characteristics of 
partnerships that are important to consider when determining the most appropriate 
structure of a partnership are discussed in section 2.4. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.5: Donahue’s Selected Privatization Arrangements (Donahue) 
 
2.6 Partnership Attributes 
As illustrated by Donahue’s framework for classifying privatization structures in 
section 2.3, there are several characteristics that can reveal important information about 
the nature of a specific partnership. Many of these characteristics, which will be from 
here-on referred to as ‘attributes’, are similar to the goals and motivations discussed in 
section 2.2. 
Though his work at Harvard University, Mark Moore has conceptualized 
partnerships as essentially a public management task and has created a ‘strategic triangle’ 
to help determine the characteristics of a partnership. Figure 2.6 illustrates the three 
pillars of this approach: legitimacy and support; operational capacity; and public value. 
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FIGURE 2.6: Mark Moore’s Strategic Triangle (Moore) 
 
This chart reveals three primary questions that public managers, and any 
partnership architect, must ask when creating a partnership:  
(1) What is the important Public Value that is desired? What is the mission?  
(2) What sources of legitimacy and support will authorize the organization to take 
and provide the resources necessary to create public value? 
(3) What operational capabilities will the organization rely on or will have to 
develop to deliver the desired result? (Trager) 
These are also critical questions to ask of established partnerships in order to understand 
how they are operating, where their weaknesses are, and how resources provided by each 
sector may have been misapplied. A few partnership attributes, building off of Moore, are 
thus: (1) specificity of mission/task/ purpose; (2) contributed resources by each partner; 
and (3) political support and overall legitimacy of means of providing service. 
 Savas explicitly outlines the attributes that he finds critical in comparing 
arrangements for providing services. (Savas 91-104) 
1. Specificity of service: How specific is the task to be completed? Can it be specified in a 
contract with performance measures? When quality and scope is critical and can vary, 
contracting becomes complex. 
Legitimacy and 
support 
Public value 
Operational 
Capacity 
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2. Availability of Producers: Competition enhances the privatization process. A competitive 
bidding process to provide a good or service often results in a lower cost service to 
consumers. Also, competition acts as quality control since there are many providers and it 
quality is not adequate, there are many other producers to shift to. 
3. Efficiency and Effectiveness: These two attributes represent two of three critical metrics 
for measuring the success of an arrangement (the other being equity). The degree of 
competition a producer faces will ultimately reflect its efficiency. Government services 
tend to be unnatural monopolies and thus are susceptible to inefficiencies. 
4. Scale of service: The scale (size) of production or a service will affect efficiency. 
Economies of scale can be achieved in all arrangements, if the arranger permits the 
producer to adjust its production level in order to produce at an optimal level.  
5. Relating Benefits and Costs: Efficiency is likely to result when consumers have an 
incentive to shop for the best quality when they can see the relationship between what 
they are paying and the benefits they get. 
6. Responsiveness to Consumers: When consumers are the arrangers, then producers tend to 
be more responsive to their needs. 
7. Susceptibility to Fraud: When awarding contracts, grants and vouchers, bribery may be a 
concern. Not being vulnerable to corruption is an important part of an arrangement. 
8. Economic Equity: Privatization does not automatically mean that an arrangement where 
the consumer will be paying for the good will occur. There are many arrangements that 
can redistribute goods and services without direct cost to the consumer. The market does 
tend to distribute based on income, but not all arrangements are market based. Vouchers, 
for example, can be redistributive. 
9. Racial Equity: It cannot be said that privatization causes minorities to lose jobs because 
they tend to have a higher proportion employed by the Government than majorities. Often 
contracting firms hire laid-off Government workers when contracting occurs. The same 
cannot be said for the equity of services.  
10. Responsiveness to Government Direction: Government services are no more responsive 
to Government direction than private services because of the inflexibility of the 
Government. Often services are provided so badly that the Government gets away with 
things the private sector never would. 
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11. Size of Government: How many Government employees does it take to administer an 
agreement and how much Government spending is encouraged by that agreement?  
 
The attributes that Savas has outlined constitute questions that one must ask about 
the specific service to be provided or public value to be created in order to determine 
what type of partnership might be the best-suited for that service’s provision. Donahue, 
expanding on his concept of collaborative governance as a form of partnership, outlines 
several other dimensions that classify specific partnerships.  
 
1. “Formality: A collaborative relationship can be institutionalized on a spectrum ranging 
from formal contracts though informal agreements to tacit understandings. 
2. Duration: At one extreme are governance arrangements meant to be permanent and at the 
other hand are ad hoc collaboration that dissolve as a crisis is resolved or a goal achieved. 
3. Focus: Collaboration can be narrowly structures to meet a single shared challenge, or can 
be more broadly designed to address a range of concerns common to collaborating 
parties. 
4. Diversity of Participants: A minimum level of diversity among participating 
institutions—at least one public and one private players—is a threshold requirement for 
collaborative governance. 
5. Stability: Collaboration will be stable if its members share objectives, and potentially 
volatile to the extent the members’ norm or interests diverge. 
6. Discretion: A large share of discretion must rest with a player who is answerable to the 
public at large and each collaborating party must possess a degree of discretion. If private 
participants merely carry out Government’s instructions—conveyed through fully 
specified contracts or other means—the relationship is something other than collaborative 
governance.” (Donahue and Zeckhauser 38-40) 
 
These dimensions tend to specify ranges of possibilities for the partnerships 
themselves—not the task at hand. Savas’s attributes, on the other hand, focus on the task, 
not the partnership. Stephen Osbourne looks at the dimensions of partnerships slightly 
differently from Donahue. “Each partnership has many dimensions. In order to try to 
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capture the richness of various forms of partnership this section sets out a range of 
dimensions to partnerships which can be combined to form a set of characteristics of a 
partnership. [These dimensions are]:  
(a) What a partnership is seeking to do—i.e. its purpose and whether it is strategic 
or project driven;  
(b) Who is involved—i.e. the key actors and the structure of their relationship in 
the partnership;  
(c) When—i.e. the timing or stage of development of the partnership process and 
changing relationships and activities over time;  
(d) Where—i.e. the spatial dimension;  
(e) How the activities are carried out, the implementation mechanisms.” 
(Osbourne 13) 
 
Of the four frameworks outlined above, Donahue and Osbourne characterize the 
partnership form, Moore characterizes the creation period of the partnership, and Savas 
characterizes the task itself. It is important to understand how these concepts overlap in 
creating a framework to evaluate partnerships. It is the goal of this thesis to characterize 
current or past partnerships based on a finite list of attributes that can be broken into 
categories. Thus, the Moore, Donahue, Osbourne, and Savas characterizations of 
partnerships and the tasks they address will serve as the foundation for the attributes 
identified in this thesis as relevant. However, this thesis does approach a different 
problem than typical Government service provision; in providing emergency 
preparedness and response services, the producers and arrangers face unique challenges. 
These challenges will be outlined in chapter 3 and the attributes that must be considered 
for those types of partnerships will also be elaborated on. It is the goal of this chapter to 
establish those attributes which are traditionally seen as important in privatization 
arrangements.  
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FIGURE 2.7: Classic Characteristics to Consider when Classifying Partnerships 
This chapter has described the theory for privatization and the opposition to 
privatization. In discussing the partnership structures that have been utilized in the past, 
this chapter laid out a menu of partnership structures that architects have to chose from 
when designing a partnership to provide a service. Chapter 2 has also discussed several 
identifying characteristics of partnerships that can help in analyzing and designing 
partnerships. Figure 2.7 lists the characteristics that will be the basis for determining the 
attributes of emergency preparedness and response (EPER) partnerships that are 
deterministic of structure and other design choices. This process will be further discussed 
in chapter 4. But first, chapter 3 discusses the environment that EPER partnerships 
operate within by outlining the literature on emergency preparedness and response. 
 
Classic Characteristics to Consider when Classifying 
Partnerships: 
 
21. Legitimacy and Support 
22. Mission 
23. Operational Capacity 
24. Specificity of Service 
25. Availability of Producers 
26. Efficiency and Effectiveness 
27. Scale of Service 
28. Relating Benefits and Costs 
29. Responsiveness to Consumers 
30. Susceptibility to Fraud 
31. Economic Equity 
32. Racial Equity 
33. Responsiveness to Government Direction 
34. Size of Government 
35. Formality 
36. Duration 
37. Focus 
38. Diversity of Participants 
39. Stability 
40. Discretion 
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CHAPTER 3: Emergency Preparedness and Response Literature Review 
 
The notions of emergency preparedness and response (EPER) are almost as 
difficult to define as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Preparedness and Response are 
functions within the larger task of emergency management. “Emergency Management 
involves four interrelated actions: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. 
Mitigation focuses on taking action to reduce risk. Preparedness recognizes that while 
mitigation actions can reduce risk, they do not eliminate the vulnerability to hazards. 
Preparedness actions seek to establish authorities and responsibilities for emergency 
actions and to assemble the resources to support these actions. Response involves actions 
to reduce casualties and save lives, protect property, and restore essential government 
services once an event has occurred, while recovery encompasses those efforts to restore 
the social and economic infrastructure and clean up, to the extend possible, the 
environment of the affects community following the emergency.” (Galloway 27) 
However, Galloway’s definitions for emergency management functions are not 
universally accepted and his terminology is not found consistently across emergency 
management practitioners.  
In addition to different emergency management terminologies, preparedness and 
response are further complicated due to the nature of the event they confront: 
emergencies. Emergencies are unpredictable, on the most part, and their effects can be 
negligible or devastating. They can be man-made or natural and can affect people and 
infrastructure. Essentially, one characteristic of emergencies is the vast amount of 
uncertainty they are fraught with. Regardless of the damage encountered during or after 
an emergency, some response capacity is required to build back up what was damaged. 
Accordingly, in order to for those response efforts to be optimal, communities must also 
be prepared and even take steps to reduce risk. However, what is included within the 
preparedness and response boundaries is not completely clear. Are prevention and 
mitigation functions of preparedness or separate activities? Are preparedness and 
response similar activities or are their sub-functions completely distinct? These and other 
questions will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. It is the intent of Chapter 3 
to outline the relevant EPER definitions and to illustrate the current state of EPER 
provision in the United States. 
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3.1 Definitions of Preparedness and Response 
There exists inconsistency in many of the definitions used by the government and 
practitioners for the terms ‘preparedness and response’. This section will describe the 
operational definitions that various emergency managers have adopted in order to define 
the terms for this thesis.  
3.1.1 Government Definitions 
The Federal Government defines ‘preparedness and response’ in several key 
homeland security documents. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defined the functions 
of emergency management when stipulating the responsibilities of FEMA (the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency). 
(A) “Mitigation: taking sustained actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to 
people and property from hazards and their effects; 
(B) Planning for building the emergency management profession to prepare 
effectively for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from any hazard; 
(C) Response: conducting emergency operations to save lives and property through 
positioning emergency equipment and supplies, through evacuating potential victims, 
through providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need, and through 
restoring critical public services; 
(D) Recovery: rebuilding communities so individuals, businesses, and governments 
can function on their own, return to normal life, and protect against future hazards; 
and 
(E) Increased Efficiencies: coordinating efforts relating to mitigation, planning, 
response, and recovery.” (Armey Section 507) 
Thus, this statute upholds mitigation, planning, response and recovery as the four main 
functions of emergency management. 
The National Response Plan, prepared by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) in 2004, comprehensively defines the preparedness and response functions, albeit 
differently than the Homeland Security Act. In this document, four stages of emergency 
management are specified: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. 
Prevention: “Actions taken to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an 
incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions taken to protect lives and 
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property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of 
activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; 
heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; 
investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health 
and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or 
quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at 
deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending 
potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.” (Department of Homeland 
Security 71) 
Preparedness: “The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities 
necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is 
a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between 
government and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify 
threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.” (Department 
of Homeland Security 71) 
Response: “Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an 
incident. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and 
meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency 
operations plans and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of 
life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes. As 
indicated by the situation, response activities include: applying intelligence and 
other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; increased 
security operations; continuing investigations into the nature and source of the 
threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; 
immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and specific law enforcement operations 
aimed at preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending 
actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.” (Department of Homeland 
Security 72) 
Recovery: “The development, coordination, and execution of service- and 
site-restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of 
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government operations and services through individual, private-sector, 
nongovernmental, and public assistance programs that: identify needs and define 
resources; provide housing and promote restoration; address long-term care and 
treatment of affected persons; implement additional measures for community 
restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and techniques, as feasible; evaluate 
the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop initiatives to mitigate the 
effects of future incidents.” (Department of Homeland Security 71-72) 
 
Before highlighting the important differences between these two sets of 
definitions, a third concept will be discussed surrounding the term ‘preparedness’. 
Preparedness can be thought of in three distinct ways. 
(1) Protection/Deterrence/Prevention 
(2) Resilience/Mitigation 
(3) ‘Emergency Preparedness’ (Cohn) 
According to Alan Cohn, a director in DHS Policy, ‘Emergency Preparedness’ can be 
distinguished from these other views because inherent in ‘Emergency Preparedness’ is 
the knowledge that a response will be necessary. A protection/deterrence/prevention 
mindset solely focuses on the elimination of a threat. Resilience/mitigation focuses on the 
reduction of a threat. In ‘emergency preparedness’ it is not a question of if a threat will 
manifest itself, but when. One service of ‘emergency preparedness’ is thus building the 
capacity to respond when one is forced to do so.  
These are important distinctions because depending on the view espoused by an 
individual, the relationship between emergency preparedness and response will differ. In 
the first two views, preparedness is completely distinct from response and therefore their 
functions can be completely separated. This will manifest itself with separate agencies 
responsible for those functions and little communication. These views of preparedness 
make life very difficult for emergency managers however. If a threat is identified, 
prevention activities become the focus while response actions take a backseat. However, 
preparedness and response need not be seen as a zero-sum game, where a budgetary gain 
for one is necessarily a budgetary loss for the other. If the last view—‘emergency 
preparedness’—is adopted, then preparedness and response are intrinsically linked and 
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their functions will be performed in a more complimentary manner. In this case, 
preparedness activities include mitigation and prevention activities, but the most critical 
activity is the building of capacity for response. Therefore, in this paradigm, all of the 
functions of emergency management can work together much easier than if a 
preparedness paradigm of solely ‘prevention’ or ‘mitigation’ is adopted. 
3.1.2 Thesis Definitions 
Building off the government definitions and acknowledging the complexities in 
distinguishing preparedness activities and response functions, the definitions of 
emergency preparedness and emergency response for the purpose of this thesis are: 
 
Emergency Preparedness (EP) involves prioritizing the allocation of fixed 
resources in order to eliminate and/or reduce vulnerabilities and manage risk. This 
‘service’ involves a continuous investment in preparing for unknown scenarios with 
varying degrees of impact severity in order to build the capacity for an effective response. 
 
 
Emergency Response (ER) involves the effectiveness and efficiency with which 
the government and its citizens are able to react to and recover from an emergency or 
disruption. ER is a reflection of the logistics capabilities of an organization to deal with 
damage resulting from any number of disruptions. This service is fraught with need for 
highly resilient and adaptable systems that deal with a wide-variety of situations. 
 
Thus EP and ER can be seen as two distinct, yet related, services that every 
government must ensure is provided in order to advance the safety and security of its 
citizens. How these services are provided—completely through the public sector, 
completely through the private sector, or through mixed arrangements—is the subject 
matter for this thesis. 
In order to determine how these services should be provided, it is important to 
understand the responsibilities of both sectors. The definitions outlined previously in the 
National Response Plan reveal how the government allocates responsibility. Prevention is 
seen as a public responsibility and should therefore be provided by the government. On 
the other hand, recovery is seen as a private responsibility by DHS and thus should be 
provided primarily by the private sector. Preparedness and response seem to lie in the 
middle of these two extremes. (see definitions in section 3.1.1.1) The responsibility lies 
on both sectors and thus the provision should be mixed. Thus, according to the DHS 
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definitions, Preparedness and Response activities are ripe for Partnerships. Figure 3.1 
illustrates this responsibility spectrum. This figure also illustrates the relationship 
between the DHS definitions (National Response Plan), the Congressional Definitions 
(Homeland Security Act), and the definitions for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Responsibilities in Preparedness and Response 
 
3.2 What Constitutes an Emergency?  
In order to truly understand the complexities of EP and ER, it is important to 
understand the nature of the emergencies that these services confront. The Stafford Act, 
passed in 2000, defines an emergency as: “any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local 
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, 
or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.” (Fowler) 
According to this definition, there are both preparedness and response activities 
associated with an emergency. The preparedness functions would include “lessen[ing] or 
avert[ing] the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States”. The response 
function is to provide “Federal assistance…to supplement State and local efforts and 
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety”.  
This general definition does not put any boundaries around what constitutes an 
emergency other than its scope overwhelming local resources and requiring government 
intervention. For the purpose of this thesis, an emergency will include all events within 
the scope of the Stafford definition as well as those that can be managed on a local level. 
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that require a response. An example of a local emergency that would not require federal 
intervention but does require local coordination would be a sever thunder storm that 
downs many power lines. Those power lines must quickly be restored but the federal 
government is not involved in that response activity. That event will be considered an 
emergency at a local level. 
3.2.1 Types of Emergencies  
The Stafford Act also illuminates many of the emergencies that the nation faces 
through its definition of a major disaster. A major disaster is “any natural catastrophe 
(including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, 
tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, 
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which 
in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude 
to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available 
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the 
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.” (Fowler) The main categories of 
emergencies are thus: natural disasters, intentional man-made, and accidental. Natural 
disasters can include any of the aforementioned events. Man-made events can either be 
the result of crime or terrorism. These events can be floods, fires, Biological or Chemical 
weapons attacks, radiological or nuclear weapons attacks, or other explosions. Accidental 
events can also resemble the effects of an intentional man-made event. Regardless of the 
cause of an emergency however, if it is severe enough, the Stafford Act requires that the 
government be capable of responding to that event. 
There are some notable differences however between those three types of 
emergencies. According the Stephen Flynn, “while people know that their government 
can’t prevent natural disasters, they do expect their officials to be vigilant in preventing 
our enemies from killing innocent civilians, toppling our landmarks, and destroying non-
military property.” (Flynn 9-10) It is thus an issue of public expectations. Natural 
Disasters are somewhat predictable but cannot be mitigated by any government efforts. 
There is no mechanism for stopping or deflecting a hurricane once it has developed and is 
heading towards Florida. On the other hand, terrorism is much harder to predict but is 
viewed by the public as preventable. Even though the intelligence community and 
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security experts will elaborate on the many difficulties the government faces in 
preventing terrorism (including a flawed intelligence network), the public tends to see 
this activity within the realm of controllability for the government. Thus, they expect an 
active campaign to prevent and mitigate that source of threats. 
Thus, these two sources of emergencies, terrorism and natural, should be dealt with 
differently when developing preparedness plans. Intelligence is critical in preparedness 
activities for man-made disasters. On the other hand, weather tracking centers are the 
most critical source of information for natural disasters. When facing a natural disaster, 
often evacuations are the most often utilized preparedness measure. For terrorism, 
prevention at any cost is touted as the philosophy. For all preparedness activities, there is 
one very important common characteristic however: uncertainty. There is a vast amount 
of uncertainty involved in both of these sources for emergencies. This uncertainty can be 
related to the time and location of an attack, or the severity of an event. Due to this 
uncertainty, Flynn acknowledges one strategy: “Our goal should not be to find fool-proof 
solutions for protecting targets terrorists are most likely to strike. It is about identifying 
workable measures that are cost-effective and not disruptive. Then we need to string them 
together in such a way that each serves to reinforce the deterrent value of the other.” 
(Flynn 70) Handling emergencies are thus about managing risk and uncertainty.  
There are distinctions in preparedness activities based on the source of the 
emergency, but response does not discriminate. Once an event has occurred, regardless of 
the cause, many response activities will look the same. Therefore, one key difference 
between preparedness and response is that preparedness activities depend on the 
emergency’s source where response is independent of the source of the emergency. 
Terrorism and natural disasters will continue to happen and we can not prevent all of 
these events from occurring. Therefore, despite the differences in managing these sources 
of emergencies, they must be managed as optimally as possible. Partnerships between the 
public and private sector may optimize several of the services required to provide 
effective emergency management. 
 
3.3 Previous Research on Public Private Partnerships as a Means for Providing 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Services 
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Several documents have been published recently that look specifically at the 
problem of using PPPs to supply EPER services. The following documents constitute the 
academic research that has been performed in this general subject area. However, none of 
these reports strive to answer the same questions as this thesis: (1) what characteristics of 
EPER services can inform decisions about designing partnerships to provide those 
services and (2) what lessons can architects and policy makers learn, from existing EPER 
partnerships, which can guide future partnership architectures? Summaries of the findings 
and research methods of the flowing relevant studies are listed below. 
In a report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Stephen Flynn and 
Daniel Preito evaluate the current state of partnerships with the private sector for 
emergency preparedness and response. Flynn and Prieto conclude that the federal 
government is currently taking too passive a role in engaging the private sector in many 
areas of EPER—most notably critical infrastructure—and that in order to more 
effectively prepare the country, the government must create better private incentives for 
partnership. They note that market incentives are not strong enough for the private sector 
to go it alone in preparedness and response investments. This report is primarily a call for 
government action to reform its partnership paradigm by encouraging action in the 
following areas: (1) changing the view that the private sector should take care of 
themselves; (2) creating a national list of priorities for critical infrastructure to guide 
partnership priorities; (3) improve information sharing between the sectors; (4) codify 
security standards that would enable EPER regulatory powers; and (5) create incentives 
such as tax breaks and federal liability protections that will motivate the private sector to 
increase investments. (Flynn, Stephen E. Prieto, Daniel B. 4) 
In a statement before the Little Hoover Commission, Rich Cooper, the Business 
Liaison Director of the Private Sector Office within DHS, elaborates on the potential for 
PPPs for EPER services in the United States. Noting that PPPs have evolved in four 
primary homeland security areas—regional security partnerships, event/circumstance 
support, commerce development and sharing, and information sharing (Cooper 4)—
Cooper expands on several examples of partnerships for EPER while stressing the 
expanded responsibility of the private sector in these efforts post-9/11. “With the advent 
of 24-7 news cycles, the Internet, the lightening speed of business in a global economy 
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and increased ownership by the private sector of critical infrastructure, the private sector 
is not longer just an observer as emergency vehicles respond to an incident…The public 
and private sectors, which once occupied completely separate and independent islands of 
responsibility, are now finding the need to have multilane bridges to connect one another 
in order to do business.” (Cooper 2) In addition to elaborating on the necessity for 
partnership, Cooper also outlines—through his experience—the challenges that PPPs for 
EPER and face: funding, leadership and control, maintaining energy, cultural/situational 
awareness, information sharing, liability, measuring results, flexibility, managing 
expectations and standing fast/leading by example. (Cooper 10-11) In conclusion, Cooper 
emphasizes the role of both planned partnerships—not merely ad-hoc collaborations—
and voluntary security standards. Essentially, this statement stresses the importance of 
public private collaboration and provides some lessons learned from previous attempts at 
partnership. 
In a chapter of the edited book “Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How 
Private Action can Reduce Public Vulnerability”, John Donahue of Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government comments on the use of public private collaboration of 
infrastructure security. This piece has three primary goals: (1) to discuss the rising 
importance of or private involvement in public missions; (2) to describe the importance 
of shared discretion in collaborative governance arrangements; and (3) to illustrate the 
challenges that collaborative governance poses as a structure for providing critical 
infrastructure protection. Donahue importantly notes that efficiency gains alone are not a 
sufficient reason to pursue collaborative governance since often “the government can 
harness private efficiency advantages, while avoiding the complexities of shared 
discretion, through simple procurement contracts.” This emphasizes that there are a range 
of partnership options available to the government and that PPPs, or collaborative 
governance, may not always be the right choice. This is a critical observation since much 
of this piece focuses on the need for the government to acknowledge discretion tradeoffs 
in order to select the most appropriate structure for partnership. There are several risks 
that accompany collaborative governance arrangements however: “Despite differing 
interests on the allocation of cost, and the details of security arrangements, the basic goal 
of reducing expected terrorist losses is shared by government, private sectors owners, and 
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security owners…. [Thus], infrastructure security poses fewer problems of conflicting 
preferences among collaborating parties than do some other arena for public-private 
collaboration.” (Donahue and Zeckhauser 446-7) In conclusion, Donahue outlines several 
steps that the government should take when determining whether a specific infrastructure 
security effort is suitable for collaborative governance.  
In January of 2007, the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 
published a report that found flaws with the nation’s public-private collaboration, surge 
capacity and supply chain management, and the legal and regulatory environment. The 
PPP findings are particularly relevant to this thesis: “The American private sector must 
be systematically integrated into the nation’s response to disasters, natural and man-made 
alike. Government alone cannot manage major crises nor effectively integrate the private 
sector after a crisis occurs. The Task Force believes that building public-private 
collaborative partnerships, starting at the state level, is of the most important steps that 
can be taken now to prepare the nation for future contingencies. Unfortunately, with few 
exceptions, collaborative relationships do not today exist.” (Business Response Task 
Force 4). This conclusion was a result of one hundred interviews performed with private 
sector representatives that focused on the current state of response capabilities in the 
United States. From these interviews, the task force identified themes that became the 
basis for their recommendations for how to improve the current system of engaging the 
private sector. This study sought to answer the following questions: (1) “how can 
business become better integrated structurally into the disaster response effort and ; (2) 
what mechanisms can improve how business and government communicate and 
coordinate decision-making before, during and after a crisis, at all levels of government?” 
(Business Response Task Force 11) Thus, this report focuses on mechanisms for better 
integration and primarily recommends that BOCs (Business Operations Centers) are 
established to compliment the current EOCs (Emergency Operations Centers) that the 
government coordinates. 
Essentially, Flynn and Prieto’s recommendations are intended to guide the 
government in creating a more welcoming environment for private participation in EPER 
services. Cooper stresses the reasons for private participation as well as lessons learned 
from practical experience with attempting to implement successful partnerships. Donahue 
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describes the problems with an advantages of a specific type of partnership—
collaborative governance—for a specific functional area—critical infrastructure—while 
making general comments about the need for private participation. Finally, the BENS 
learned from private security professionals in order to pinpoint flaws in the current EPER 
system and make recommendations about how to improve the system to be more 
welcoming for the private sector.  
The method for this thesis is described in Chapter 4. In short, interviews were 
performed with representatives from examples of Partnerships for EPER. These 
interviews specified the identifying characteristics (attributes) of the partnerships. Then, 
those attributes were used to make general observations about which attributes affect the 
structural characteristics of the partnership. Should the task be provided through a 
contract, collaboration, or purely through the government? Can that be determined by 
looking at the attributes of the task to be provided? Those are the questions that this thesis 
seeks to address. Thus, the questions and findings of this thesis are related, but distinct 
from other studies that have recently been performed in this field. 
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CHAPTER 4: Bridging the Gap: Research Design 
  
Ultimately, this research strives to create a prescriptive framework to advise 
emergency preparedness and response (EPER) partnership architects how to structure 
their partnership based on the attributes of the service they are trying to provide. 
Therefore, the primary audience for this research is partnership architects—both in the 
public and private sector. In order to meet this objective, the following two research 
questions are addressed: 
 
1. What characteristics of EPER services can inform decisions about designing 
partnerships to provide those services? 
2. What lessons can architects and policy makers learn, from existing EPER 
partnerships, which can guide future partnership architectures? 
 
By looking at three sets of attributes—Structural, Event and Functional—this 
research will provide insight on how, based on those attributes, partnerships can be best 
structured. Figure 4.1 illustrates the inputs to and the outputs of the research method. 
These insights will be sought through a case study method. However, in order to 
understand the research instrument—the interview—and the attributes selected as inputs 
and outputs to the framework, some background is required. Section 4.2 will address the 
method for selecting the attributes used in this research. Section 4.3 will discuss the 
interview instrument and Section 4.4 will address the evolution of the instrument and 
attributes over the course of the study. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1: Research Method Framework 
 
Event 
Attributes 
Functional 
Attributes 
Structural 
Attributes 
Decision Rules 
  56 
4.1 Determining the Functions of Emergency Preparedness and Response 
As discussed in chapter 2, the traditional attributes for categorizing partnerships is 
well developed. Figure 2.5 lists those classic characteristics to consider when classifying 
partnerships and refers to them as ‘privatization attributes’. However, not all of those 
classic ‘privatization attributes’ are relevant for emergency preparedness and response 
activities. Section 4.2.4 will acknowledge those classic privatization attributes that are 
important for EPER services. It is important to note that initially in this research the 
attributes were not classified as ‘structural, functional and event’ as described by Figure 
4.1; instead, the attributes were characterized as ‘privatization’ and ‘EPER’ following 
naturally from the literature reviews. As those attributes became better understood over 
the course of the research, they were reclassified as functional, structural and event. Thus 
for the beginning sections of this research methodology chapter, the attributes will be 
described as ‘privatization’ or ‘event’ and the evolution of those attributes to ‘functional’, 
‘structural’ and ‘event’ will be described near the end of the chapter.  
As discussed, the initial set of ‘privatization attributes’ was developed through the 
literature review and displayed in Figure 2.7. More difficult than selecting the 
‘privatization attributes’ however, is the development of the ‘EPER attributes’: 
characteristics that are distinctive solely because these functions are based on service 
delivery surrounding an emergency. The emergency situations that are faced in EPER 
services pose interesting attributes that may alter how a service should be provided. In 
order to determine the attributes that are appropriate for Partnerships for EPER services, 
an attribute assessment was performed. This assessment is discussed in section 4.2.1. 
4.1.1 Attribute Assessment: Determining Attributes from EPER Functions 
In chapter 3, the stages of emergency preparedness and response were discussed. 
Figure 3.1 summarizes those stages as defined by several parties. In order to best 
understand the actual services that are performed within these stages, these stages were 
broken down into 9 sub-functions.  
1. Determination of Vulnerabilities 
2. Identify Threats 
3. Assess Vulnerabilities/Threats 
4. Provision of Required Resources/Activities/Planning for Mitigation 
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5. Implementation of Plans in Anticipation of Emergency  
6. Implementation of Preparedness/Response Plans During Event 
7. Implementation of Response/Recovery Plans Post-Event  
8. Short Term Provision/Recovery 
9. Long-Term Recovery/Rebuilding  
The first five sub-functions are in the emergency preparedness phase. Sub-
functions 6 through 8 are in the response phase and sub-function 9 is in the recovery 
phase. These sub-functions were primarily derived from the NRP definitions for the 
phases of emergency management.  
For each of these sub-functions, the responsibilities of both the public and private 
sector and examples of activities within the sub-functions were explored. For example, 
for the sub-function “Provision of Required Resources/Activities/Planning for 
Mitigation”, the following were some of the roles and responsibilities determined for 
each sector. 
1. Private Sector Roles and Responsibilities: 
a. must create contingency plans that are well communicated to all 
stakeholders  
b. must ensure the safety of employees in order to return to business as 
usual as quickly as possible  
c. must establish clear communication channels/hierarchy in the event of 
an emergency  
d. must work with the government and other private partners to rehearse 
plans 
2. Public Sector Roles and Responsibilities: 
a. must develop emergency response plans that are distributed to and 
agreed upon by all stakeholders 
b. must effectively communicate updated intelligence to the private 
sector to modify SOPs/emergency plans 
c. must establish clear communication channels/hierarchy in the event of 
an emergency  
d. must develop plans to ensure the viability, integrity and capability of 
critical distribution systems  
e. must encourage the creation of a flexible and resilient culture with 
stakeholders (development of robust organization structures, 
communication networks, supply chains, etc…) by providing 
incentives to the private sector 
f. must work with levels of government and private partners to rehearse 
plans 
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Building on these roles on responsibilities, specific activities in this sub-function 
were then explored. Three examples of activities that were explored for “Provision of 
Required Resources/Activities/Planning for Mitigation” were (1) the creation of SOPs, 
contingency plans, and chains of command; (2) the rehearsal of plans; and (3) the 
education of employees and residents. These activities are still somewhat large however 
and can be broken down further into manageable chunks that are allocated to those 
responsible. For example, with the creation of SOPs and contingency plans there are 
several types of plans that must be developed, including: water provision plan, 
transportation plan, housing and shelters, emergency search and rescue, triage, and 
communications restoration. These plans can and should be integrated especially when 
compounding effects cause multiple critical resources to be jeopardized.  
The attribute assessment was then based on extracting defining characteristics 
from the example activities. What were characteristics of the activities within this sub-
function that could be determinative of the most appropriate structure for their provision? 
Working backwards from the example activities within the “Provision of Required 
Resources/Activities/Planning for Mitigation” sub-function, the following attributes were 
found to be important: Diversity (Range) of Stakeholders/ Responsible Parties; Number 
of Stakeholders/ Participants; Scope of Beneficiary; Investment Required to Provide 
Service; Level of Coordination Between Partners Required; Frequency of Interaction 
Between Partners; Duration of Interaction to Provide Service and; Level of Sensitivity of 
Information Shared between Partners.  
This method was then repeated for all of the sub-functions and the following list 
of attributes was generated. For the complete attribute assessment see Appendix B. 
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FIGURE 4.2: Attributes Derived from EPER Functions 
This list represents all of the attributes that characterize partnerships for EPER 
and thus include some attributes that describe the partnership itself and some new 
attributes that describe the emergency environment. Thus, the attributes in Figure 4.2 
were further categorized as Privatization or EPER attributes. Attributes 1 though 15 are 
privatization attributes—characteristics of the function or the partnership themselves. 
Attributes 16 though 22 are EPER attributes—characteristics of the emergency situation 
that the function confronts. These attributes that were derived from the attribute 
assessment were then combined with some of the traditional privatization attributes 
discussed in chapter 2 in order to determine the privatization and EPER attributes used 
for this study. 
4.1.2 Important Attributes for Partnerships in EPER 
1. Diversity (Range) of stakeholders who have 
incentives to participate 
2. Scope of Beneficiary 
3. Number of Actual Partners 
4. Duration of Interaction 
5. Level of coordination required 
6. Frequency of Interaction 
7. Level of sensitivity of information 
required/shared 
8. Sector expertise 
9. Ownership and Responsibility of task/asset 
10. Complexity/ Specificity of task 
11. Motivation for Partnership 
12. Catalyst for Partnership 
13. Leadership Structure of Partnership 
14. Political Environment 
15. Risk Profile 
16. Activation Period of Partnership (based on 
Emergency) 
17. Type of emergency confronted 
18. Geographic Scope of Anticipated Emergency 
19. Duration of Event 
20. Anticipated Nature of Consequence 
21. Severity 
22. Degree of Uncertainty in Task 
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Figure 2.7 lists the traditional privatization attributes used to characterize 
partnerships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.7: Traditional Privatization Attributes 
When combined with the attributes derived from the attribute assessment 
discussed in section 4.2.1, these classic privatization attributes complete the attributes 
used as inputs to the research framework for this research. Not all of the classic 
privatization attributes listed in figure 2.7 are appropriate for classifying EPER services 
however. Furthermore, some of the classic privatization attributes are captured within the 
attributes derived from the assessment. There are a few shared attributes between the 
classic attributes and the desired attributes: Duration, Diversity of Participants, and 
Specificity of Service. Operational Capacity was not addressed in the attribute 
assessment, but is important for any partnership and is therefore included in the final 
attribute list. Other attributes that were not derived through the assessment, but are 
Classic Characteristics (Traditional Privatization Attributes) to 
Consider when Classifying Partnerships: 
 
1. Legitimacy and Support 
2. Mission 
3. Operational Capacity 
4. Specificity of Service 
5. Availability of Producers 
6. Efficiency and Effectiveness 
7. Scale of Service 
8. Relating Benefits and Costs 
9. Responsiveness to Consumers 
10. Susceptibility to Fraud 
11. Economic Equity 
12. Racial Equity 
13. Responsiveness to Government Direction 
14. Size of Government 
15. Formality 
16. Duration 
17. Focus 
18. Diversity of Participants 
19. Stability 
20. Discretion 
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important enough to include in the final list are: financing capacity, scale of service, 
formality, and discretion. 
 ‘Legitimacy and support’ are captured within the ‘sector expertise’ and ‘political 
environment’ derived attributes. The ‘legitimacy’ of a function is dependent on which 
partner is the expert in that service provision. ‘Support’ is captured by the political 
environment that a function exists within; if public or political support is absent or 
volatile, it will be captured in the political environment attribute. Also a concern in many 
partnerships is an arrangement’s ‘Susceptibility to Fraud’; it is important to maintain 
legitimacy through openness and trust. This is captured through the ‘political 
environment’ attribute. 
‘Mission’ is important in the classical attributes in determining both the 
‘specificity of service’ and the ‘focus’ of the function. It is important for ‘stability’ to 
have every partner’s ‘mission’ aligned. Thus, the indicatives attributes that encompass 
these attributes in the final list are ‘specificity of service’ and ‘alignment of missions’. 
Several others of the classical attributes relate to how well a consumer is able to interface 
with the provider of the service. For EPER services, there is not much consumer 
behavior; these are services that are provided in order to protect the population or restore 
life after a disruptive event. Consumer choice in many of these services is therefore not 
relevant since those are not the dynamics that influence provision. Thus, the classical 
attributes ‘Relating Benefits and Costs’ and ‘Responsiveness to Consumers’ are not 
included in the final list. 
Competition is typically seen as necessary in order for the benefits of privatization 
to be fully realized. However, in most areas of EPER service provision, competitive 
momentum has not yet gathered. Thus, the ‘Availability of Producers’ is not considered 
either. However, this would be an interesting attribute to consider when a market for 
EPER services has grown. Also, though the ‘Size of Government’ is an important 
theological attribute for considering when to privatize, this attribute is too vague to be 
considering in this research as a direct variable for partnership structure. Similarly, 
‘Responsiveness to Government Direction’ is excluded as well.  
‘Economic Equity’ and ‘Racial Equity’ are huge concerns when designing 
partnerships to provide public goods. For EPER services, providing to all races and 
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economic strata is critical. However, these are attributes to consider in the design phase 
of a partnership and not necessarily in the selection of the most appropriate structure. 
Thus, these equity attributes are not included in the final list.  
Finally, the ‘Efficiency and Effectiveness’ with which a service is provided will 
be extremely important in the sustainability and benefit of the partnership. However, this 
attribute stands alone from the others. The other attributes mentioned thus far may be 
predictive variables for the most appropriate partnership structure for providing an EPER 
function—the main research question for this thesis. However, the efficiency with which 
a service is provided is almost a separate question. Also, since the nature of these EPER 
services is to increase overall security, there will inevitably be some efficiency-security 
tradeoffs. Deborah Stone, lays out some of these tradeoffs: (1) People are not motivated 
to work when they are secure, so productivity declines with increased security; (2) the 
more security society provides, the bigger its service sector. The service sector has the 
lowest rate of productivity in the economy; and (3) Economic efficiency requires 
technological changes and innovations that necessarily make some people worse off (and 
insecure.” (Stone 107) This stone definition of security refers to individual security and 
well being; this security definition is especially relevant to response activities where the 
victims are often individuals who have been stripped of the homes and resources. It is 
these individuals security that are addressed though emergency response partnerships. 
Therefore, though efficiency is a desired outcome of a partnership, it is not the goal of 
partnerships for EPER, security is. It is important to note that partnerships may tend to 
make the provision of these activities marginally more efficient than either sector 
producing them alone; however, efficiency is not an attribute and may not even be a 
required outcome. 
In addition to this tradeoff that is inherent in the services that this thesis addresses, 
there are also different types of inefficiency that must be avoided: allocative inefficiency 
and x-efficiency. According to Leibenstein, allocative inefficiency occurs when resources 
are not distributed correctly to a task. This is thought of as traditional economic 
inefficiency. On the other hand, x-inefficiency occurs when resources are not used as 
productively as they could be; the mix of resources may be optimal, but they are not 
being utilized productively. (Leibenstein 392-415) Therefore, in any partnership 
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arrangement, architects are looking to reduce both types of inefficiency. However, 
picking a partnership structure based on the inefficiencies is difficult. The scope of a 
service can be selected based on efficiency concerns and economies of scale. Incentives 
will be developed if x-inefficiencies exist. But for the purpose of this research, the 
success and efficiency with which an EPER function is provided is not addressed. Since 
partnerships for these services are still so new, the focus of this research is on how to 
structure partnerships for these services. This thesis does not directly, in the framework, 
address the success of those partnerships. This is an interesting question for future 
research however when better metrics for success in this area are understood, and there is 
a more developed portfolio of successful partnerships for EPER. Therefore, ‘efficiency 
and effectiveness’ are not included in the final list of attributes, mostly because these 
attributes are so difficult to measure. 
Figure 4.3 lists the complete set of attributes considered in this research. 
Ultimately the goal is to map these attributes to the most appropriate partnership structure 
for various EPER service provision. 
 
FIGURE 4.3: Preliminary Attributes for Research Framework 
Privatization Attributes 
• Catalyst  
• # of Stakeholders  
• # of Partners 
• # of Beneficiaries  
• Specificity of Task/ Focus 
• Scale of Service 
• Frequency of Interaction 
• Authority/ Credibility 
• Responsibility  
• Financing Capacity 
• Operational Capacity 
• Sector Expertise 
• Motivation  
• Leadership Structure 
• Existence of Contract 
• Sensitivity of Information 
• Degree of Risk  
• Political Concerns 
• Duration of Service  
• Discretion 
 
EPER Attributes 
• Type of Emergency 
Confronted  
• Geographic Scale of 
emergency 
• Severity 
• Consequence type  
• Activation Period of PPP 
• Uncertainty 
• Duration of Event 
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4.2 The Interview Instrument 
In order to gather a data set with which to recognize patterns and trends that can be 
predictive of partnership structure, interviews with representatives from current or former 
partnerships for EPER were conducted. It was the intent of these interviews to gather 
information about each of the aforementioned attributes in figure 4.3. Twenty-one 
interviews, representing various partnership structures and EPER services were 
performed with one representative of the partnership. The case studies were found though 
recommendations from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), state agencies, 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) organizations, and EPER practitioners. Based on the 
data collected from the interviews, spectrums of outcomes for each attribute were 
developed. These spectrums were then used to refine the interview data so that patterns 
and trends could be identified. For a complete list of the questions used in the interviews, 
see Appendix C. The data from these interviews and the trends and patterns found with 
this data will be discussed in chapter 5. Chapter 6 will then address how those patterns 
and trends should influence architects and policy makers. 
 
4.3 Iterations to the Research Framework 
The attributes listed in Figure 4.3 were modified several times over the course of 
the data collection and data processing phases. Most significantly, it was discovered that 
there is another level of distinction embedded in the privatization and EPER attributes. 
Some of these attributes are inherently structural in nature; these attributes reflect 
decisions that an architect makes about how to structure a partnership. Other Attributes 
are functional in nature; these attributes are naturally linked to the service the partnership 
is trying to provide and are independent of decisions the architect can make about them. 
The third category—event attributes—contains characteristics unique to partnerships that 
address emergency preparedness and response activities. These attributes describe the 
emergencies that the partnerships seek to confront.  
Many of the structural attributes were previously designated as privatization 
attributes including: Frequency of Interaction, Leadership Structure, Existence of 
Contract, Number of Partners, and Number of Beneficiaries. The ‘Frequency of 
Interaction’ variable proved to not capture the full nature of the interaction dynamics in a 
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partnership, therefore a second interaction attribute—‘type of interaction’—was added to 
the structural attributes. The ‘type of interaction’ attribute deals with whether 
communication is collaborative or one way. The ‘frequency of interaction’ attribute deals 
with how regularly that communication takes place. ‘Existence of a Contract’ was also 
modified and for the rest of the thesis is referred to as the ‘Formal Tools’ attribute. This 
was modified since contracts are not the only formal tools available to partnerships, 
grants and other informal arrangements are also tools. The last two attributes—the 
numbers of beneficiaries and partners—did not fully capture the participatory nature of 
the partnerships either. Thus two more structural attributes were added. The “sectors 
represented by partners” and “sectors represented by beneficiaries” are intended to 
capture not only how many parties are effected, but who is affected by the partnership. 
Two other structural attributes were discovered through the interview process and 
added into the data set: start date and degree of information sharing. The ‘start date’ is an 
important variable since it adds a time dimension to the analysis. The ‘degree of 
information sharing’ is also distinctly a structural attribute since how information is 
shared is a decision of the architect. The ‘sensitivity of the information shared’ however 
is not necessarily a decision made by the architect and is thus designated as a functional 
attributes. The functional attributes will now be discussed. 
Many functional attributes were derived from the privatization attributes 
discussed in Figure 4.3 as well: Number of Stakeholders, Specificity of Task/ Focus, 
Scale of Service, Authority/ Credibility, Responsibility, Financing Capacity, Operational 
Capacity, Sector Expertise, Motivation, Sensitivity of Information, and Duration of 
Service. ‘Number of Stakeholders’ is not a structural attribute, since a stakeholder is a 
party that has a stake in the provision of a service. Stakeholders are not selected by the 
architect, they are naturally tied to the service and therefore both ‘number of 
stakeholders’ and ‘sectors represented by stakeholders’ are considered functional 
attributes. The second attribute, specificity of task/ focus, was divided into two attributes 
to make data classification more straightforward: focus of task and specificity of service. 
The ‘specificity of service’ deals with how broad or narrow the service being provided is, 
and the ‘focus of the task’ deals with the nature of that task. The final privatization 
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attribute mentioned above, ‘duration of service’ was renamed ‘length of service’ for the 
rest of this study.  
The interview process revealed something interesting about the ‘motivation’ 
attribute, listed in Figure 4.3, as well. This privatization attribute was intended to address 
what inclined partners to involve other sectors in the service provision. However, this 
motivation attribute could be reframed as six distinct functional attributes. The most 
common motivations for including another sector are: capacity constraints, financing, and 
expertise. Thus, it was more informative to classify partnerships based on who possessed 
those resources for the service they were trying to provide. Thus, to capture those 
‘motivations’, six functional attributes were created: authority/credibility/legitimacy, 
responsibility, financing capacity, operational capacity, service expertise, and possession 
of resources. The interviews then shed light on which sectors possessed these attributes. 
However, since these six functional attributes are closely interrelated, they will be here-
after, as a group, referred to as the ‘motivational attributes’—a subset within the 
functional attributes. 
The final set of modified attributes is known as the ‘event attributes’. These event 
attribute are primarily found in the EPER attributes listed in Figure 4.3: Type of 
Emergency Confronted, Geographic Scale of emergency, Severity, Consequence type, 
and Activation Period of PPP. The severity attribute was renamed ‘severity of harm’ and 
the consequence type attribute was refined by renaming it ‘type of harm’. A sixth 
attribute was added in order to capture the EPER characteristic of the partnership: Stage 
of EPER. This attribute is intended to capture whether the partnership addresses 
preparedness or response services. 
Several of the attributes in Figure 4.3 were either eliminated or reframed during 
the interview process: Catalyst, Degree of Risk, Political Concerns, Duration of Event, 
Discretion, and Uncertainty. ‘Catalyst’ proved to be a very difficult attribute to capture 
on a spectrum that would reveal any valuable insights into the nature of the partnership 
itself. Therefore, it was eliminated from the final attribute set. The three attributes that 
address uncertainty (degree of risk, political concerns, and uncertainty) were reframed 
and not included in the final attribute set. A separate analysis utilizing only the 
uncertainty data was performed. The ‘duration of the event’ proved to have very little 
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relevance to actual practitioners; this was revealed over the course of the interviews and 
thus this speculative attribute was eliminated. Finally, ‘discretion’ was also a difficult 
attribute to capture with interviews. This attribute would naturally be influenced by the 
representative of the partnership selected to be interviewed. Due to the natural bias in 
only speaking to one member of the partnership from one partner, this attribute was 
eliminated from the analysis. Therefore, the final set of categorized attributes used in the 
analysis of the data from the interviews in displayed in Figure 4.4. 
 
FIGURE 4.4: Final Attributes for Research Framework 
 
4.3.1 Attribute Spectrums 
All of the attributes in Figure 4.4 can be placed on an ordinal spectrum. These 
spectrums are illustrated below by Table 4.1. The following table arranges the values 
possible for each attribute on ordinal spectrums. After an interview was performed, the 
locations on the spectrum for each of the attributes for that particular partnership were 
determined. Once all of the partnerships were categorized and coded according to Table 
4.1, this meta-data set was used to determine patterns and trends and the conclusions of 
this research. The data and resulting analysis will be detailed in Chapter 5. The 
conclusions will be presented in chapter 6. It is the purpose of Table 4.1 to illustrate the 
possible value ranges for the attributes listed in Figure 4.4.  
 
Structural Attributes: 
Start Date 
Type of Interaction 
Frequency of Interaction 
Leadership Structure 
Formal Tools 
Degree of Info Sharing 
Number of Partners 
Number of Beneficiaries 
Sectors Represented  
by Partners 
Sectors Rep by  
Beneficiaries 
Functional Attributes: 
Number of Stakeholders 
Sectors Rep by Stakeholders 
Specificity of Service 
Focus of Task 
Authority/Credibility/ 
Legitimacy 
Responsibility 
Financing Capacity 
Operational Capacity 
Service Expertise 
Possession of Resources 
Sensitivity of Information 
Scale of Service 
Length of Service 
 
Event Attributes: 
Type of Emergency  
Confronted 
Geo Scale of Emergency 
Stage of EPER 
Severity of Harm 
Type of Harm 
Activation Period 
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Start Date 1980s   1990s     2000s 
Type of Interaction bottom-up   collaborative mixture   top-down 
Frequency of Interaction ad-hoc 
ad-hoc and 
irregular 
formal irregular formal 
irregular 
and regular 
formal regular formal 
regular formal 
and ad-hoc 
Leadership Structure coordinator   
a few key 
decision makers   formal board 
coordinator 
and board 
St
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
Formal Tools none   
informal 
agreements     
formal 
agreement 
 Degree of Information Sharing none   uneven sharing     all-shared 
 Number of Partners few (2-4)   many (5-10)     large #( 10+) 
 Number of Beneficiaries few (2-4)   many (5-10)     large #( 10+) 
 Number of Stakeholders few (2-4)   many (5-10)     large #( 10+) 
 
Sectors Represented by 
Partners public 
public and 
NGOs NGOs 
private and 
NGOS private 
private and 
public 
 Sectors Rep. by Beneficiaries public 
public and 
NGOs NGOs 
private and 
NGOS private 
private and 
public 
Sectors Rep. by Stakeholders public 
public and 
NGOs NGOs 
private and 
NGOS private 
private and 
public 
Focus of Task operational   both     managerial 
Specificity of Service narrow   middle     broad 
Authority/ Credibility/ 
Legitimacy pubic   shared     private 
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 
Responsibility pubic   shared     private 
 
Financing Capacity pubic   shared     private 
 
Operational Capacity pubic   shared     private 
 
Service Expertise pubic   shared     private 
 
Possession of Resources pubic   shared     private 
 
Sensitivity of Information public range sensitive Range   classified 
 
Scale of Service point city state Region   nation 
 
Length of Service  months   years     indefinite 
Type of Emergency 
Confronted  natural   all-hazards     man-made 
Geo Scale of Emergency  point city state region   nation 
Stage of EPER preparedness   both response intermediate recovery E
ve
n
t  
Severity of Harm  minor range severe range   catastrophic 
 
Type of Harm  things   both     people 
 Activation Period ex-ante   during ex-post   continuous 
 
TABLE 4.1: Spectrums for Classifying Partnership Attributes 
 
In conclusion, the general research methodology is best visualized with the 
research structure diagram in chapter 1. This chapter has discussed the refinement of the 
research method, as illustrated in the preliminary finding cycle, the data gathering block 
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in its entirety, and has set the stage for the analysis and conclusions block that will be 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1: Research Structure
Data Analysis 
 
 
 
Identify Patterns/Trends and 
Attribute Relationships 
 
 
 
Analyze Patterns/Trends for 
Architects 
 
 
 
Analyze Patterns/Trends for 
Policymakers 
Identify Case 
Studies 
 
 
 
Perform Interviews 
 
 
 
Code Interviews Literature 
Review 
Identification of 
Method 
Preliminary Framing Data Gathering Analysis and 
Conclusions 
Research Question 
Definition 
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CHAPTER 5: Case Study Data and Findings 
  
Twenty-one interviews were conducted with representatives from various 
emergency preparedness and response (EPER) partnerships. One representative from 
each partnership was interviewed and all interviewees asked the same set of 
questions. Interviewees came from the federal government, state and local public 
employees, and representatives from the private sector. Partnerships were selected 
based on recommendations from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Business Civil Leadership Center (BCLC), and internet searches for partnerships for 
emergency preparedness and response. Several more partnerships were pinpointed 
than interviews were performed and there was a selection bias dependent on which 
partnership represented returned emails requesting an interview. Of the 21 interviews 
conducted, 18 were used in the data analysis. The interviews that were not included in 
the analysis were deleted because they did not provide a true emergency preparedness 
and response service.   
 
5.1 Case Study Data 
The descriptions of the 18 partnerships that were used in the data analysis are 
listed below. 
 
SPIN Summary: This is a partnership where the police department (PD) of 
Nassau County, New York collects and distributes information about various 
emergencies (Weather, traffic incidents, robberies, terrorism) to private sector 
partners within the county who use that information to better prepare themselves for 
future emergencies. The partnership is operated and funded by the PD and is 
primarily an information-sharing activity. This is not a formal partnership, but the 
private sector does provide expertise and force multipliers.  
Katrina Back to Business Workshops Summary: After Hurricane Katrina, 
local businesses needed information and people in order to recover and get the 
economy moving again. This service was provided by the federal, state and local 
government and spearheaded by the DHS private sector office. Three workshops were 
held at various locations in Louisiana that (1) acted as a job fair to help businesses 
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and people looking for jobs to connect and (2) provided information about how to get 
up and running again (how to get building permits, water, etc…). This is an example 
of a task that was controlled by the government (both financially and provisionally) in 
order to help to private sector that was reduced to disarray and confusion.  
Technical Assistance Contract Summary: After a disaster, public 
infrastructure may be damaged; this contract employs three engineering firms to 
assess the damage to that infrastructure in order to estimate the cost to fix it. These 
cost estimates, and the determination of what insurance will cover, are the basis for 
grants that FEMA provides to states to reimburse the rebuilding of public 
infrastructure. Contractors are used both due to their technical expertise and the lack 
of full time staff at FEMA to provide the same service. The contracts are reopened to 
competition in 5 year cycles and awards are based on technical expertise. There were 
3 contracts valued at $200 million each in 2007. 
Katrina Call Center Contract Summary: This is an ad-hoc response 
partnership that staffs call centers receiving calls from the public registering the 
damage they have incurred as a result of a disaster and are thus requesting 
government assistance. After Hurricane Katrina, more call center agents were needed 
than FEMA employs due to the millions of people submitting registrations. An 
Urgent and Compelling Contract was formed with two contractors to provide the 
capacity needed to handle to call volume. The partnership lasted for 5-9 months and 
was terminated when call volume was reduced. FEMA is interested in creating a more 
permanent contract for this service because ramp up and down costs are so high, but 
has not done so yet. These ad-hoc contracts are used for emergencies (theoretically 
all-hazards) that require higher volume, but typically only natural disasters create a 
need for those volumes. 
Aid Matrix Grant Summary: This partnership provides donation logistic 
management software for emergency response activities. The software was created by 
and will be maintained by Aidmatrix and is funded by a grant from FEMA. Users of 
the software include (1) private donors of supplies after an event and (2) voluntary 
agencies (Red Cross, Food Banks and Faith Based Orgs) and some government 
entities that will utilize the donations. Leaders in the field can access the donation 
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system and get in touch with the donator to arrange delivery of the goods; they arrive 
when they are needed and thus the disaster area is not clogged up with un-needed 
supplies and the transportation nodes are not congested with donations. This 
partnership was initiated after the logistics failure of hurricane Katrina and should 
remain indefinitely.  
ESRI Project Impact Partnership Summary: This partnership was an 
extension of the Project Impact (PI) program at FEMA in the late 90s that sought to 
reduce risk in local communities. In this partnership, ESRI donated Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) software and technical support to local communities 
whose proposals won a competition for that resource. Awards were made for 3 years, 
annually, at the PI conference. FEMA and ESRI coordinated to competition and once 
the awards were made to communities, ESRI trained local users in the software. The 
software enables communities to assess risk by correlating natural hazards to 
vulnerabilities (flood plains, salt lines, etc…) and current preparedness efforts 
(evacuation routes, etc…). This data could then be used in determining future zoning 
and the rerouting of emergency response plans. This program was ultimately 
terminated in 2001 when the Bush administration cut Project Impact as a whole.  
Democratic National Convention (DNC) 2004 Partnership Summary: For 
the Democratic National Convention in 2004, the city of Boston had to prepare for a 
host of changes and situations that could occur during the 4 day convention. The goal 
was to create the best plan possible for risk avoidance and public safety. Some of the 
many tasks encountered were: terrorism prevention and response; demonstrators and 
activists, traffic flow; supplies into the city; police deployment; and public transport. 
Initially the public sector partnered with itself trying to coordinate many of these 
services, but realized they needed to engage the private sector. The private sector was 
engaged by including them in the taskforces and coordinating the loaning of resources 
to the DNC. Each partner provided financing and delivered a portion of the tasks; 
however, most of the security service provision was done by the public sector (local 
PD and Secret Service). The DNC committee was able to avoid any emergencies and 
created plans that enabled to city to operate as close to ‘business as usual’ as possible. 
The collaboration was extremely complex and a success for that event, but the 
  74 
services and taskforces were not institutionalized for future planning and 
preparedness efforts.  
Medical Reserve Corps Summary: The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is 
housed within the Office of the Surgeon General, but it is a community-based 
program that encourages the creation of local units to address public health and 
emergency management issues. This nationwide network of local MRCs enables local 
volunteers - mostly medical and public health professionals, but others as well - to be 
identified, credentialed and trained in advance of an emergency, therefore allowing 
their utilization when the need arises. Many MRCs also support ongoing public health 
efforts, like health screenings and disease prevention activities throughout the year. A 
goal of this partnership is to increase the resiliency of local communities, to enable 
them to better deal with their medical and public health needs day-to-day and 
following emergencies. There are currently 644 MRCs, each led by a local MRC 
coordinator. Housing organization, funding level, mission, and organizational 
structure all vary by MRC. In all MRCs, however, volunteers are coordinated to 
reduce the confusion that can ensue post-disaster if volunteers just show up and get in 
the way. This is reduces the risk to all involved, and volunteers and victims are safe 
and protected. 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Sector Coordinating 
Councils (SCCs) Summary: The NIPP created a coordinated national framework for 
Critical Infrastructure/ Key Resources (CI/KR) protection within and across sectors. 
The partnership structure enables the formation of Sector Coordinating Councils 
(SCCs) which bring together representatives from specific sectors to share best 
practices and lessons learned in risk mitigation efforts. SCCs self organize and are 
self run in order to share critical information about the state of their sector. This 
partnership structure established the Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN), a free mechanism for sharing threat information with the private sector so 
they can take action to mitigate against real threats. The goal is to have incidents also 
reported up to the government from private sector owners and operators through the 
local law enforcement in order to share general information as well. Owners assess 
risks and then make security investments and take protective actions at their own 
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discretion. The relationship between the private sector and government is a “peer 
relationship” since the government has no authority to mandate private sector action 
in the area of CI/KR preparedness (outside the chemical sector). Thus, all action is 
completely voluntary and consensual. Membership in the SCCs is free, though some 
SCCs may chose to fund a staff or information sharing tool for their own purposes. 
The government provides administrative support at all levels to all 17 SCCs. 
Ultimately, the goal of this partnership structure is to enable members of the CI/KR 
community to uphold their responsibility to provide essential services as efficiently as 
possible in the face of all hazards and to mitigate threats where possible. 
Business Round Table (BRT) Partnership for Disaster Response 
Summary: This partnership is coordinated by the Business Roundtable Taskforce: 
Partnership for Disaster Response (PDR). Established in May 2006, this taskforce 
consists of 30 dues-paying private sector members. The CEOs of the members meet 
quarterly to conduct business. The PDR serves five primary services: (1) get the 
private sector and government representatives in touch through meetings to leverage 
expertise; (2) help the government partner better with the private sector overall; (3) 
provide communications capacity for members before or after an emergency through 
secure phone lines and web pages; (4) track members donations to various agencies 
after a disaster to determine how well those resources were utilized; and (5) leverage 
private sector resources to create better processes for the next disaster. Thus, the PDR 
provides several services to its members as well as facilitating interaction between 
those members and the government so that the government can leverage their 
expertise to improve the overall response structure. Several members are involved in 
projects with the government to improve national response on a voluntary basis; the 
government’s contribution is allowing these private sector entities to come to the 
table. 
BCLC (Business Civil Leadership Center) Disaster Response and 
Recovery Program Summary: The Disaster Response and Recovery Program is a 
partnership between a coordinator—the BCLC—corporate donors, public sector 
representatives, and NGOs. This partnership provides two primary services: (1) 
influence the process and communications used in emergency response and recovery 
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efforts; and (2) ease the method for distributing donations and contributions after a 
disaster occurs. BCLC and partners continuously work on the first function, whereas 
the second is dependent on the occurrence of a national catastrophic event. This is a 
unique type of collaboration due to the presence of a coordinator whose contribution 
is enabling communication between partners and acting as an advocate for overall 
improved emergency response processes. BCLC is a non-profit charitable 
organization who provides expertise in making connections in the emergency 
preparedness community. The risks to this partnership/program include some political 
risks (non-profit competition, perceptions of effectiveness and partisan politics), the 
risk of continuing relevance of mission, and the risk of declining donors over time to 
support the program.  
Localized Incident Command Partnership Summary: This partnership is a 
local effort between a private sector corporation and the Fire Department (FD) to 
ensure the best possible response to local incidents in order to minimize impact. 
Working together through the structure of both public and private incident command 
systems, the tasks of incident management are divided between the partners in a 
complimentary way. In order to jump-start a partnership, the private sector partner 
identifies at risk facilities and then (1) familiarizes the FD with those facilities 
through tours of the building and (2) prepositions supplies and systems to mitigate 
incidents and risks. These local partnerships are duplicated in other areas on a 
facility-by-facility basis. Large-scale incidents that extend beyond the boundaries of 
the selected facility are not addressed with this partnership. Ultimately, this 
partnership seeks to achieve three goals (1) life safety (2) incident suppression and (3) 
asset protection. 
Office Depot Foundation Partnership: The Office Depot Foundation strives 
to (1) ensure the safety of employees and (2) enable prompt return to business and life 
as usual after an emergency situation. Funded by employees and matched by Office 
Depot, the funds are used to (1) support relief agencies that provide services to 
employees and the community in the immediate aftermath of an emergency and; (2) 
assist employees who underwent damage during the emergency to return to life as 
usual. Office Depot works with several partners, including the Red Cross, Feed the 
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Children, BCLC and DHS, to achieve its mission and share preparedness and 
response best practices. Office Depot funds the partnership and each partner provides 
critical components of the services required to achieve the Foundation's relief goals. 
The main beneficiaries of these relief efforts are Office Depot employees and local 
affected communities. Primarily, this partnership focuses on how to best allocate 
money to aid in the relief effort, thought the Foundation often provides other in-kind 
donations as well.  
Abbot Production Contributions Program Summary: After an emergency 
Abbot partners with various proven relief agencies to provide pharmaceuticals and 
nutritionals to the immediate relief effort. Abbot chooses the partners they want to 
work with, based on their ability to respond effectively to a particular disaster, and 
those relief agencies perform assessments to determine what products and how much 
of those products are needed. Relief partners then request product from Abbot who 
delivers them to specific sites for the relief partners to distribute to the end users. This 
partnership is activated for a variety of emergencies and has responded to both natural 
disasters and internal conflict. Abbot does not have the capacity alone to distribute 
their product since they cannot get into the effected sites as quickly as the relief 
organizations. The relief organizations rely on Abbot’s donations in order to respond 
more robustly as well. The government is not involved in this activity at all; this 
partnership is a private sector collaboration effort. 
Tyson’s Disaster Relief Program Summary: In this partnership, Tyson 
works with various relief agencies to provide food in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster. The relief agencies specify the location the truck must deliver the food to 
and the partners mutually decide how much will be sent. Depending on the relief 
agencies that contact them for assistance, the communication will be different. These 
partnerships are ad-hoc after each emergency and last for the immediate relief period. 
The ad-hoc partnerships do influence future interaction however since Tyson tends to 
work with the same relief agencies. The largest risk/hurdle that this partnership faces 
is the internal politics of the large relief agencies. Since the relief agency stipulates 
the delivery location, if there is no contact initiated by the relief agency, then a 
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partnership will not be activated. The government is not involved in this activity; this 
partnership is a collaboration between various private sector entities. 
Red Cross Coordinated Assistance Program (CAN): This partnership 
shares client data between participating NGOs after major disasters in order to 
eliminate duplicative relief and recovery efforts. This client data includes a victim’s 
story and what types of services they have received from other NGOs after a disaster. 
In order to share the data, a web based application—maintained by CAN and the Red 
Cross—is activated upon request by the member agencies, typically after major 
disasters. This application is not available at all times. All participating NGOs 
(approximately 220) must sign legal agreements with the Red Cross that outlines the 
information sharing and privacy concerns of clients. Because of the privacy concerns 
with this information, the government can not access the database; government access 
may be a deterrent to some NGOs and clients to use the system. This partnership is 
funded through donors who are not involved, as of right now, on the steering 
committee for the partnership.  
Regional Intelligence Sharing Network Partnership: This is a fusion center 
partnership that is a regional information sharing network for crime and terrorism 
intelligence in a large urban area. The information that is pooled is from local Police 
Departments, state law enforcement, the federal government (FBI) and the private 
sector. Threat information is provided by the public sector and a large percentage of 
the vulnerability and suspicious activity information by the private sector. The 
mission of this partnership is to enhance the region's overall level of public safety by, 
on an ongoing basis, sharing information about threats and vulnerabilities and 
providing one public sector contact point for private sector partners to call for current, 
accurate and consistent threat information. There is no contract and participation is 
free and voluntary for the private sector. The technology for this partnership is still in 
its design phase however; finding a technology that can effectively synchronize all 
threat and vulnerability information into one database is proving to be difficult. The 
ultimate goal is for analysts to use that coordinated database in order to make 
strategic threat assessments for the region. There are many threats to the sustainability 
of this partnership including: competition for budget, privacy issues, technology 
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issues, public perception of "intelligence" sharing at the local level, and the internal 
cultural dynamics of the partners.  
A2H Disaster Relief Partnership: America's Second Harvest (A2H) solicits 
product donations from the food and grocery industry to distribute to their network of 
food banks, during regular operations as well as after disasters. A2H works with 
fortune 500 companies and convinces them to donate food and groceries that are 
unable to be sold to retailers, grocery stores, mass merchandisers or other venues.  
A2H's headquarter location in Chicago acts as a broker to match those in-kind 
product donations with Member food banks.  In regular operations the food banks and 
donors typically coordinate the transportation of the goods; during a disaster those 
transportation needs and costs are assumed by A2H.  In addition to working with their 
network of food banks and over 40 corporate product donors during times of disaster, 
A2H tries to  coordinate with American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and FEMA 
to reduce duplicated efforts in distribution to those in need or evacuees.  Ultimately, 
this partnership is a collaborative arrangement between A2H, the coordinator, and 
businesses and food banks.  Risks to the operation and sustainability of the 
partnership include: media uncertainty, disaster location uncertainty, and added 
scrutiny to daily operations from unaffected parts of the network.  
 
5.2 Research Findings 
Once the interviews were completed, the partnerships were classified based on 
the spectrums described in Table 4.1. The data was then color coded with shades of 
grey and organized in order to elicit patterns and trends from the data. For a given 
attribute, the data was organized on its spectrum and then compared to every other 
attribute to determine relationships. This reorganization was repeated for each event 
and functional attribute in order to find relationships between the event, functional, 
and structural attributes. For the full spreadsheet see Appendix D.  
After comparing the attributes, several conclusions emerged. Some of the 
conclusions confirmed existing privatization theory whereas others are new. The new 
conclusions have not previously been commented on in literature due to the lack of 
privatization literature on EPER services. There are 6 confirmatory conclusions laid 
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out in section 5.2.1 and 17 new conclusions described in section 5.2.2. The new 
conclusions can be further categorized as: expected, counterintuitive and weak. The 
new expected conclusions are findings that are both logical and novel. The new 
counterintuitive conclusions are novel, but not necessarily what was logically 
expected. The new weak conclusions are also novel, but have weaker data supporting 
their arguments and thus a larger data set may be needed to comment definitively on 
them. The implications of these findings for EPER partnership architects are 
discussed in chapter 6. 
5.2.1 Structures Illustrated in EPER Case Studies  
Before describing the aforementioned conclusions, the partnership structures 
observed in the case studies will be discussed. Of the 18 case studies, there was one 
example of public supply and operation (Public SAO), two contracts, one grant and 
14 examples of collaborative governance, or PPPs. Due to the large numbers of 
collaborative structures encountered, it was determined that these partnerships may be 
further refined. Thus, the collaboration partnerships were divided into three sub-
designations: (1) public-private collaboration (2) private collaboration and (3) 
facilitated collaboration.  
Public-private collaboration is characterized by partners from both the 
public and the private sector. Private collaboration consists of partners only from the 
private sector (including NGOs). Facilitated collaboration is unique from the other 
two structures. The two facilitated collaboration partnerships—BCLC and BRT—
primarily act as intermediaries for the public and private members who actually 
implement EPER services. These facilitated collaboration partnerships operate 
differently from the other collaboration structures and thus should remain distinct. All 
three collaboration structures fall within the structure categorization of “collaborative 
governance/PPP” but are further refined for the EPER partnerships studied in this 
thesis. All structures that are traditionally considered “collaborative governance” or 
PPPs are hereafter classified as either (1) public-private collaboration (2) private 
collaboration or (3) facilitated collaboration. 
5.2.2 Confirmatory Conclusions 
  81 
The following conclusions found in the data analysis confirm existing 
privatization theory and thus increase the credibility of the analysis as a whole. These 
confirmatory conclusions are listed and explained as follows. 
 
1. The formal tools used to provide a service influence the partnership’s 
structure. Contracts and Grants tend to use formal agreements, whereas 
informal agreements show up in collaborative structures. 
 
 
KEY    
Formal Tools Formal 
Agreement 
Informal 
Agreement 
None 
 
Table 5.1: Formal Tools and Structure 
 
This follows directly from the definition of a contract and a grant (see section 
2.3.1). These structures utilize legal agreements to specify the terms of a 
partnership—including how much payment will be received by the producer and what 
degree of service should be provided. The other types of structures represented by the 
data set—public supply and operation, public-private collaboration, facilitated 
collaboration, and private collaboration—are much less formal partnership structures 
and thus one would not expect to see formal agreements here.  
The presence of informal agreements in private collaborations is not 
surprising but a bit more unconventional. Typically in collaboration (PPP) 
arrangements, missions are aligned as a means for ensuring continuity in the service 
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provision. However, in the two private collaborations that utilize informal 
agreements—A2H and Red Cross CAN—the architects chose to protect themselves 
with more than mission alignment. In the A2H Disaster Relief partnership, A2H 
signed various informal agreements with food providers specifying how much food 
they are to provide to affected areas in the recovery process. Since the recovery 
process is much more long term than immediate relief efforts, A2H signed these 
agreements to ensure continuity in the goods being provided to recovery areas. For 
the Red Cross CAN partnership, the architects found it necessary for all member 
NGOs to sign privacy agreements to ensure that client (victims of disasters) data 
would not leak from the CAN system. This added another layer of protection onto the 
partnership. As expected however, the other 12 collaboratory arrangements do not 
utilize any formal or informal tools and instead rely on trust and other intangibles to 
preserve the partnership structure 
It should be noted that another reason that formal agreements do not show up 
in private collaborations is the nature of how the private sector operates around EPER 
services. Due to the degree of uncertainty present in providing EPER services to the 
public, whether humanitarian or not, formally committing to provide a service 
regardless of severity, location and scale is unrealistic for the private sector. 
Ultimately the private sector is a profit seeking entity and will chose to preserve its 
financial well-being over humanitarian aid. Thus, the private sector is extremely 
hesitant to sign any binding agreement in many EPER areas. The exceptions of course 
are the contracts and grants that are formal agreements between the public and private 
sector; but the services that the private sector signed on to provide in these formal 
arrangements are profitable for the companies involved in the partnership because 
they are paid in proportion to the scale of response required by them. The private 
collaborations studied in this research, however, are not profitable services and thus 
scale is a huge consideration. Therefore, it is noted, that outside of profitable 
contracts and grants for specific services, the private sector should be expected not to 
sign any agreements binding them to EPER service provision. 
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2. The motivational attributes influence the partnership’s structure. The sectors 
that possess the motivational attributes will be a factor in which structure is 
appropriate.  
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KEY     
Authority/ 
Credibility/ 
Legitimacy 
Private Shared Public Unknown 
Responsibility Private Shared Public Unknown 
Financing Capacity Private Shared Public Unknown 
Operational 
Capacity 
Private Shared Public Unknown 
Service Expertise Private Shared Public Unknown 
Possession of 
Resources 
Private Shared Public Unknown 
Table 5.2: Motivational Attributes and Structure 
 
This result is well-documented in privatization literature, though framed in a 
different way. According to Donahue and Zeckhauser, the primary motivations for 
privatization, as discussed the Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1), are resources, information, 
productivity, and legitimacy (Donahue and Zeckhauser 17). This data represents those 
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motivations in terms of who possesses them. The motivational attributes are thus: (1) 
which sector has the authority/legitimacy/credibility to provide the service; (2) which 
sector has the responsibility to provide the service; (3) which sector possesses the 
financing capacity; (4) which sector has the operational capacity to run the service; 
(5) which sector is the expert in the service provision (an indicator of who can 
perform the task the most productively); and (6) which sector possesses the resources 
necessary to operate the service (including information). As the private sector is 
found to possess more of these motivational attributes, one would expect the private 
sector involvement in the service provision—the degree of privatization—to increase. 
This is illustrated by the data as the motivational attributes become increasingly 
reliant on the private sector. First public-private collaborations appear as the attributes 
are shared between both sectors, and then purely private collaborations appear as the 
attributes become purely private. This data shows a direct correlation between the 
motivational attributes of a partnership and the structure selected to provide that 
service.  
 
3. The motivational attributes influence the sectors chosen to be partners and 
those sectors that are beneficiaries or stakeholders. For the services that are 
primarily private in operation, funding and responsibility, the private sector 
becomes the main partners. 
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Table 5.3: Motivational Attributes and Sectors Represented 
KEY        
Sectors Represented 
by Partners 
Public and 
private 
Private Private and 
NGOs 
NGOs Public and 
NGOs 
Public All 
Sectors Rep. by 
Beneficiaries 
Public and 
private 
Private Private and 
NGOs 
NGOs Public and 
NGOs 
Public All 
Sectors Rep. by 
Stakeholders 
Public and 
private 
Private Private and 
NGOs 
NGOs Public and 
NGOs 
Public All 
Authority/ Credibility/ 
Legitimacy 
Private n/a Shared n/a Public Unknown n/a 
Responsibility Private n/a Shared n/a Public Unknown n/a 
Financing Capacity Private n/a Shared n/a Public Unknown n/a 
Operational Capacity Private n/a Shared n/a Public Unknown n/a 
Service Expertise Private n/a Shared n/a Public Unknown n/a 
Possession of 
Resources 
Private n/a Shared n/a Public Unknown n/a 
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This conclusion should be a logical follow-on to the previous finding. If the 
motivational attributes reveal that the private sector possesses most of the legitimacy, 
responsibility, financing capacity, operational capacity, service expertise and 
resources, and thus the architect chooses a private collaboration structure, the partners 
should be solely represented by the private sector. This illustrated by the last four 
partnerships in the table—Abbot, Tyson’s, Red Cross CAN and Office Depot 
Foundation. All of these partnerships are purely private sector collaborations due to 
the nature of the motivational attributes and thus only private sector partners (NGOs 
are considered private sector) should be present in the partnership. Alternatively, 
when the motivational attributes are either shared or different sectors provide 
different attributes, then multiple sectors must be engaged in the partnership.  
Sectors can be engaged in various ways however: as stakeholders, as 
beneficiaries or as partners. Any party that is a stakeholder has a stake in ensuring the 
service is provided and thus often becomes a partner. Stakeholders are functional 
attributes since the parties that have a stake depends solely on what service is to be 
provided. On the other hand, both the partners and beneficiaries are structural 
attributes since who benefits from a service and who is involved in its provision are 
decisions of the architect, to some degree. A key conclusion is that the stakeholders, 
beneficiaries, and partners are not always the same in an EPER partnership. For most 
of these partnerships, the general public is a primary beneficiary and stakeholder who 
is never formally involved as a partner. 
 
4. Partnerships with a narrow focus tend to be more operational in nature; 
partnerships with a broad focus tend to be more managerial.  
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KEY     
Focus of Task Managerial n/a Both Operational 
Specificity of 
Service 
Broad n/a Middle Narrow 
 
Table 5.4: Focus of Task and Specificity of Service 
 
This is a hypothesis that was explored in a conversation with Professor John 
Donahue at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This 
privatization expert commented that in any partnership structure, he would expect to 
see a relationship between the specificity of the service being provided (how narrow 
or broad it is) and the focus of that task (whether the partnership is operational or 
managerial). The distinction between operational and managerial partnership deserves 
some discussion. An operational partnership is one that is focused primarily on 
implementing a specific task. These partnerships are concentrated on “making the 
rubber meet the road”. For example, the Abbot Contributions partnership is purely 
operational. After an emergency, this company interacts with its NGO partners (Red 
Cross, Salvation Army, etc…) and determines what pharmaceutics and nutritionals 
(ensure, etc…) are needed at what disaster locations. Those products are then 
delivered and dispersed. This partnership is completely focused on implementing a 
very operational task.  
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On the other hand, managerial partnerships are focused more on coordination, 
strategy and information sharing. These partnerships are less concerned with 
implementing specific EPER services themselves; they instead enable their partners 
to implement on their own or smaller sub-groups. For example, the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has created a framework for the 17 critical 
infrastructure sectors to interact in order to share best practices and lessons learned to 
reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate hazards. These sector coordinating councils 
(SCCs) consist of representatives from the sector in question (chemical, 
transportation, etc…) that discuss strategies for their sectors and share relevant 
information. This partnership is purely managerial; it provides a service that brings 
together relevant partners and then shares information that enables partners to 
implement specific EPER services themselves. However, the managerial task of 
bringing the partners together is an important EPER service in itself; without the 
connections this partnership creates, many other EPER services would not be 
provided.  
There are some partnerships that have components of both types of tasks: 
some implementation and some strategy, coordination and information sharing. For 
example, the DNC partnership brought together partners to share information and 
create strategy surrounding the Democratic National Convention in Boston. This 
partnership was also operational however in that it performed most of the security 
measures that occurred during that week as well. 
The data shows that there is a correlation between the focus of the task and 
how narrow or broad that task is. It is logical that tasks that are considered narrow 
would be easier to make operational due to their specificity. Handling a very narrow 
task in a managerial way would be somewhat counterproductive. Ultimately EPER 
partnerships strive to implement or enable implementation. If a service is easily 
implemented (as most narrow tasks are) then the complexity introduced by handling it 
in a managerial way would be sub-optimal. On the other hand, services that are broad 
would be more difficult to be completely operational due to the complexity of those 
services; therefore the most value added from broad services is revealed through the 
activities found in managerial tasks. Therefore, this data clearly reveals that the 
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Donahue hypothesis proved to be true according to the data used in this study: narrow 
tasks are handled through operational partnerships and broad tasks are handled 
through managerial partnerships. 
 
5. Partnerships with a broad focus do not use formal tools. The narrower the 
focus, the more likely it is a contract or other legal agreement may be used. 
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Table 5.5: Formal Tools, Focus of Task and Specificity of Service 
 
This data reveals that contracts, grants, and other formal or informal tools are 
appropriate only for tasks that are narrow in scope. All four partnerships that utilize 
formal tools are providing a service that has a narrow focus. This is consistent with 
general privatization opinion on the use of contracts. Contracts are thought to be 
appropriate only for tasks that are highly specifiable since the act of writing a contract 
requires all contingencies to be outlined in the document. According to Savas, when 
KEY    
Specificity of 
Service 
Broad Middle Narrow 
Focus of Task Managerial Both Operational 
Formal Tools Formal 
Agreement 
Informal 
Agreement 
None 
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quality and scope are critical and can vary, contracting becomes complex (Savas 91-
104). Essentially, when there are a wide variety of potential qualities that a service 
can be provided at and high quality is critical, specifying contracts can be difficult 
due to difficulties in determining performance criteria. For EPER services, quality is 
critical which would naturally make writing contracts for these types of services 
difficult. But they are present according to the data. This can be explained by the 
second variable that Savas mentions: scope. When the scope can be defined and is 
reasonably narrow, then despite the quality constraints, an effective contract may be 
written. Thus, for EPER partnerships, this data reveals that formal and informal 
arrangements (including contracts) are only possible for tasks with narrow scopes but 
are not suitable for all such partnerships. 
5.2.3 New, Expected Conclusions 
In addition to the confirmatory conclusions that were discovered with the 
coded case study data, there were also several new, expected conclusions that relate 
event and functional attributes to one another and several structural attributes. These 
conclusions are relatively novel and offer the most wealth for architects of EPER 
partnerships. The 17 conclusions and the relevant data from the case studies are 
presented below. 
 
1. Partnerships addressing events that effect people tend to be owned, operated, 
and financed by the private sector.  
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Table 5.6: Motivational Attributes and Type of Harm 
 
The data clearly shows that partnerships that address events that harm 
people are typically private sector collaborations. For five of the six partnerships that 
were designed to address events that harm exclusively people, the majority of the 
authority, responsibility, financing, capacity, expertise, and resources lies with the 
private sector. All of the private-private collaboration partnerships studied address 
events that harm people. One of the seven public-private collaborations addresses 
exclusively events that harm people, but these arrangements are also used for events 
that address only things and both people and things.  
This is a surprising result: the private sector is performing many 
humanitarian services in the wake of a disaster, not the government. This result is 
primarily because the expertise for these humanitarian response services lies with the 
non-profit sector, an insight gathering through many interviews. Many of the required 
  92 
skills in the response effort have been concentrated in the non-profit sector. 
Organizations such as the Red Cross, United Way and Salvation Army are known 
experts in distributing food and goods after an emergency. These findings are not 
asserting that the government should or should not be providing humanitarian 
response services; it is observed that the private sector tends to provide these services 
due to resources, expertise, and the other attributes listed in the table. 
On the other hand, the public sector is much more involved in partnerships 
that address both types of harm (to people and things) and exclusively things. 
“Things” include public infrastructure, the economy, and other non-human victims. It 
is not surprising the government is involved in events which impact public 
infrastructure, even though the vast majority of that infrastructure is owned by the 
private sector. Many critical services cannot be performed without that infrastructure 
operational, and thus the government has a large stake in ensuring its recovery. Many 
times the cost to expedite the repair of these facilities would be cost-prohibitive for 
the private sector alone, and thus it is critical for the government to step in 
supplement efforts.  
 
2. Operational partnerships tend to be led by either one coordinator or a few key 
decision makers. The more managerial the partnership, the more likely a board 
is to be involved in the leadership. 
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Table 5.7: Leadership Structure and Focus of Task 
 
According to the table, 10 of the 11 partnerships that are exclusively 
operational are led by either a coordinator or a few key decision makers. Operational 
partnerships are those that implement a specific task or set of tasks; managerial 
partnerships on the other hand tend to be focused on overall coordination efforts. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that an operational partnership, with a narrow mission, 
would tend to be led by an individual or a few individuals. When the task the 
partnership accomplishes is highly specified it is much more likely and able to be 
managed by a few key people. The exception is the Medical Reserve Corp (MRC) 
partnership where local steering committees are involved in strategy issues; this 
partnership also relies heavily on local coordinators however for coordinating a 
medical response after an emergency.  
If the partnership is more managerial, with a broad mission, the daily tasks of 
the leadership are not implementation; in this case, leadership is often more involved 
in strategic decision making. Of the three managerial partnerships, all are led by a 
board for oversight, expertise, and strategy. The main goal of these partnerships 
(NIPP, BRT, BCLC) is to provide means for members to implement EPER tasks; the 
partnership itself does not necessarily implement those best practices, lessons learned, 
and general strategy.  
Interestingly, of the four partnerships that perform both managerial and 
operational services, all have the presence of a board and half also employee 
coordinators. For the Red Cross CAN partnership, the operational aspects are still in 
the design phase. Therefore, at this point, much of the guidance and leadership for 
this partnership comes from a board of stakeholders. For the SPIN and Regional 
Information Sharing Partnerships, a board is present is order to develop security best 
KEY     
Leadership 
Structure 
Coordinator and 
board 
board A few key 
decision makers 
coordinator 
Focus of Task managerial n/a both operational 
Specificity of 
Service 
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practices and guide strategic decision making; coordinators are necessary as well 
however because both of these partnerships are operational as well. For the fourth 
partnership, the DNC, there were so many partners and stakeholders in this effort to 
prevent, mitigate and respond to any events during the DNC, that the only effective 
way to engage all relevant parties was to divide the leadership and operational units 
into boards for several key issue areas. Therefore, the key insight in this data set is 
that as partnerships enlarge their mission and become more managerial, a board may 
become more necessary to guide the direction of the partnership. With broad missions 
come much flexibility and discretion in where to concentrate efforts; therefore a 
board of experts may be more effective at controlling the focus of the partnership. 
 
3. Partnerships with a narrow, operational focus and tend to use top down 
communication models. Collaborative communication models are used for both 
narrow, operational and broad, managerial focuses. 
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Table 5.8: Focus of Task and Type of Interaction  
KEY     
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Focus of Task Managerial Both Operational n/a 
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This conclusion naturally follows from the complexity of a task influencing 
how it is best implemented. Highly specified missions are typically accompanied by 
more operational partnerships since the task being performed is specific enough to 
implement successfully. On the other hand, with broad missions, a specific task is 
more difficult to implement since the partnership has so many goals; therefore they 
tend to operate more as managerial partnerships. Therefore, just as operational 
missions are more likely to be led by one coordinator or a few individuals, they would 
also seem more suitable for top-down communication models than managerial 
partnerships. It would seem natural for directions to be passed down from one 
coordinator to the rest of the partners to expedite implementation in an operational 
partnership. This is not true for all operational partnerships however. Operational 
partnerships are not exclusively top-down in communication structure; of the 11 
operational partnerships, only four are purely top-down and two have components of 
both types of communication. Thus the primary insight is not that operational 
partnerships tend to be top-down, but that managerial partnerships are not. 
Managerial partnerships, due to their more vague nature, would be very 
difficult to operate in a top-down fashion. Managerial partnerships almost 
intrinsically rely on collaborative communication; these partnerships are led by 
boards, they aim to share knowledge in order to optimize their EPER mission, and 
they rely heavily on relationship and trust in order to remain sustainable. Thus, one 
would expect a managerial partnership to be collaborative in communication 
structure. 
 
4. Partnerships with a broad, managerial focus tend to operate continuously. 
Partnerships that operate exclusively before or after an emergency tend to have 
a narrow, operational focus.  
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Table 5.9: Focus of Task and Activation Period 
According to the data, all of the exclusively managerial partnerships operate 
continuously. Exclusively operational partnerships on the other hand occur in all three 
activation periods: ex-ante, ex-post and continuous. However, the operational 
partnerships are concentrated in the ex-post activation period; 9 of 10 ex-post 
partnerships are operational. Lastly, partnerships that have both operational and 
managerial components can be found active primarily ex-ante, but also ex-post. Three 
of the four ex-ante partnerships perform both managerial and operational services.  
It is logical that managerial partnerships would operate continuously. These 
partnerships have a host of tasks to perform and are primarily generating best 
practices and strategies to improve emergency management processes as a whole. 
Therefore, these partnerships would need to operate continuously—not just before or 
after an emergency—in order to perform their tasks. However, operational 
partnerships tend to perform well defined narrow tasks and do not need to operate 
continuously in order to perform their mission. Interestingly, partnerships that 
perform both operational and managerial tasks tend to be performed before an 
KEY    
Focus of Task Managerial Both Operational 
Activation Period Continuous Ex-Post Ex-Ante 
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emergency—ex-ante. Looking at these three partnerships—Regional Information 
Sharing, SPIN and DNC—this makes sense. These partnerships rely on the 
anticipation of emergencies in order to try to prevent them. These are preparedness 
partnerships that engage many partners in order to share information about potential 
threats, develop strategy to counter them, and then act before the emergency happens. 
Thus these partnerships are both operational—by preventing emergencies—as well as 
managerial—by developing strategies and sharing information between partners.  
Thus, the main insight this data reveals is that depending on how a partnership 
decides to run—operationally or managerially—the time frame surrounding an 
emergency in which it operates may be influenced. 
 
5. Partnerships with a broad focus involve larger numbers of partners. 
Partnerships with a narrow focus involve fewer numbers of partners.  
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Table 5.10: Focus of Task and Number of Partners  
 
This data illustrates that all partnerships that focus on broad services engage a 
large number of partners (ten or more). Also, all partnerships that only engage a few 
partners (1-4) are narrow in scope. The reverse is not true however; not all 
partnerships that address narrow missions engage few partners. Of the 10 partnerships 
with narrow focuses, five engage few partners, 4 engage many (5-10) and one 
engages a large number (10 or more). All tasks that focus on services that are between 
narrow and broad in specificity engage large numbers of partners as well. This data 
reveals that in general, the more broad the task being performed by a partnership, the 
larger the number of partners that are involved. This is logical because as the scope of 
a task increases, the number of people that have stake in that task (stakeholders) 
should increase. It should be a goal of an architect to include as many stakeholders in 
a partnership as possible for both productivity and sustainability reasons. This finding 
is not explicitly stated in any of the privatization literature referenced in this study, 
but seems to be a logical conclusion that could be made about all partnerships, not 
just ones that focus on providing EPER services. 
 
6. Partnerships with an exclusively narrow, operational focus tend to be seen in 
response stage of EPER. Partnerships with an exclusively broad, managerial 
focus tend to be seen when the partnership addresses both the preparedness and 
response stages of EPER.  
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10) 
Few (1-4) 
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Table 5.11: Focus of Task and Stage of EPER 
 
Of the 9 response and recovery oriented partnerships, all are operational 
partnerships with narrow focuses and missions (except for the Red Cross CAN 
partnership). This is not a surprising result. The nature of response services are that 
they tend to be location specific and address more specific immediate needs of the 
general public or damaged infrastructure. Thus, for many response partnerships, 
acting operationally—as opposed to managerially—should be expected.  
It is interesting that the three exclusively managerial partnerships discovered 
through this research all address both stages of response—preparedness and response. 
In other words exclusively managerial tasks, with no operational component, only 
surface for partnerships that address all stages of response. This is logical due to the 
enlarged missions that come along with addressing multiple stages of EPER. By 
addressing several stages of response, acting operationally becomes more difficult as 
the focus is to large; therefore, one would expect managerial partnerships to emerge 
for partnerships that broadly address all stages of response. There are two 
KEY     
Stage of EPER Recovery Response All Preparedness 
Focus of Task Managerial n/a Both Operational 
Specificity of 
Service 
Broad n/a Middle Narrow 
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partnerships—the MRC and the Local Incident Command—that address both stages 
of EPER but are operational. This is due to the narrow missions of those partnerships 
despite their efforts to address issues in both stages of EPER. On the other hand, the 
three exclusively managerial partnerships have very broad missions in their attempt to 
address all stages of response. 
The three preparedness partnerships (SPIN, DNC, and Regional Info Sharing) 
categorized as ‘both’ for focus of task include both operational and managerial 
services however. Thus, another insight is that no managerial tasks surfaced for 
exclusively response services; there are managerial components of some preparedness 
services, but there are no managerial components for response services. This is not 
surprising either. In response, partners have a pretty good idea of what they are 
dealing with and how to operate accordingly. However, in preparedness, there is still 
a huge speculative function since what to prepare against is not an exact science. 
Therefore, one would expect to see managerial as well as operational tasks in 
preparedness services in order to address issues in strategy and implementation. 
 
7. Partnerships that provide response services utilize formal tools. 
Partnerships that provide preparedness services do not use formal agreements. 
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Table 5.12: Stage of EPER and Formal Tools 
 
According to the data, there are no formal or informal agreements used when 
designing partnerships for preparedness. This includes partnerships that address all 
stages of EPER. It is only during the response and relief partnerships where contracts 
are signed, grants are awarded, or informal privacy agreements are utilized. Two 
partnerships utilize informal agreements in their partnership framework. The Red 
Cross has members sign privacy agreements agreeing not to share client data and 
America’s Second Harvest (A2H) signs contracts with several food companies in 
order to ensure continuity in the donations of their relief effort. The three partnerships 
that utilize formal tools are better developed partnership types: contracts and a grant.  
This data shows that formal and informal agreements are more common in 
response partnerships. This is most likely because of the nature of response 
partnerships. Since response partnerships are activated after an emergency has 
occurred, the partners know that situation they are dealing with and are able to act 
accordingly. Response partnerships tend to be more operational in nature and have 
more narrow missions; since the services provided are highly specified, they are 
easier to write into a contract. On the other hand, preparedness services are fraught 
with uncertainty and often try to accomplish relatively larger missions, making 
contracts even more difficult. For partnerships that address both stages, missions 
often become even larger and thus these partnerships would be the most difficult to 
use formal and informal tools. This is a clear relationship between a decision an 
architect can make about what tools to use to format the partnership and the stage of 
EPER that the partnership is meant to address. 
 
8. Partnerships that provide preparedness services tend to address the entire 
spectrum of possible severity outcomes, whereas partnerships that provide 
response and recovery services vary in the severity of harm they address. 
 
 
KEY     
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Agreements 
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Table 5.13: Stage of EPER and Severity of Harm 
 
This data reveals primarily that preparedness services address the entire range 
of severity outcomes whereas response services tend to address a subset of that range. 
This is logical because of the uncertainty in the preparedness function. On the most 
part, preparedness efforts address the range of severity outcomes because any given 
event that they are preparing for can have a range of severity outcomes. Preparedness 
partnerships are consistently active before an emergency and thus don’t have a 
severity outcome to trigger their activation. On the other hand, response services 
become operational after an emergency occurs and the severity is known. Therefore 
response partnerships have the luxury of being able to choose when to respond since 
severity is a known variable. For preparedness, severity is unknown and can therefore 
not be a design choice by the architect. Response partnerships can chose to respond to 
the entire range of severities—like the Aid Matrix, NIPP and Localized Incident 
KEY       
Stage of EPER Recovery Response All n/a Preparedness n/a 
Severity of Harm Catastrophic Severe to 
catastrophic 
Severe Minor to 
Severe 
Minor All 
Severities 
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Command do—but the point is they are able to chose, whereas that is much more 
difficult for preparedness partnerships to do. 
9. Partnerships that provide preparedness services tend to operate before an 
emergency (ex-ante), and partnerships that provide response services tend to 
operate after an emergency (ex-post). Partnerships that provide both 
preparedness and response services tend to operate continuously. 
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Table 5.14: Stage of EPER and Activation Period 
 
This conclusion is a natural result of the definition of these two attributes. 
‘Stage of EPER’ describes the stage of the emergency management effort that a 
partnership is operating within. ‘Activation Period’ describes the period, around the 
emergency itself, that a partnership is activated and operational. It is clear from the 
data that (1) a partnership that addresses preparedness services will operate ex-ante—
before an emergency (2) a partnership that addresses response will operate ex-post—
after an emergency and (3) a partnership that addressed all stages of EPER will 
operate continuously.  
The exception is the Local Incident Command. This partnership addresses 
both stages of EPER but is only active after the emergency. This may seem 
KEY      
Stage of EPER Recovery Response All n/a Preparedness 
Activation Period Continuous n/a Ex-Post n/a Ex-Ante 
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counterintuitive. However, the preparedness service for this partnership is merely a 
tour of the company’s facilities for the fire department. The operational phase of the 
partnership, where plans are carried out and the partners interact as the partnership 
intended, is in response. This partnership was created by a large corporation in the 
Midwest and the fire department in order to make the fire fighters job easier in the 
event of an emergency and to prevent as many losses as possible to the company by 
expediting the response process. In order to achieve these goals, there are a few 
preparedness services that are implemented, but they are hardly frequent enough to 
classify this partnership as continuous.  
 
10. Partnerships that operate before an emergency (ex-ante) do not exist for 
large scale anticipated disasters. Partnerships that operate continuously tend to 
be created for anticipated emergencies of national geographic scope. 
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Table 5.15: Stage of EPER and Geographic Scale 
KEY      
Stage of EPER recovery Response All n/a Preparedness 
Activation Period Continuous n/a Ex-post n/a Ex-ante 
Geo Scale of 
Emergency 
Nation Region State City Point 
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From the table it is apparent that all ex-ante partnerships address exclusively 
the preparedness stage of EPER. Similarly, ex-post partnerships address exclusively 
the response and/or recovery stages of EPER. Continuous partnerships tend to address 
all stages of EPER. Preparedness partnerships that act exclusively before an 
emergency (ex-ante) do not exist at anticipated geographic scales for the emergency 
that are larger than a state. On the other hand, response partnerships that are 
exclusively active after an emergency (ex-post) exist on the entire range of 
geographic scales. Partnerships that are continuously operating and thus provide both 
preparedness and response services before and after an emergency, act exclusively at 
a level where the largest geographic scale of emergency that is confronted is national.  
Therefore, continuous partnerships address the widest range of geographic 
scales whereas exclusively ex-ante partnerships address the smallest range of 
geographic scales. This result is difficult to explain. It is apparent from the data that 
there is a link between when the partnership operates and the geographic scale of an 
emergency that the partnership intends to address. Why preparedness services that 
operate before an emergency are more common for small scale anticipated 
emergencies is unclear. Also, why continuously operating partnerships that address 
preparedness and response both before and after an emergency exist only for 
anticipated emergencies of national scope is unclear as well. The later may be true 
due to difficulties in maintaining the capacity to respond to incidents of national 
scope; the continuous partnerships—BCLC, BRT, NIPP and MRC—are constantly 
active in order to remain prepared to respond at a range of scopes.  
 
11. Partnerships that address only natural hazards tend to equally share all 
information. Hazards involving man-made threats may deal with sensitive 
information if the information is less evenly shared. 
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Table 5.16: Type of Emergency and Sensitivity of Information 
 
Since there is only one case study that addresses exclusively man-made 
incidents, the data can not be conclusive about how this type of emergency relates to 
information issues. However, for all of the partnerships that address exclusively 
natural disasters, the information required to operate the partnership is all public 
domain and all partners share that information equally. For all-hazards partnerships, 
the sensitivity of information varies and is not always equally shared among partners. 
One would expect the most sensitive information to be utilized for man-made threats 
since much of the information used in countering events like terrorism is highly 
sensitive classified intelligence. Information about natural disasters is much less 
sensitive and generally accessible.  
KEY     
Type of Emergency 
Confronted 
Man-Made n/a All-Hazards Natural 
Degree of Info 
Sharing 
Uneven 
Sharing 
n/a n/a All-Shared 
Sensitivity of 
Information 
Highly 
Sensitive 
Sensitive Public to 
sensitive 
Public 
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This conclusion is interesting because it sheds light on the ease of operation in 
a partnership. Uneven information sharing will inevitably pose problems between 
partners. This can be due to difficulties setting up platforms for information sharing, 
trust issues that emerge when information is withheld, and operational difficulties 
when different partners are privileged to different information. Therefore uneven 
information sharing should only be intentionally selected by an architect if the 
sensitivity of the information warrants it. From this data one can assume that 
information issues should not pose problems for partnerships that address exclusively 
natural disasters, but should be considered for all hazards partnerships and potentially 
those that address only man-made incidents as well. 
 
12. Large scale disasters are paired with partnerships for national services, and 
point disasters are paired with partnerships for small scope services.  
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Table 5.17: Scale of Service and Geographic Scale 
 
KEY      
Scale of Service Nation Region State City Point 
Geo Scale of 
Emergency 
Nation Region State City Point 
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One would expect the scale of the service to reflect the scale of the disaster 
that service is trying to confront. This data shows a clear relationship between the 
scale of the service being provided and the scale of the emergency. In only two cases 
do the two attributes not mirror each other: MRC and Back to Business Workshops. 
These partnerships are exceptions because their architects chose to organize their 
implementation components on a smaller scale than the disaster itself. For the 
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) volunteers are recruited and deployed on a city-by-
city basis. An event might affect an entire state or region, but then several city MRCs 
would become operational. The implementation unit is smaller than the event unit in 
the case in order to ease response coordination. In the wake of hurricane Katrina—a 
regional event—the Back to Business Workshops were provided in three different 
cities in the south east. Because the product was a workshop that had to be given at a 
specific location, these workshops were organized at the city level. Thus for these two 
examples, in order to ease implementation, the architects of the partnership chose to 
reduce the unit for the scale of service.  
In every other case however, the scale of service (the level at which the 
service is implemented or coordinated) exactly matches the geographic scale of the 
anticipated emergency. Thus, one would expect to see a state level partnership to 
address the state level problem of tornados in the Midwest and a regional level 
partnership to address the regional problem of hurricanes in the south east, for 
example. 
 
5.2.4 New, Counter-Intuitive Conclusions 
In addition to the new, expected conclusions, there are also some conclusions 
that were expected, but not found in the patterns and trends. 
 
1. There is no correlation between the stage of EPER and the degree of 
information sharing or the sensitivity of information.  
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Table 5.18: Stage of EPER and Sensitivity of Information 
 
It is often believed that preparedness services deal with more sensitive 
information than response services. Therefore, one would expect to see a relationship 
between the stage of EPER and the sensitivity of information used in the partnership. 
However, this data does not definitively reveal that conclusion. Two of the four 
preparedness partnerships deal with sensitive information. Two response partnerships 
(out of 9) also deal with sensitive information. The partnerships that deal with 
sensitive information—Technical Assistance Contract and Red Cross CAN—are not 
dealing with highly sensitive intelligence information. Red Cross CAN is dealing 
with client privacy issues and the Technical Assistance Contract is concerned with the 
proprietary information of the contractors. Therefore, the sensitive information found 
in preparedness partnerships is relatively more sensitive than the information found in 
response partnerships, but not all preparedness partnerships deal with highly sensitive 
information. This data therefore shows the presence of sensitive information in 
preparedness partnerships, but it is not related as strongly as one might believe. 
KEY     
Stage of EPER Recovery Response All Preparedness 
Sensitivity of 
Information 
Highly Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive to 
Public 
Public 
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2. There is no correlation between the scale of the service and the specificity of 
the service and the focus of the task. 
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Table 5.19: Focus of Task and Scale of Service  
 
These three attributes are all functional—meaning they should be pre-
determined based on the service a partnership is trying to provide. One would expect 
the scale of a service—how large the area of potential beneficiaries and operations 
is—to be linked to how narrow or broad the task being performed is. This relationship 
would seem to be logical at first, however the data reveals an interesting reframing of 
that observation. According to the data, operational as well as managerial tasks can be 
national in scope. Managerial tasks tend to be exclusively national, but operational 
tasks run the range of scales. Therefore, extremely broad missions may affect the 
scale of service, but narrowness does not imply that the scale need be any smaller. As 
long as a mission/ service is well defined, then it can scale up to many levels is the 
partnership has the operational capacity. Thus, how high up a partnership scales is not 
a function of how narrow the task is, but may be a function of how much capacity the 
KEY      
Scale of Service Nation Region State City Point 
Focus of Task Managerial n/a Both n/a Operational 
Specificity of 
Service 
Broad n/a Middle n/a Narrow 
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partnership has to scale up.  It is interesting that while narrowness does not lead to 
any conclusions about the scale of service, the broadness does. It is logical that 
partnerships with very broad missions that tend to be managerial—providing best 
practices as an intermediary—would tend to be operated at a national scale in order to 
involve the most partners for collaboration and information sharing. 
 
5.2.5 New, Weak Conclusions 
In addition to the expected and counter-intuitive conclusions this research 
discovered, there are also several conclusions for which a convincing argument can 
be made, but sufficient data is not present to convincingly support it. Thus, the 
following conclusions are promising with a larger data set, but are not as strong as the 
previous new conclusions. 
 
1. Partnerships that have a broad, managerial focus have emerged in the last few 
years. 
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KEY     
Start Date 2002-present 
(post DHS) 
2000-2002 (Pre-
DHS) 
1990’s 1980s 
Focus of Task Managerial Both Both Operational 
Specificity of 
Service 
Broad Middle Narrow n/a 
 
Table 5.20: Start Date and Focus of Task 
 
Of the 11 operational partnerships, four were initiated in the 1980s and 1990s. 
There were no managerial partnerships initiated during the same time frame 
according to the data set used for this study. Operational partnerships, however, have 
been consistently created over the last 30 years. Therefore, managerial partnerships 
may be seen as a ‘newer’ form of partnership that began in 2003 with the NIPP. The 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) laid out a framework for the private 
sector to begin coordinating within relevant infrastructure sectors in order to improve 
overall preparedness. This federal level EPER partnership was ultimately bourne 
from the creation of a new Department (Department of Homeland Security) after 
September 11, 2001. This event brought a lot of focus on the capacity of the federal 
government to prepare for and respond to disasters; Hurricane Katrina in 2005 then 
reinforced this focus.  
Therefore, in 2006, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Business 
Roundtable (BRT) and the BCLC both created taskforces that would provide a means 
for the private sector to interface with the federal government in the realm of EPER. 
The BRT and BCLC were both created to be intermediaries between the large federal 
government EPER operation and vulnerable and interested private sector partners. 
These types of intermediaries were not needed until federal EPER services were fully 
concentrated in a new government bureaucracy. Therefore, it is logical that over time 
an intermediary function would emerge as an essential EPER task. It is thus a 
hypothesis of this study that the emergence of DHS as a federal warehouse of all 
public EPER services encouraged the emergence of broader and more managerial 
EPER partnerships in the 2000s.  
 
2. Partnerships that have a broad, managerial focus with a broad focus and a 
managerial approach address emergencies that are national in scale.  
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Table 5.21: Geographic Scale of Emergency and Focus of Task 
 
All of the managerial partnerships studied explicitly focus on events that are 
of national scale. The ‘nation’ category is inclusive of all of the other scale degrees: 
region, state, city and point. Thus, these managerial partnerships have the largest 
range of geographic scale as well. These partnerships are thus designed to be able to 
handle local emergencies as well as one with national significance; thus it is not 
surprising they are managerial in nature since one of their most important services is 
developing best practices to be applied at any scale of emergency.  
However, there are four partnerships—MRC, A2H, Aid Matrix, CAN—that 
also strive to address the full range of geographic scopes, but are more operational in 
nature. These have much more narrow missions than the managerial partnerships 
however. The NIPP, BRT and BCLC all act as disseminators of information for their 
partners and many types of services are then provided under that umbrella. MRC, 
A2H, Aid Matrix, and CAN all have specific services that they strive to provide at a 
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Focus of Task Managerial n/a Both n/a Operational 
Specificity of 
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  114
national level, respectively: (1) provide medical support for response efforts; (2) 
distribute food to affected areas in the response effort; (3) track donations in order to 
eliminate duplication and confusion post-emergency and; (4) coordinate NGO client 
data after an emergency. Therefore, for narrow missions, operational services can 
exist for emergencies of national scope. The main insight from this data is that 
managerial services do not exist for scales that are not inclusive of national events. 
Therefore, managerial services tend to be created for emergencies of the largest 
possible scale and range of scales. 
 
3. Early on, all partnerships were collaborative in communication. As time has 
passed, some remain collaborative but top down and mixture modes have 
emerged as well. 
 
Ptnship 
Name Lo
ca
l I
n
ci
de
n
t C
o
m
m
an
d 
A
2H
 
D
isa
st
er
 
R
el
ie
f 
O
ffi
ce
 
D
ep
o
t F
o
u
n
da
tio
n
 
ES
R
I P
ro
jec
t I
m
pa
ct
 
Ty
so
n
's
 
D
isa
st
er
 
R
el
ie
f 
R
ed
 
Cr
o
ss
 
CA
N
 
SP
IN
 
pa
rt
n
er
sh
ip
 
M
R
C 
D
N
C 
Pa
rt
n
er
sh
ip
 
N
IP
P 
A
id
 
M
at
rix
 
Pr
o
jec
t 
Te
ch
n
.
 
A
ss
ist
an
ce
 
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 
In
fo
 
Sh
ar
in
g 
A
bb
o
t  
Co
n
tr
ib
u
tio
n
s 
K
at
rin
a 
Ca
ll 
Ce
n
te
r 
 
B
ac
k 
to
 
B
u
sin
es
s 
W
ks
hp
s 
B
R
T 
B
CL
C 
Start Date 
                  
Type of 
Interaction 
                  
Structure p
u
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
G
ra
n
t 
Co
n
tr
ac
t 
pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
b.
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
Co
n
tr
ac
t 
Pu
bl
ic
 
SA
O
 
fa
ci
lit
at
ed
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
fa
ci
lit
at
ed
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5.22: Start Date and Type of Interaction  
 
The fact that partnerships operating under top-down communication structures 
did not emerge until 2002, according to these case studies, is not surprising. After 
September 11, 2001 and again after Hurricane Katrina in October of 2005, several 
KEY     
Start Date 2002-present 
(post-DHS) 
2000-2002 
(pre-DHS) 
1990s 1980s 
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partnerships emerged that chose this type of communication dynamic. However, there 
were several partnerships that emerged post 9-11 that chose not to embrace a top-
down communication model, but a collaborative one. Of the three partnerships 
created post 9/11 to provide goods to affected areas after a disaster (Tyson’s Disaster 
Relief, Aid Matrix, Abbot Contributions), only one is top-down. Therefore, the 
observation is not that 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina influenced completely the nature 
of communication. Instead, it is observed that before these events, that type of 
communication did not exist at all.  
It seems that top-down and mixture (both top-down and collaborative 
components present) communication methods have been emergent ways to operate 
EPER partnerships. It may appear that top-down communication methods are 
somewhat antiquated and may be a step back. Accepted methods for operating 
partnerships tend to move in cycles however. This is illustrated by many Public 
Private Partnerships for public infrastructure over the past 30 years. There have been 
cycles, lasting approximately 10 years, which shift preferences between complete 
private operation, complete public operation, and collaborative arrangements. Thus, it 
is not surprising that preferred methods for communication would cycle as well—
especially after events where communication failures were perceived as one of the 
largest reasons the response was flawed. Top-down communication is not optimal for 
all partnerships and may affect sustainability, but in the face of high-pressure high-
consequence emergency situations, a direct and clear chain of command may be the 
most desirable communication structure in some cases. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
The following boxes display a summary of the conclusions found in this 
research: 
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CONFIRMATORY CONCLUSIONS 
1. The formal tools used to provide a service influence the partnership’s 
structure. Contracts and Grants tend to use formal agreements, whereas 
informal agreements show up in collaborative structures. 
2. The motivational attributes influence the partnership’s structure. The sectors 
that possess the motivational attributes will be a factor in which structure is 
appropriate.  
3. The motivational attributes influence the sectors chosen to be partners and 
those sectors that are beneficiaries or stakeholders. For the services that are 
primarily private in operation, funding and responsibility, the private sector 
becomes the main partners. 
4. Partnerships with a narrow focus tend to be more operational in nature; 
partnerships with a broad focus tend to be more managerial.  
5. Partnerships with a broad focus do not use formal tools. The more narrow the 
focus, the more likely it is a contract or other legal agreement may be used. 
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NEW EXPECTED CONCLUSIONS 
1. Partnerships addressing events that effect people tend to be owned, operated, 
and financed by the private sector. 
2. Operational partnerships tend to be led by either one coordinator or a few key 
decision makers. The more managerial the partnership, the more likely a 
board is to be involved in the leadership. 
3. Partnerships with a narrow, operational focus and tend to use top down 
communication models. Collaborative communication models are used for 
both narrow, operational and broad, managerial focuses. 
4. Partnerships with a broad, managerial focus tend to operate continuously. 
Partnerships that operate exclusively before or after an emergency tend to 
have a narrow, operational focus.  
5. Partnerships with a broad focus involve larger numbers of partners. 
Partnerships with a narrow focus involve fewer numbers of partners.  
6. Partnerships with an exclusively narrow, operational focus tend to be seen in 
response stage of EPER. Partnerships with an exclusively broad, managerial 
focus tend to be seen when the partnership addresses both the preparedness 
and response stages of EPER.  
7. Partnerships that provide response services utilize formal tools. Partnerships 
that provide preparedness services do not use formal agreements. 
8. Partnerships that provide preparedness services tend to address the entire 
spectrum of possible severity outcomes, whereas partnerships that provide 
response and recovery services vary in the severity of harm they address. 
9. Partnerships that provide preparedness services tend to operate before an 
emergency (ex-ante), and partnerships that provide response services tend to 
operate after an emergency (ex-post). Partnerships that provide both 
preparedness and response services tend to operate continuously.  
10. Partnerships that operate before an emergency (ex-ante) do not exist for large 
scale anticipated disasters. Partnerships that operate continuously tend to be 
created for anticipated emergencies of national geographic scope. 
11. Partnerships that address only natural hazards tend to equally share all 
information. Hazards involving man-made threats may deal with sensitive 
information if the information is less evenly shared. 
12. Large scale disasters are paired with partnerships for national services, and 
point disasters are paired with partnerships for small scope services.  
 
NEW COUNTER-INTUITIVE CONCLUSIONS 
1. There is no correlation between the stage of EPER and the degree of 
information sharing or the sensitivity of information. 
2. There is no correlation between the scale of the service and the specificity of 
the service and the focus of the task.  
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This chapter described the case studies collected as data for this analysis and 
explained the patterns that those case studies illustrated. Chapter 6 will build on the 
conclusions described in this chapter in order to articulate the implications of these 
findings for EPER partnership architects and policy makers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEW WEAK CONCLUSIONS 
1. Partnerships that have a broad, managerial focus have emerged in the last few 
years. 
2. Partnerships that have a broad, managerial focus address emergencies that are 
national in scale.  
3. Early on, all partnerships were collaborative in communication. As time has 
passed, some remain collaborative but top down and mixture modes have 
emerged as well. 
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CHAPTER 6: Implications for Architects and Policy Makers 
  
6.1 Overview 
The findings detailed in chapter 5 outlined twenty-two correlations that were 
identified from the case study analysis on partnerships for emergency preparedness 
and response (EPER). These correlations offer some interesting insights for EPER 
partnership architects. When faced with an emergent EPER service, how should a 
partnership be structured to provide that service? Does the nature of the service that is 
being provided influence service provision? Depending on the emergencies that a 
service is trying to confront, will partnership structures also depend on event 
attributes? Are there any lessons from this analysis, based on past partnerships, which 
can shed light on how to best set up a partnership? This chapter will address these 
questions and inform architects and policy makers about the implications of these 
findings on their tasks as emergency managers.   
The overall correlations between the functional, event and structural attributes 
will be illustrated. Then these correlations will be presented and described in a 
decision chart form for architects. Ultimately, this chapter hopes to present the key 
findings from this research as applicable to designing EPER partnerships. 
6.2 Important Attribute Relationships for Architects 
In chapter 5, the relationships between individual attributes, as represented by 
the data, were discussed. This chapter relates those correlations to decisions that 
architects can make when designing an EPER partnership.   
 
FIGURE 6.1: Framework for Architecting EPER Partnerships 
 
Figure 6.1 describes the overall framework being explored in this study. 
Functional and Event attributes are assumed to be determined by the service the 
Event 
Attributes 
Functional 
Attributes 
Structural 
Attributes 
Decision Rules 
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partnership is providing; the architect cannot readily make decisions that influence 
these attributes. Thus these attributes resemble independent variables. On the other 
hand, the structural attributes are determined by the decisions of the architect and are 
thus the variables that must be described in terms of what independent variables 
influence them. Which functional and event attributes should influence the structural 
decisions of the architect? These relationships can be visualized with an N-squared 
matrix.  
FIGURE 6.2: N-Squared Matrix for Attribute Relationships 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the relationships between all twenty-two attributes. Some of 
the areas enclosed in the figure show how various groupings of attributes relate to 
C E 
F 
A 
B 
D 
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other attributes in their same classification: triangle A shows how structural attributes 
relate to each other; triangle D shows how functional attributes relate to each other 
and; triangle F shows how event attributes relate to each other. Square B highlights 
which event and functional attributes are related to one another. The two boxes that 
remain—B and C—relate functional and event attributes, respectively to structural 
attributes. Thus, those boxes—B and C—offer the most wealth of information in 
terms of informing architects about decisions they can make about how to structure a 
partnership based on the service they are trying to provide.  
The black squares represent correlations that were found in the data and 
indicated in privatization literature, or ‘confirmatory conclusions’ as discussed in 
chapter 5. The grey squares represent correlations that are relatively novel, or ‘new 
conclusions’ as discussed in chapter 5. The crossed out boxes represent correlations 
that were expected to exist, but the data did not show a relationship. Finally, the 
existence of a white square does not imply that there is not a relationship between 
those two variables; the limited data set of this research very well could have 
overlooked some other important relationships. Thus, this study will comment on the 
significance of the relationships that were found with the case studies, not 
relationships that were not. 
Though this figure adequately illustrates the general clumping of relationships 
between attribute categories, the relationships between individual attributes can be 
illustrated in other ways. Figures 6.3 through 6.5 show the how the functional and 
event attributes correlate to the structural attributes by showing individual linkages. 
Solid arrows represent confirmatory correlations; dotted lines represent new linkages. 
These figures are a step towards a decision framework that will enable an architect to 
make decision about the structure of a partnership based on the given functional and 
event attributes.  
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Figure 6.5 highlights the relationships between the independent partnership 
variables (functional and event attributes) and the dependent variables (structural 
attributes). This figure does not include the functional and event attributes that do not 
have a correlation to a structural attribute. It is these relationships that offer the most 
wealth for architects; once a service to be performed is known, the functional and 
event attributes can be determined and the conclusions found in this study can then be 
used to make decisions about the structural attributes. 
Building off Figures 6.3-6.5 there is yet another way to illustrate the 
relationships between attributes. It is difficult to say conclusively in which way the 
arrows on the connecting lines face; in most cases the relationships are bi-directional. 
However, it is useful to illustrate in a more concise fashion where the decision points 
are. Figure 6.6 illustrates the threads of relationships and decisions that can be made 
for the relevant attributes. The only attributes included in this figure are those that 
clearly influence structural decisions, including the overall structure of the 
partnership. In order to fully explain this figure, each thread will be highlighted as a 
decision tree and further described. This figure shows nine primary threads that will 
be discussed: 
1. Motivational Attributes Sectors Rep. by StakeholdersStructure 
2. Formal ToolsStructure 
3. Focus of Task/Specificity of ServiceType of Interaction, Leadership 
Structure, Formal Tools, Number of PartnersStructure 
4. Stage of EPER/Activation PeriodFocus of Task/Specificity of 
ServiceFormal ToolsStructure 
5. Stage of EPER/Activation PeriodFormal ToolsStructure 
6. Geographic Scale of Emergency (Scale of Service)Focus of 
Task/Specificity of ServiceFormal ToolsStructure 
7. Type of HarmMotivational AttributesStructure 
8. Start Date Type of Interaction 
9. Type of Emergency Confronted Sensitivity of InformationDegree of 
Information Sharing 
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FIGURE 6.6: Relationship Paths to Structural Decisions 
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6.2.1 Decision Making Framework for Structuring EPER Partnerships 
The following figures and explanations will better describe the paths between 
the independent partnership variables and the dependent variables. Lines and arrows 
do not imply a direct and absolute relationship, only a correlation. Just because one 
attribute’s value is correlated to another attribute’s value does not mean that the 
correlation is always true, just that it was observed in the data. Thus, these figures 
should not be interpreted as absolute decision rules, but as guides built on emergent 
patterns observed through historical partnerships. 
1. Motivational Attributes Sectors Rep. by StakeholdersStructure 
 
FIGURE 6.7: Relating Motivational Attributes to Structure 
 
This figure represents several general pathways. Path 1 illustrates that if the 
public sector possesses all of the legitimacy, responsibility, financing capacity, 
operational capacity, service expertise and resources, the architect usually selects to 
engage only the public sector and the partnership becomes structured as public supply 
and operation. On the other hand if the private sector possesses most of the 
motivational attributes, then the architect is most likely to chose to engage the private 
sector and NGOs and thus structure the partnership as a private-private collaboration; 
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3 
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this is shown by path 3. Path 2 shows the final option: if the motivation attributes are 
shared then the entire range of partners are possible to engage and thus any 
partnership structure could be appropriate, depending on what partners are engaged.  
These pathways illustrate the importance of determining what sectors possess 
the motivational attributes for a service before choosing partners and ultimately the 
structure for a partnership. This pathway is well understood in privatization literature 
and is applicable to EPER partnerships as well according to this research. Thus the 
first lesson for an EPER architect is to determine what sectors should be involved in a 
partnership by identifying which possess the required legitimacy, financing, 
operational capacity, resources and responsibility.  
 
2. Formal Tools Structure 
FIGURE 6.8: Relating Formal Tools to Structure 
 
These pathways are also well understood in traditional privatization literature 
and according to this research also apply to partnerships for emergency preparedness 
and response. Pathway 1 illustrates that formal agreements may only exist for 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON ONE: Determine what sectors should be 
involved in a partnership by identifying which possess the required 
legitimacy, financing, operational capacity, resources and 
responsibility. 
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contracts and grants, not any other EPER partnership structures identified in this 
research. This follows directly from the definition of a contract and a grant (see 
section 2.3.1). These structures utilize legal agreements to specify the terms of a 
partnership—including how much payment will be received by the producer and what 
degree of service should be provided. Pathway 2 shows the link between the use of 
informal instruments and private-private collaboration structures. Pathway 3 
illustrates that for all structures other than contracts and grants, no formal or informal 
arrangements may be necessary. The exception of course is that informal agreements 
are utilized in some cases in private-private collaborations, but in means are they 
required. 
Thus, these relationships show a direct link between two structural attributes 
that an architect has decision making authority over. Once the formal or informal 
tools desired are selected, a partnership structure becomes more straight-forward to 
select. However, the fact that if no agreements are used a wide variety of structures 
are available, shows that the architect is still allowed a lot of freedom in selecting 
structures based on the nuances of the service being provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Focus of Task/Specificity of Service Type of Interaction, Leadership 
Structure, Formal Tools, Number of PartnersStructure 
 
There are several structural attributes that the focus of task/ specificity of 
service influences. Thus, this section will identify how this functional attribute, once 
determined, can help architects to select several structural characteristics for the 
partnership being created. 
ARCHITECTUAL LESSON TWO: Narrow down the options for 
partnership structure by identifying the types of agreements the 
partnership will employ between partners. 
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FIGURE 6.9: Relating Focus of Task/Specificity of Service to Type of Interaction 
 
Figure 6.9 illustrates how the focus of the task or service being provided by the 
partnership can influence how the partners will interact throughout the partnership. Once 
a mission is defined, that mission can be characterized as narrow, middle or broad in 
scope (specificity of service). Pathway 1 illustrates that narrow missions may be the only 
scope suitable for top-down communication structures. However, the primary insight is 
not that operational and narrow partnerships can be top-down, but that managerial 
partnerships are typically not. Pathway 2 shows that managerial partnerships, due to their 
more vague nature, would be very difficult to operate in a top-down fashion and are more 
likely to be either collaborative or have a mixture of both types of interaction.  
These pathways reveal that once the breadth of mission is established, how 
partners should interact throughout the partnership may be determined. For narrow 
operational missions, this study reveals that any type of interaction may be possible; for 
broad managerial missions, top-down communication was not seen in the data. 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON THREE: Once the scope of the mission of 
a partnership has been determined, the way in which partners may 
interact during the partnership can be determined. 
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FIGURE 6.10: Relating Focus of Task/Specificity of Service to Leadership Structure 
 
Figure 6.10 illustrates that the focus of the task/specificity of service can also 
help an architect to specify the leadership structure of the partnership. Pathway 1 
illustrates that for this study, narrow operational missions tend to be led by a 
coordinator or a few key decision makers. This is not surprising; when the task the 
partnership accomplishes is highly specified it is much more likely and able to be 
managed by a few key people. Pathway 2 shows that for broad managerial missions, 
the guidance of a board may also be necessary in order to maintain the strategic 
component of managerial focuses. Therefore, the key insight in this data set is that as 
partnerships enlarge their mission and become more managerial, a board may become 
more necessary to guide the direction of the partnership. 
For an architect, this means that once the scope of the mission has been 
determined, the leadership structure of the partnership may be established based on 
the experience of previous EPER partnerships. 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON FOUR: Once the scope of the mission of 
a partnership has been determined, and appropriate leadership 
structure for the partners may be determined. 
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FIGURE 6.11: Relating Focus of Task/Specificity of Service to Structure 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the pathways between the focus of the task and the formal 
tools appropriate for the partnership. This pathway thus elaborates on the formal tools 
to structure pathway discussed in Figure 6.8; this second part of the pathway in 
figure 6.11 is identical to the one discussed in figure 6.8. Pathway 1 above reveals 
that formal or informal tools may be appropriate only for tasks that are narrow in 
scope. However, this does not imply that all narrow/operational missions require 
formal or informal arrangement. For the EPER partnerships studied in this thesis, no 
other breadth of mission scope was deemed appropriate for formal or informal tools 
(and thus contract or grant structures) though not all narrow missions required these 
tools to be provided. This finding is also well discussed in privatization literature and 
according to this study is also applicable to EPER partnerships. 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON FIVE: Once the scope of the mission of a 
partnership has been determined, the appropriate agreements 
between partners may be established which helps to determine the 
overall structure for the partnership.  
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FIGURE 6.12: Relating Focus of Task/Specificity of Service to Number of Partners 
 
Figure 6.12 illustrates how the focus of task/specificity of service can help an 
architect determine the number of partners to engage in the partnership structure. 
Pathway 2 reveals that in general, the more broad the task being performed by a 
partnership, the larger the number of partners that are involved. This is logical 
because as the scope of a task increases, the number of people that have stake in that 
task (stakeholders) should increase. It should be a goal of an architect to include as 
many stakeholders in a partnership as possible for both productivity and sustainability 
reasons. The narrower the task, as illustrated by pathway 1, the less partners are 
required to implement the service due to the smaller number of stakeholders. These 
pathways serve only to give an architect and idea about how ‘big’ their partnership 
will need to be in order to accomplish the stated mission by bringing all relevant 
parties to the table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Stage of EPER/Activation PeriodFocus of Task/Specificity of 
ServiceFormal ToolsStructure 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON SIX: Once the scope of the mission of 
partnership has been determined, the approximate range for the 
number of partners that should be engaged in operating the 
partnership may be determined. 
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FIGURE 6.13: Relating Stage of EPER/ Activation Period to Structure 
 
Figure 6.11 illustrated how the focus of task/specificity of service can guide 
decisions about partnership structure. Figure 6.13 above shows that there is an event 
attribute—stage of EPER/Activation Period—that can influence the functional 
attribute discussed in figure 6.11. Pathways 3 illustrates that operational/narrow 
missions, which are appropriate for formal and informal agreements and are typically 
structured as contracts or grants, are well suited for response services that act after an 
emergency. Pathway 1 confirms this correlation between response services and the 
use of formal and informal agreements: another linkage shown by the data. Pathway 2 
illustrates that preparedness services tend to address missions that are ‘middle’ in 
scope and the partnerships provide both operational and managerial components.  
Thus, there is no distinctive pathway between preparedness services and structure, as 
illustrated by Figure 6.13. Therefore, the architect has a lot of freedom in making 
decisions about how to structure these types of partnerships since historical 
partnerships do not have patterns or trends to offer according to this study’s data set. 
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5. Geographic Scale of EmergencyFocus of Task/Specificity of Service 
Formal ToolsStructure 
 
 
FIGURE 6.14: Relating Geographic Scale of Emergency to Structure 
 
Specific pathways are not listed in figure because the arrows connecting the 
event attribute—geographic scale of emergency—to the functional attribute—focus 
of task/specificity of service—all illustrate one point. Managerial services were not 
seen for scales that are not inclusive of national events. Therefore, managerial 
services tend to be created for emergencies of the largest possible scale and range of 
scales. This figure reveals that for all degrees of scope, operational and ‘both’ 
partnerships exist. However, managerial partnerships only exist, according to the data 
set, at a national scale. Thus unless and architect is facing a national task, it maybe 
unlikely that a managerial approach for running the partnership is required. 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON SEVEN: The stage of EPER to be 
addressed in the service influences both the focus of the task and the 
formal tools and therefore may inform the appropriate structure for 
the partnership. 
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However, this result offers little guidance for architects in terms of how to 
structure their partnership. Since no relationships exist between the focus of the task 
and the formal tools used in the partnership for a managerial/broad mission, there is 
no linkage to structure. Thus, even though managerial partnerships were only seen for 
partnerships that address national emergencies, this offers little insight, in terms of 
structure, for the architect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Type of HarmMotivational AttributesStructure 
 
FIGURE 6.15: Relating Type of Harm to Structure 
 
Pathway 1 illustrates that for partnerships that address events that harm 
people, the private sector possesses the most motivational attributes and thus provides 
Type of Harm  
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON EIGHT: Once the emergency that is 
being confronted by a partnership is identified and the geographic 
scale of its impact is specified, the focus of the task/ specificity of 
service that results from those categorizations may help to inform 
structural decisions. 
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the service as a private-private partnership. On the other hand, pathways 2 and 3 show 
that for events that harm things or both people and things, the motivational attributes 
are primarily public or shared between the sectors.  Therefore for partnerships that 
address harm to things or both things and people, structures will range from public 
SAOs (if the public sector possesses the motivational attributes) to collaboration (if 
the motivational attributes are shared). 
Thus, if the architect determines, according to the service they intend to 
provide, what harm they are trying to prevent, they can be guided by past partnerships 
in making structural decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Start Date Type of Interaction 
 
 
FIGURE 6.16: Relating Start Date to Type of Interaction 
 
This figure illustrates that over time architects have had a greater range of 
interaction choices available to them. Before 2000, this study found no partnerships 
that utilized top-down interaction. Therefore, it seems that top-down and mixture 
(both top-down and collaborative components present) communication methods may 
be emergent ways to operate EPER partnerships. Essentially, this finding indicates 
that architects may have more freedom in selecting interaction structures because 
there seems to be no clear pattern for success: all do reasonably well. However, 
figure 6.9 should influence the architect in this decision as well—operational 
partnerships tend to be more top-down and managerial partnerships tend to be more 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON NINE: The type of harm a partnership 
intends to address may inform the structure of the partnership. 
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collaborative. Figure 6.16 primarily displays the effect of time on interaction choices 
and, though a weaker guideline, may offer some insight for the architect as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Type of Emergency Confronted Sensitivity of InformationDegree of 
Information Sharing 
 
FIGURE 6.17: Relating Type of Emergency Confronted to Degree of Information 
Sharing 
 
Pathway 1 shows that for partnerships that counter natural disasters 
exclusively, the majority of the information required to operate the partnership may 
be in the public domain. Thus, these partnerships are characterized by the even 
sharing of information with all partners equally informed. According to the data, this 
is not true for partnerships that confront either man-made or all-hazards events. For 
all-hazards partnerships, the sensitivity of information varies and is not always 
equally shared among partners. Therefore uneven information sharing should only be 
intentionally selected by an architect if the sensitivity of the information requires it. 
From this data one can assume that information issues should not pose problems for 
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ARCHITECTUAL LESSON TEN: Over time, the options for 
interaction structures between partners may have enlarged, giving 
the architect relatively more discretion in this structural decision. 
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partnerships that address exclusively natural disasters, but should be considered for 
all hazards partnerships and potentially those that address only man-made incidents as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These twelve architectural lessons serve primarily to guide an architect in the 
decision making process required to set up a new EPER partnership. This analysis has 
revealed that several structural attributes—characteristics that are defined by the 
architect—have clear linkages to several functional and event attributes—
characteristics that are independent of an architect’s decision making process. 
Therefore, when presented with an EPER service to provide through a partnership, an 
architect should reference the above lessons in order to utilize historical lessons from 
EPER partnerships.  
These lessons are by no means comprehensive and do not fully describe all 
the questions an architect should be asking when designing an EPER partnership. All 
of the attributes studied in this thesis will need to be defined, but some attributes are 
more open to architectural creativity than others, as illustrated by the relatively few 
concrete patterns that emerged through this study. This leaves a lot of flexibility for 
architects in designing EPER partnerships. In general, partnerships are dynamic 
entities and must adapt to changes in their environment. Thus, the lessons asked 
above may need to be continually re-evaluated along with other considerations. 
Figure 6.6 should be seen as a tool that can help EPER architects to be mindful of the 
relationships between the characteristics of their partnership and several interaction 
effects. 
ARCHITECTUAL LESSON ELEVEN: Once the hazards that a 
partnership will address are defined, the degree of information 
sharing present between partners can be established. 
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FIGURE 6.18: Summary of Architectural Lessons 
 
6.3 Implications of Findings for Policymakers 
In order to fully understand what these findings mean for policy makers, who 
are also sometimes the architects in EPER partnerships, the current procedures for 
EPER partnerships must be understood. This section will describe the current US 
system for EPER partnerships and then discuss what lessons this research can offer 
policy makers in the future. 
 
LESSON ONE: Determine what sectors should be involved in a partnership by 
identifying which possess the required legitimacy, financing, operational capacity, 
resources and responsibility. 
LESSON TWO: Narrow down the options for partnership structure by identifying 
the types of agreements the partnership will employ between partners. 
LESSON THREE: Once the scope of the mission of a partnership has been 
determined, the way in which partners may interact during the partnership can be 
determined. 
LESSON FOUR: Once the scope of the mission of a partnership has been 
determined, and appropriate leadership structure for the partners may be determined. 
LESSON FIVE: Once the scope of the mission of a partnership has been 
determined, the appropriate agreements between partners may be established which 
helps to determine the overall structure for the partnership. 
LESSON SIX: Once the scope of the mission of partnership has been determined, 
the approximate range for the number of partners that should be engaged in 
operating the partnership may be determined. 
LESSON SEVEN: The stage of EPER to be addressed in the service influences both 
the focus of the task and the formal tools and therefore may inform the appropriate 
structure for the partnership. 
LESSON EIGHT: Once the emergency that is being confronted by a partnership is 
identified and the geographic scale of its impact is specified, the focus of the task/ 
specificity of service that results from those categorizations may help to inform 
structural decisions. 
LESSON NINE: The type of harm a partnership intends to address may inform the 
structure of the partnership. 
LESSON TEN: Over time, the options for interaction structures between partners 
may have enlarged, giving the architect relatively more discretion in this structural 
decision. 
LESSON ELEVEN: Once the hazards that a partnership will address are defined, 
the degree of information sharing present between partners can be established. 
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6.3.1 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 
Since 2003, there have been two primary HSPDs that have directed the 
management of emergencies in the United States. HSPD-5 lays out the four life cycle 
steps of emergency management. President George W Bush specified that in order “to 
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a single, 
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. The objective of the 
United States Government is to ensure that all levels of government across the Nation 
have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national 
approach to domestic incident management. In these efforts, with regard to domestic 
incidents, the United States Government treats crisis management and consequence 
management as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions.” 
(Bush) Essentially, this directive merges the functions of incident management and 
response, bringing preparedness and response activities closer—but not completely—
together. Additionally, HSPD-5 directly allocated the responsibility of two response 
functions to the Department of Homeland Security: the development of a National 
Response Plan (NRP), and the development of a National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). 
This desire to integrate crisis management and consequence management is 
interesting considering how the federal government has actually operated since 
HSPD-5.  Of the four federally catalyzed partnerships that initiated after HSPD-5 
studied in the thesis—NIPP (National Infrastructure Protection Plan), Katrina Call 
Center, Technical Assistance, and Back to Business Workshops—three only address 
one stage of emergency management. Only the NIPP is a federally initiated event 
consequence tool that addresses both preparedness and response and all-hazards. The 
other three were grants or contracts awarded by the government, post-Katrina, to aid 
in the relief effort. This illustrates two interesting conclusions: (1) the stated 
emergency management policy of the US government is not being implemented 
consistently; and (2) in the face of catastrophic events, many plans and policies will 
be overruled by immediate and emergent needs. 
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Later in 2003, HSPD-8 was issued as “a companion to HSPD-5, which 
identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive 
describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, 
including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident.” (Bush) 
HSPD-8 effectively broadened the scope of preparedness functions. According to the 
directive, “the term "preparedness" refers to the existence of plans, procedures, 
policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to 
maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events. The term 
"readiness" is used interchangeably with preparedness… The term "prevention" refers 
to activities undertaken by the first responder community during the early stages of an 
incident to reduce the likelihood or consequences of threatened or actual terrorist 
attacks. More general and broader efforts to deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not 
addressed in this directive.” (Bush) Thus, in this directive, deterrence and disruption 
are not seen as functions of preparedness. In addition to defining the scope of 
preparedness, this HSPD also directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
to develop a National Preparedness Goal and National Preparedness Plan to 
accompany the National Response Plan.  
6.3.2 Federal EPER Tools: NRP, NPP, NIPP, NIMS, ESPs 
The National Response Plan (NRP) is a document the Department of 
Homeland Security developed in response to HSPD-5. “The purpose of the NRP is to 
establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery.”(Department of Homeland Security 2) The NRP, utilizing the 
NIMS (National Incident Management System), established mechanisms to: 
POLICY LESSON ONE: Agencies that address EPER services will 
face a tension between urgent EPER needs and the desire for long-
term strategy and policy. Therefore, agencies must accept that 
partnerships that address both situations must be accepted and 
encouraged within the culture of the organization in order to counter 
the uncertainty that EPER services are fraught with.  
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• “Maximize the integration of incident-related prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery activities; 
• Improve coordination and integration of Federal, State, local, tribal, 
regional, private-sector, and nongovernmental organization partners; 
• Maximize efficient utilization of resources needed for effective incident 
management and Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) protection 
and restoration; 
• Improve incident management communications and increase situational 
awareness across jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors; 
• Facilitate emergency mutual aid and Federal emergency support to State, 
local, and tribal governments; 
• Facilitate Federal-to-Federal interaction and emergency support; 
• Provide a proactive and integrated Federal response to catastrophic events; 
and 
• Address linkages to other Federal incident management and emergency 
response plans developed for specific types of incidents or hazards.” 
(Department of Homeland Security 2) 
 
However, this document is not present an adequate policy for how the private 
and public sectors should partner to improve overall EPER coordination. As 
illustrated by this study, there are a variety of ways to partner with the private sector 
in order to provide EPER services, based on the attributes of the service that is being 
provided. Thus, there is a lot of choice and flexibility for architects and policy 
makers. However, policy makers should recognize the importance of several 
attributes in determining appropriate partnership structures. When an all-hazards or 
integrative crisis and consequence management approaches become the policy of the 
US government, the policy makers are, in some ways, influencing the structure of 
partnerships that will emerge. Thus, policy makers should understand the 
architectural lessons outlines in section 6.2 in order to create policy that does not 
eventually lead to undesirable structural outcomes. 
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The National Preparedness Plan (NPP), published in 2005, elaborates on the 
national preparedness goal. “The National Preparedness Goal is to achieve and 
sustain capabilities that enable the Nation to collaborate in successfully preventing 
terrorist attacks on the homeland, and rapidly and effectively responding to and 
recovering from any terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency that does 
occur to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. This state of 
national preparedness will be achieved by reaching risk-based target levels of 
capability, and sustained by measuring readiness and directing resources to areas of 
greatest risk and need.” (Department of Homeland Security 32) Essentially, DHS 
presents a model that (1) identifies scenarios that pose the greatest danger to the US; 
(2) provides guidance to various levels of governments with the capabilities they must 
develop and maintain to counter those threats; and (3) lists a comprehensive set of 
tasks that must be performed in all events. This framework essentially sets up 
mechanisms for the government to interact and be informed, but does not outline a 
method for interacting with the private sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The National Response Plan (NRP) organizes differently in order to address 
response services. In the NRP, Emergency Support Function (ESF) groups are 
developed in order to better organize vulnerable communities to prepare for and 
respond to a disaster. “The ESFs provide the structure for coordinating Federal 
POLICY LESSON TWO: Policy makers must understand that by 
constraining certain event attributes through federal policies and 
procedures, they may be inadvertently influencing the ultimate 
structure of partnerships. 
POLICY LESSON THREE: Many federal emergency management 
policies and procedures outline public responsibilities and tasks, but 
do not explicitly state roles for the private sector. Without more 
formally engaging the private sector, emergency management 
functions may not be optimized. 
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interagency support for Incidents of National Significance. The ESF structure 
includes mechanisms used to provide Federal support to States and Federal-to-Federal 
support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for 
non-Stafford Act incidents.”(Department of Homeland Security ESF-i) These 
functions are: 
ESF #1 – Transportation 
ESF #2 – Communications 
ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering 
ESF #4 – Firefighting 
ESF #5 – Emergency Management 
ESF #6 – Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services 
ESF #7 – Resource Support 
ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services 
ESF #9 – Urban Search and Rescue 
ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 
ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources 
ESF #12 – Energy 
ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security 
ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation 
ESF #15 – External Affairs 
  
Each ESF is coordinated by a government agency and is supported by several 
other agencies. For example, ESF#8—Public Health and Medical Services—is 
implemented at the federal, state and local level. Louis Ritter, the St. Johns Country, 
Florida Emergency Preparedness Planner, described the implementation of this ESF 
as follows. “In ESF-8 (Health and Medical), public health is generally the lead 
agency (Health and Human Services (HHS) at the Federal level, Florida Department 
of Health at the State level, and the local County Health Department within a county 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)). We consider ESF-8 a system because we are 
very reliant on partnerships with other agencies and others from the private sector. 
ESF-8 support agencies include hospitals, nursing homes, emergency medical system 
providers, medical equipment distributors, and others. In St. Johns County, the ESF-8 
partners meet on a regular basis so that plans can be reviewed (or created) in order to 
ensure the best response possible and to ensure that we are not duplicating efforts in 
areas and leaving gaps in others.” (Ritter)  Thus, this ESF structure is a federal 
framework for local and state partnerships addressing various emergency 
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preparedness and response services that enables, but does not require, the private 
sector involvement. 
Many of the government initiatives described are very large and coordinated 
at the federal level. This size may be beneficial for some emergency preparedness and 
response services, but detrimental to others. Whether or not economies of scale can 
be achieved in these types of service provision is important to consider when setting 
up national frameworks for their provision. There is no one size fits all solution 
either. Federal coordination may work as well as local coordination for certain EPER 
services. As illustrated by the architectural lessons, federal scope partnerships should 
be set up for services that address national scale emergencies. However, there are 
many other incident scopes that are historically handled through smaller partnerships. 
Complex federal level partnerships are not required to provide EPER services as 
illustrated by this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.3 All-Hazards Environment 
Also notable in the U.S. federal strategy for emergency management is DHS’s 
‘all-hazards’ approach. The mission of FEMA, as outlined in the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, is to “reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all 
hazards by leading and supporting the Nation in a comprehensive, risk-based 
emergency management program.” (Armey) This is important due to the large variety 
of hazards that the emergency managers must face and the different characteristics of 
those hazards. As discussed in section 3.1.2.1, natural hazards and terrorist activity 
differ as sources of emergencies. Is an all-hazards response policy the most effective 
way to address the spectrum of emergencies the nation faces considering the different 
characteristics of varying emergencies? This research cannot comment on the relative 
success of All-Hazards partnerships to partnerships that address only natural or man-
POLICY LESSON FOUR: Creating complex federal level 
partnerships for EPER is not the only option for policy makers, 
though current national directives lean towards that approach. This 
study shows that effective partnerships are possible at several scales 
and that not all of them require government intervention. 
  149 
made hazards. However, there are a few conclusions that can be made about the all-
hazards nature of the current US policy. 
All Hazards partnerships must deal with more sensitive information than 
partnerships that exclusively address natural disasters. Thus, all-hazards partnerships 
must also confront difficult information sharing problems that often introduce a 
technology component into the daily operation of a partnership. By lumping together 
all hazards into the operation of preparedness and response partnerships, the 
government introduces a common operational headache: effective information 
sharing. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.4 Other Critiques of Current US System 
The Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University 
published a report in 2006 touting a new structural paradigm for how emergency 
preparedness and response efforts should be organized in the United States. They 
point out several flaws in the current EPER system. “Neither the NRP or the NIMS is 
a plan, and neither is supported by continuously evolving planning processes; hence, 
our preparedness and response architecture is incomplete…The nexus for such 
planning should be at the regional level, with regional contingency plans integrated at 
the federal level to resolve conflicts, establish priorities, identify shortfalls in 
resources, and allow for objective assessment of acceptable risk.” (Homeland 
Security Policy Institute 12-13) With this, the steering committee proposed a 
rearrangement of how preparedness and response activities are delivered and 
coordinated by the federal government. They note that since (1) most major disasters 
are regional, not national, in scope and (2) the federal government is not intended to 
be or prepared to be a first responder, federal EPER efforts should be organized 
regionally. Regional offices would not only hold operational responsibilities, but also 
serve as a regional center for the DHS Preparedness Directorate and FEMA. 
POLICY LESSON FIVE: The all-hazards approach to emergency 
management that the government has adopted introduces more 
technological uncertainty into the operation of the partnership by 
complicating information sharing between partners. 
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(Homeland Security Policy Institute 6-10). They envision regional partnerships with 
state and local governments, NGOs, and the private sector but do not elaborate on the 
format of those partnerships. Essentially, they espouse the concept of federalism and 
believe that a more effective national preparedness and response structure would be 
regionally—not nationally—based.  
This thesis supports the idea that regional partnerships are also desirable and 
possible for certain EPER services. However, this study would not go as far as 
constraining all EPER services to a regional scope; flexibility in scope and partners is 
required in order to optimize partnerships. 
 
 
 
 
The Business Executives for National Security (BENS) describe a different 
way for arranging EPER services through a modification of the current structure to 
better engage the private sector. They believe that the current structure does not 
adequately engage the private sector. Currently, many government response efforts 
are coordinated through state and local EOCs (Emergency Operation Centers). BENS 
suggests that these centers be complemented with BOCs (Business Operations 
Centers) to act as a liaison between EOCs and the private sector. These BOCs would 
ensure that businesses are more involved in planning and the rehearsal of plans, as 
well as coordinated responses. Furthermore, they recommend that BEMACs 
(Business Emergency Management Assistance Compacts) be institutionalized so that, 
in the event of a disaster, mutual aid agreements between businesses will be 
established to help with the response effort. (Some EMACs—the government 
version—already exist). Through these additional entities, BENS believes that overall 
preparedness and response efforts can be improved. (Business Response Task Force 
13-20) 
 
 
 
POLICY LESSON SIX: Flexibility in the scale and membership in 
partnerships is important in optimizing the provision of EPER 
services. 
POLICY LESSON EIGHT: Engaging the private sector through more 
formal policies and planning is desirable, but should not become so 
overly bureaucratic as to discourage private participation. 
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FIGURE 6.19: Summary of Policy Lessons 
 
As stated previously in this thesis, many of the points the BENS present are 
valid: the private sector is not adequately involved in formal networks for EPER. 
However, overly formal networks can also increase the bureaucratic burden on 
private sector partners. Thus, it is a delicate balance that harnesses the resources and 
expertise of the private sector and yet continues to remain cost-feasible for those 
partners. Businesses ultimately are guided by their bottom line and will opt out of 
partnerships if they become too costly or burdensome as compared to the benefit they 
receive.  
 
6.4 Areas for Further Research 
This research has offered many architectural and policy recommendations 
based on the results of the case studies performed with many partnerships for EPER. 
These recommendations have been framed as to advise individuals who impact how 
LESSON ONE: Agencies that address EPER services will face a tension between 
urgent EPER needs and the desire for long-term strategy and policy. Therefore, 
agencies must accept that partnerships that address both situations must be accepted 
and encouraged within the culture of the organization in order to counter the 
uncertainty that EPER services are fraught with.  
LESSON TWO: Policy makers must understand that by constraining certain event 
attributes through federal policies and procedures, they may be inadvertently 
influencing the ultimate structure of partnerships. 
LESSON THREE: Many federal emergency management policies and procedures 
outline public responsibilities and tasks, but do not explicitly state roles for the 
private sector. Without more formally engaging the private sector, emergency 
management functions may not be optimized. 
LESSON FOUR: Creating complex federal level partnerships for EPER is not the 
only option for policy makers, though current national directives lean towards that 
approach. This study shows that effective partnerships are possible at several scales 
and that not all of them require government intervention. 
LESSON FIVE: The all-hazards approach to emergency management that the 
government has adopted introduces more technological uncertainty into the 
operation of the partnership by complicating information sharing between partners. 
LESSON SIX: Flexibility in the scale and membership in partnerships is important 
in optimizing the provision of EPER services. 
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those partnerships are created in order to learn from past experience to create 
intelligent EPER partnerships. However, this research did not comment on the 
efficacy of those partnerships studied. Devising a method for evaluating the relative 
effectiveness of different EPER partnership structures and services is an important 
contribution to the emergency management field and should be further explored. In 
addition, this research attempted to identify the role of risk in structuring EPER 
partnerships. For partnerships that address emergencies and unknown degrees of 
severity, uncertainties and risks are huge concerns. The interview process of this 
thesis recorded the risks that the partnerships face but that risk data was not directly 
analyzed for the purpose of this study. That data is included in Appendix E. Another 
interesting research question would be to devise a method for illustrating the impact 
that the high risk environment present for EPER services has on the structuring and 
efficacy of partnerships. Lastly, and obviously, an expanded data set with more 
interview data could offer more conclusive trends and patterns. Collecting more 
interview data and performing the attribute analysis over again could reveal 
additional insights not found in this study. 
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APPENDIX A: Privatization Supplements 
 
 
 
 
 
Government  Public        Service   Operations  Cooperative  Lease-     Build-       Build-      Wrap         Buy-    Build- 
Department   Authority  Contract & Maintenance         Build-     Transfer-  Operate-   Around     Build    Own- 
             Contract         Operate  Operate    Transfer    Addition   Operate Op. 
             (LBO)    (BTO)      (BOT)                        (BBO) (BOO) 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Spectrum of Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure {{44 Savas, 
E.S. 2000/s241;}} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Facility  Model  Description 
 
Existing Facility  Sale  Private Firm buys facility, operates it under s franchise, and collects  
user fees 
   Lease  Government leases facility to a private firm, which operates it under a  
franchise and collects user fees 
   Operations  Private firm maintains and operates a government-owned facility; 
   & Maintenance Government pays private firm a fee 
   Contract 
 
Existing Facility that Lease-Build- Private form leases or buys facility from government, operates it  
Requires capital  Operate (LBO) under a concession, and expands or rehabilitates it, collecting user 
Investment for   Buy-Build fees and paying a franchise fee 
Expansion or  Operate (BBO) 
Rehabilitation 
   Wrap-Around Private firm expands a government owned facility, owns only the  
   Addition  expansion, but operates the entire facility, collecting fees 
 
New Facility to be  Build-Transfer Private firm finances and builds new facility, transfers to public  
Built   Operate (BTO) ownership, then operates from 20-40 years, collecting user fees 
 
   Build-Operate- Same as BTO, but facility is transferred to public ownership after 20- 
Transfer (BOT) 40 years 
 
Build-Own Private firm finances, builds, owns and operates facility and collects  
Operate (BOO) fees, under perpetual franchise 
 
TABLE 2: Models of Infrastructure Privatization {{44 Savas, E.S. 2000/s246;}} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fully Public Fully Private 
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APPENDIX B: Attribute Assessment of EPER Sub-Functions 
 
Determination of Vulnerabilities 
1. private sector 
a. must identify location and time specific vulnerabilities  
b. private sector can identify their own vulnerabilities (infrastructure, supply 
chain, resistance to natural hazards, etc…) or can contract out that 
function if secrecy issues can be overcome 
c. must recognize vulnerabilities in their area that may affect their business, 
their employees or their infrastructure… these may be internal or external 
and the company ay or may not be able to harden against those threats 
alone 
d. must work with local businesses/government to identify common 
vulnerabilities 
e. must be aware of emergent vulnerabilities and work with the government 
to make sure vulnerability determination is consistent 
2. public sector 
a. must work to identify government owned vulnerabilities (government 
buildings, internet, etc…) 
b. must identify national/regional vulnerabilities and trends such as industry 
concentration, health care infrastructure (for combating influenzas), etc… 
 
Identify Threats 
1. private sector 
a. must remain locally vigilant in terms of potential threats facing their 
business or supply chain  
b. must communicate threat information to public sector and (potentially) 
other local stakeholders 
c. determine how ongoing, cyclical or catastrophic threats will affect existing 
and/or unknown vulnerabilities 
2. public sector 
a. must identify emergent threats through surveillance and testing 
b. must collect information of a sensitive nature (i.e. terrorism intel) and 
distribute that information in a timely way to affected parties 
c. must identify regional threats and trends such as emergent terrorism trends 
and weather patterns 
d. must supplement private work in anticipating how threats will affect 
various vulnerabilities 
 
Assess Vulnerabilities/Threats 
1. private sector 
a. must evaluate the potential severity of vulnerabilities in the face of threats:  
i. Geographic Effect (Point, Network, Region) 
ii. Time Horizon (Short-term, Long-term) 
iii. Severity of Effects (Minimal, Significant, Catastrophic) 
iv. Nature of Effects (Economic, Loss of Life, Political) 
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b. Must anticipate threat levels (Theoretical, Imminent, Confirmed) based on 
shared government information and independent intelligence/assessment 
c. Must prioritize these threats/vulnerabilities 
2. public sector 
a. must evaluate large-scale impact of threats/vulnerabilities (USCAPS and 
airline industry for example); there is a lot of room for PPPs here  
b. must prioritize threat and vulnerabilities in order to determine which to 
fund/encourage mitigation and determine a method to prioritize those 
combinations  
i. determine how prioritization and assistance should be allocated: 
location-based threat-specific, location-based vulnerability 
specific, risk-based location specific etc…  
c. must provide threat assessment information to private sector stakeholders 
d. must encourage partnerships that reduce vulnerabilities 
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. Private Sector Determination of vulnerabilities to act on 
a. Supply-chain vulnerabilities; build in resilient business practices (multiple 
suppliers, etc…) 
b. Distinction between internal and external vulnerabilities  
i. Internal: affect business as usual, but may not affect other parties 
ii. External: part of a network of affects that influences the way the 
business can respond—can not necessarily prevent but must be 
prepared to respond 
c. Dependent on information (intel) from the government 
 
Provision of Required Resources/Activities/Planning for Prevention/Mitigation 
 
Assumptions: 
1. threats have been identified, assessed and prioritized 
2. there are some prevention activities involved in this stage and some “emergency 
preparedness” activities  
 
Roles and Responsibilities for each sector: 
1. private sector 
a. must create contingency plans that are well communicated to all 
stakeholders (employees and suppliers especially) 
b. must ensure the safety of employees in order to return to business as usual 
as quickly as possible (provision of emergency kits, emergency meeting 
places, etc…) 
c. must establish clear communication channels/hierarchy in the event of an 
emergency  
d. must work with the government and other private partners to rehearse 
plans 
2.  public sector 
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a. must develop emergency response plans that are distributed to and agreed 
upon by all stakeholders 
b. must effectively communicate updated intel to the private sector to modify 
SOPs/emergency plans 
c. must establish clear communication channels/hierarchy in the event of an 
emergency  
d. must develop plans to ensure the viability, integrity and capability of 
critical distribution systems (transportation (at state/local level) and 
communication specifically) which could be contracted out to logistics 
companies 
e. must develop plans for short-term housing/shelter needs 
f. must encourage the creation of a flexible and resilient culture with 
stakeholders (development of robust organization structures, 
communication networks, supply chains, etc…) by providing incentives to 
the private sector 
g. must work with levels of government and private partners to rehearse 
plans 
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. Creation of SOPs, contingency plans, and chains of command 
a. Function specific that can then be integrated depending on the scenario 
i. Water provision plan, transportation plan, housing and shelters, 
emergency search and rescue, triage, communications restoration, 
etc… 
ii. Must anticipate compounding effects when multiple functions are 
jeopardized 
iii. Develop logistics SOPs including a central command structure 
with flexibility built in at local level 
2. Rehearsals of plans 
a. Logistics planning for activities 
b. Lessons learned accumulation and modification of plans 
3. Education of employees and residents 
a. Provision of emergency kits and plans for employees and families 
(private) 
b. Government efforts to educate a local community about the threats they 
face 
 
Attributes: 
1. Diversity (Range) of stakeholders (business, local government, state government, 
households, non-profits, etc…) 
2. Number of stakeholders/ participants (1, 2, 3-5, 5-10, etc…)  
3. Scope of beneficiary (business, local population, multiple local populations, state, 
region, nation) 
4. Investment required (time, capital, process change, etc…) 
5. Level of coordination required (none, one way communication, two way 
communication) 
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6. Frequency of Interaction (never, as needed, scheduled times, continuously, etc…) 
7. Duration of Interaction (one time, short term, tong term, etc…) 
8. Level of sensitivity of information shared (classified, trade secret, sensitive, 
unclassified, general knowledge, etc…) aka, level of information asymmetry? 
9. Principle Agent Problem? 
 
Implementation of Plans in ANTICIPATION of Emergency 
 
Assumptions: 
1. Emergency is anticipated (natural disaster, etc…) and various plans that could be 
adapted to meet needs of disaster have been rehearsed 
2. this is a major prevention stage as well 
 
Roles and Responsibilities for each sector: 
1. private sector 
a. must identify appropriate plans and direct employees to follow general EP 
plans (congregate, evacuate, etc…) 
b. must modify plans if anticipated event demands change 
2. public sector 
a. must provide timely information to public and private sector about 
emergency in order to allow for plans to occur 
b. must establish and communicate the powers of the government in certain 
disaster scenarios (power to quarantine, evacuations, etc…) and create 
enforcement mechanisms 
c. notify the general public about steps to take post disaster (Shelters, food 
distribution locations, etc…) 
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. communication between the government and private sector to establish together 
what types of plans should be implemented to ensure effective coordination 
2. private sector communication with employees: steps they should take to mitigate 
the emergency (activate private sector plans) 
3. government communication with affected population: steps to be taken that are 
consistent with private planning 
a. engage local media as well as the preplanning efforts with private sector to 
generate flexible plans 
b. modification of current threat level framework 
4. Activate government powers to mitigate emergency (quarantine, evacuation, 
etc…) 
5. After being informed of an imminent threat, efforts may be taken to eliminate the 
threat (stopping a terrorist plot, etc..) 
 
Attributes: 
1. Type of emergency confronted (anticipated (natural disaster, accident, etc) or 
unanticipated (terrorism, etc…)) 
2. Anticipated consequence (low, medium, high) 
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3. Level of pre-planning required  
4. Regulatory Responsibility  
 
Implementation of Preparedness/Response Plans During Event  
 
Assumptions: 
1. emergency can either be anticipated or unanticipated, but during event there will 
be certain steps anyone can take to enhance chance of survival 
2. Government (at least one level of) can act as a third party, coordinating response 
during event. However, some parts of the government could become impaired in 
an emergency. 
 
Roles and Responsibilities for each sector: 
1. private sector 
a. must identify appropriate plan and activate established plans by having 
educated individual employees and stakeholders 
b. must ensure that communication channels are enabled and empowered 
2. public sector 
a. must communicate immediately with critical partners in communication 
and transportation infrastructure 
b. must start planning/coordinating for response post-event 
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. during an emergency, certain activities may be taken to mitigate the aftermath: 
a. coordination of response by identifying plans 
b. initial damage assessment and how that impacts plans, modification of 
plans to adjust 
c. engagement of experts (government analysts, boards, etc…) to address 
possible spillover effects 
d. utilization of communication channels/databases developed pre-
emergency to identify critical stakeholders 
e. deployment of emergency personnel (health and safety professionals) to 
scene if safe 
 
Attributes: 
1. Scope of Emergency (point, multiple point, larger area, city, region, network, 
etc…) (WTC, Katrina, E coli spinach outbreak, etc…) 
2. Duration of Event  
 
 
Implementation of Immediate Response/Recovery Plans Post-Event  
 
Assumptions: 
1. Emergency can either be anticipated or unanticipated, implementation of response 
plans/or ad-hoc response post-event will be required in either event 
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2. This is the initial organization stage. Both urgent activities and network plans are 
beginning to be coordinated. 
Roles and Responsibilities for each sector: 
1. private sector 
a. must identify, implement or develop any appropriate plans within the 
context of the larger effect of the event 
b. must encourage the safety of employees and family members before 
carrying out other plans (assisting others, contracted services, etc…) 
c. if critical infrastructure is owned, must become operational as soon as 
possible in order to enable other response efforts. (these plans are a 
priority) 
d. must work to quickly and safely get employees back to work 
e. individual assessment of damage relating to business… buildings, 
employees, extent of damage into supply chain, etc… 
f. timely response of affected insurance agencies 
2. public sector 
a. must identify appropriate plans and modify for specific event 
b. Prioritize response plans (to provide basic human needs) based on 
preliminary damage assessment 
i. Emergency search and rescue operations 
ii. Provision of water and sanitation (water sanitation kits, port-a-
potties, septic tanks, etc…) 
iii. Ensure provision of emergency medical care 
iv. Provision of emergency shelter for affected stakeholders 
c. Must coordinate response efforts based on established chain of command 
and plans/SOPs 
d. networked critical infrastructure damage assessment (transportation and 
communication for distribution) and allocation of resources to most 
critical areas 
e. assessment of system level, long term needs of citizens and rebuilding by 
utilizing existing communication networks to acquire damage assessments 
by private entities 
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. ensure the focus of emergency workers by protecting family 
2. deploying officials as soon as possible to perform a preliminary assessment of 
actual damage and severity to know to what extent to implement plans 
3. once a company has ensured its own short term stability, it is has a responsibility 
to the general community, it can then activate those plans 
4. immediate response by empowered search and rescue entities  
5. immediate damage management (fire station to control fire, etc…) 
6. Coordination of temporary human needs (shelter, medical care, food, water, 
etc…) 
7. flexible response efforts that are not based on pre-planning 
 
Attributes: 
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1. Sector expertise (public, private, combination of both, etc…) 
2. Actual Damage (minimal…catastrophic) 
 
Short Term Provision/Recovery 
 
Assumptions: 
1. relevant plans have been identified and started 
2. network effects are beginning to be understood 
 
Roles and Responsibilities for each sector: 
1. private sector 
a. account for employees to the best of their ability  
b. assist in ensuring the usability of the transportation network for people and 
goods to get back to business as usual 
c. commit fully to plans and communication networks established before the 
emergency 
2. public sector 
a. Repair power lines (less critical infrastructure) 
b. Provision of emergency food supplies for affected stakeholders 
c. Maintenance of order/rule of law 
d. Assurance of post-emergency safety and security 
e. Provision of other affected critical resources 
f. Logistics management  
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. private utility companies repairing their infrastructure with the help of other 
utility companies 
2. private sector activation of internal plans and bringing back employees to work as 
quickly as possible… making their environment “workable” 
a. fix critical damage to buildings 
b. re-connect to critical systems (internet, communication, etc…) 
c. re-secure sensitive areas 
3. public sector encouraging the repair of critical infrastructure by throwing money 
at private operators or donating people to help (national guard, etc…) 
4. deployment of security forces (police) 
5. mobilization, collection and distribution of critical items (food, supplies, etc…) 
6. educating the public about recovery efforts that are taking place (media) 
a. where they can receive critical care, food, water and shelter 
 
Attributes: 
1. ownership 
2. level of coordination required 
3. degree of public funds required 
4. complexity of task 
5. sector expertise 
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Long-Term Recovery/Rebuilding  
 
Assumptions: 
1. these activities are critical to restoration of life as usual, but are not critical in 
initial stages either due to time constraints or the severity of other issues 
 
Roles and Responsibilities for each sector: 
1. private sector 
a. return to business as usual (job creation, infrastructure repair, financial 
stability, etc…) 
b. development of best practices and lessons learned 
c. The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-
restoration plans for private assets 
2. public sector 
a. The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-
restoration plans for government owned assets 
b. Prioritization of rebuilding/repair activities to critical infrastructure (?)—
where does this really happen? 
c. Rebuilding/repair of critical infrastructure (?) 
d. Allotment of public funds to support private rebuilding effort 
 
Specific Examples of Activities in this area: 
1. individual businesses undergo long term repairs to business (economic, less than 
critical infrastructure, etc…) 
2. reflection of experience: good and bad components of plans, modification of plans 
and creation of new plans 
3. sharing of emergency information, best practices and lessons learned 
4. introduction of new regulation 
5. public spending to rebuild/recover where private funding and insurance cannot 
 
Attributes: 
1. low cost provider/builder… investment opportunities 
2. political support 
3. sector expertise 
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APPENDIX C: Interview Questions 
 
1. General Partnership 
a. Describe what your partnership does. (2 sentence service provided…) 
b. What is the mission of your partnership? 
c. What is the nature of the task? (Management, Financing, Service 
provision, technical provision…) 
d. Was this service provided in a different way before the partnership was 
founded? 
e. When was the partnership established? 
2. PPP Attributes: 
a. Please describe the stakeholders who have an incentive to participate in 
the partnership: (business, local government, state government, 
households, non-profits, etc…) 
b. Who benefits from this partnership and on what scale? (business, local 
population, multiple local populations, state, region, nation) 
c. How many partners are involved and who are they? 
d. Structure of Partnership: (what are the chains of command, etc…) 
i. What was the catalyst for this partnership? Who started it/backed 
it? 
ii. What does the leadership of the partnership look like? 
1. president/ceo/coordinator or board 
2. hierarchy or flat 
iii. Describe the governance of this partnership. How are decisions and 
plans made and who has the authority to make them? 
iv. How is this partnership financed? 
v. Who delivers the service? (which partner?) 
vi. Does this partnership utilize a contract? What type of contract? 
vii. Are there specific performance criteria or other incentives built 
into the partnership (through a contract, etc…) 
viii. What are the responsibilities of each partner? What does each 
contribute? 
e. At inception, what were the motivations for partnering with the private 
sector instead of relying on public provision?  
f. Who is considered the expert in this service provision (public or private 
sector) and why? Is there much competition in the provision of this 
service? 
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g. Duration of Interaction: (one time, short term, tong term, etc…) 
i. At inception, how long was this partnership intended to last? How 
long has it lasted and has its time horizon changed? If so, why? 
ii. How do partners interact? 
1. Sporadic interaction (phone calls, ad hoc meetings, etc…) 
2. Scheduled interaction (weekly teleconferences…) 
3. independent (reporting but little feedback…) 
iii. What is the level of coordination between partners? 
1. one way communication 
2. two way communication  
3. other 
h. Level of sensitivity of information required/shared: (classified, trade 
secret, sensitive, unclassified, general knowledge, learning and experience 
knowledge, etc…)  
i. How would you classify the sensitivity of the information that your 
partnership uses? 
1. public domain 
2. trade secret (business knowledge) 
3. sensitive 
4. classified 
5. TS/intelligence 
ii. Does everyone interact at the same level of sensitivity? 
i. political environment: (labor situation, privatization theology, budget 
concerns) 
i. What were potential political concerns in designing this 
partnership? Did the architects try to address any of them? 
1. labor 
2. theology 
3. budget 
4. intelligence control 
5. other 
j. risk profile: (what risks do a task face? Political, demand, performance, 
financial, social equitability, loss of life/infrastructure, etc…) 
i. In creating the partnership, what risks were intentionally 
addressed? 
1. political 
2. demand 
3. performance 
4. financial 
5. social equity 
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ii. what are the risks to the partnership now? What keeps you up at 
night? 
iii. In order to complete your task do you rely on other entities 
supplying critical information/services? If so, what tasks? 
3. EP/ER Attributes 
a. Activation period of partnership: (ex-ante, during, ex-post, or all) 
i. If this partnership is activated at different points, when is that? 
1. ex-ante? 
2. during 
3. ex-post? 
ii. Does the partnership operate differently during different times or 
phases? What guides the activities in different phases? 
b. Type of emergency confronted: (anticipated (natural disaster, accident, 
etc) or unanticipated (terrorism, etc…)) 
i. What types of emergencies does the partnership address? 
1. natural 
2. man made 
3. anticipated vs unanticipated 
ii. Does the partnership address emergencies or more continuous 
services? 
c. Scope of Anticipated Emergency: (point, multiple discontinuous points, 
large area, city, region, network, etc…)  
i. When looking at the emergencies this partnership deals with, what 
is the nature of those events? What is the affected geographic area 
like? 
1. point 
2. multiple point continuous 
3. multiple point discontinuous 
4. large area 
5. city 
6. region 
7. nation 
8. network 
ii. What is the affected area in the value chain? (supply chain, etc…) 
iii. What is the typical duration of the event? 
1. momentary 
2. short (1 min-30 min) 
3. intermediate (30 min-2 hours) 
4. long (2 hours-1day) 
5. extended (1 day +) 
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iv. What is the nature of the anticipated consequence? 
1. life or quality of life 
2. critical infrastructure damage 
3. economic damage  
4. other 
v. What is the anticipated degree of severity of the consequence? 
1. variable 
2. typically low 
3. medium 
4. high 
5. uncertain 
vi. What is the probability of this event occurring? 
1. certain 
2. high 
3. etc… 
d. Degree of Uncertainty in Task (known unknowns): (negligible, 
considerable, enormous, etc…) 
i. Describe the uncertainties in this EP/ER situation as distinct from 
those in PPP structure. How does the PPP deal with these 
uncertainties? 
ii. How does the partnership deal with this variation/uncertainty? 
iii. Is this uncertainty systemic (the nature of what you do) or 
unsystemic (Able to be addressed with changes in operations)? 
e. Flexibility (unknown unknowns) 
i. How flexible is your partnership to deal with emergent issues?  
ii. How have you built this into the structure of the partnership, or is it 
ad hoc? 
f. Stakes 
i. How high are the stakes of this emergency? 
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APPENDIX D: Full Coded Data Set 
 
 
The following three tables show the categorization for all of the partnerships and 
attributes analyzed in this study. 
  
Pa
rt
n
er
sh
ip
 
Na
m
e 
Back to 
Business 
Workshops 
Aid Matrix 
Project 
DNC 
Partnership 
BRT 
BCLC 
Katrina Call 
Center Contract 
Techn. 
Assistance 
Contract 
SPIN 
partnership 
Regional Info 
Sharing Ptnshp 
Local Incident 
Command 
NIPP 
MRC 
ESRI Project 
Impact 
A2H Disaster 
Relief 
Abbot  
Products 
Contributions 
Tyson's 
Disaster Relief 
Red Cross 
CAN 
Office Depot 
Foundation 
St
ar
t D
at
e 
20
05
 
20
05
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
05
 
20
05
 
20
01
 
20
05
 
19
80
 
20
03
 
20
02
 
19
97
 
19
93
 
20
05
 
20
01
 
20
01
 
19
93
 
N
at
u
re
 
of
 
Cr
ea
tio
n
 
ad
 
ho
c 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
ed
 
pl
an
n
ed
 
pl
an
n
e
d 
pl
an
n
ed
 
pl
an
n
ed
 
Ty
pe
 
of
 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
to
p 
do
w
n
 
Co
lla
-
bo
ra
tiv
e 
m
ixt
u
r
e 
Co
lla
-
bo
ra
tiv
e 
0 
to
p 
do
w
n
 
m
ixt
u
r
e 
Co
lla
b
- or
at
iv
e 
to
p 
do
w
n
 
Co
lla
b
or
at
iv
e 
Co
lla
b
- or
at
iv
e 
to
p 
do
w
n
 
Co
lla
b-
or
at
iv
e 
Co
lla
b-
or
at
iv
e 
to
p 
do
w
n
 
Co
lla
b-
or
at
iv
e 
Co
lla
-
bo
ra
tiv
e 
Co
lla
b-
or
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
of
 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
ad
 
ho
c 
R
eg
.
 
in
fo
rm
al
 
Irr
eg
.
f
or
m
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
R
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
0 
R
eg
.
 
fo
rm
a
l 
Irr
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
R
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
R
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
Irr
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
R
eg
.
 
in
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
fo
rm
al
 
Irr
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
Irr
eg
.
 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
re
gu
la
r 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
re
gu
la
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
ad
 
ho
c 
re
gu
la
r 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ad
 
ho
c 
ad
 
ho
c 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
Co
or
di
n
at
or
 
Co
or
di
n
at
or
s 
bo
ar
ds
 
bo
ar
d 
bo
ar
d 
Co
or
di
n
at
or
 
Co
or
di
n
at
or
s 
Co
or
d
-
in
at
or
 
an
d 
bo
ar
d 
Co
or
d-
in
at
or
 
an
d 
bo
ar
d 
Co
or
d-
in
at
or
 
bo
ar
d 
Co
or
d-
in
at
or
 
an
d 
bo
ar
d 
 
a 
fe
w
 
de
ci
si
o
n
 
m
ak
er
s 
a 
fe
w
 
de
ci
si
on
 
m
ak
er
s 
Co
or
d-
in
at
or
s 
a 
fe
w
 
de
ci
si
o
n
 
m
ak
er
s 
bo
ar
d 
Co
or
d-
in
at
or
 
Fo
rm
al
 
To
ol
s 
n
on
e 
le
ga
l 
ag
re
-
em
en
t 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
le
ga
l 
ag
re
e
-
m
en
t 
le
ga
l 
ag
re
e-
m
en
t 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 
ag
re
e-
m
en
t 
n
on
e 
n
on
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 
ag
re
em
e
n
t 
n
on
e 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
Sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
al
l 
sh
ar
e
d 
u
n
e
ve
n
 sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
e
d 
al
l 
sh
ar
e
d 
al
l 
sh
ar
e
d 
u
n
e
ve
n
 sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
e
d 
u
n
e
ve
n
 sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
u
n
e
ve
n
 sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
u
n
e
ve
n
 
sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
u
n
e
ve
n
 
sh
ar
in
g 
al
l 
sh
ar
ed
 
# 
of
 
Pa
rtn
er
s 
fe
w
 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
fe
w
 
fe
w
 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
fe
w
 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
fe
w
 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
 
# 
of
 
Be
n
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
# 
of
 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
fe
w
 
la
rg
e 
# 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
m
an
y 
m
an
y 
la
rg
e 
# 
 
 
Se
ct
or
s 
R
ep
.
 
by
 
Pa
rtn
er
s 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
t
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
Pr
iva
t
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
Se
c.
 
R
ep
.
 
by
 
Be
n
ef
i. 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iv.
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
Public SAO 
Grant 
public-private 
collaboration 
Facilitated 
collaboration 
Facilitated 
collaboration 
Contract 
Contract 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
private-
private 
collaboration 
private-
private 
collaboration 
private-
private 
collaboration 
private-
private 
collaboration 
private-
private 
collaboration 
TA
B
LE
 
D
.
1:
 
C
a
se
 
St
u
dy
 D
at
a
 F
o
r 
St
ru
ct
u
ra
l A
tt
ri
bu
te
s 
  
Pa
rt
n
er
s
hi
p 
N
am
e 
Back to 
Business 
Workshops 
Aid Matrix 
Project 
DNC 
Partnership 
BRT 
BCLC 
Katrina Call 
Center Contract 
Techn. 
Assistance 
Contract 
SPIN 
partnership 
Regional Info 
Sharing Ptnshp 
Local Incident 
Command 
NIPP 
MRC 
ESRI Project 
Impact 
A2H Disaster 
Relief 
Abbot  
Products 
Contributions 
Tyson's 
Disaster Relief 
Red Cross 
CAN 
Office Depot 
Foundation 
Se
ct
o
rs
 
R
ep
.
 
by
 
St
ak
eh
o
ld
er
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
t
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
al
l 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
pr
iva
te
 
an
d 
N
G
O
s 
Fo
c
u
s 
o
f 
Ta
sk
 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
O
pe
ra
tio
n
al
 
bo
th
 
M
an
a
ge
ria
l 
M
an
a
ge
ria
l 
O
pe
r
at
io
n
al
 
O
pe
ra
tio
n
al
 
bo
th
 
bo
th
 
O
pe
ra
t
io
n
al
 
M
an
a
ge
ria
l 
O
pe
ra
t
io
n
al
 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
bo
th
 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
Sp
e
ci
fic
ity
 
o
f 
Se
rv
ic
e 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
m
id
dl
e 
br
oa
d 
br
oa
d 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
m
id
dl
e 
m
id
dl
e 
n
ar
ro
w
 
br
oa
d 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
n
ar
ro
w
 
Au
th
o
rit
y/
 
Cr
ed
ib
ili
ty
/ 
Le
gi
tim
a
cy
 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
0 
sh
ar
e
d 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e
d 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
R
es
po
n
si
bi
lit
y 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
0 
sh
ar
e
d 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
0 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
Fi
n
an
c
in
g 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
O
pe
ra
tio
n
al
 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pr
iva
te
 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
e
d 
pr
iva
t
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
Ex
pe
rt
is
e 
0 
pr
iva
te
 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
e
d 
pr
iva
t
e 
pr
iva
te
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
Po
s
se
ss
io
n
 
o
f R
e
so
u
rc
es
 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
ed
 
sh
ar
e
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
sh
ar
ed
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
pr
iva
te
 
Se
n
si
tiv
ity
 
o
f 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
ra
n
ge
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
n
si
ti
ve
 
pu
bl
ic
 
ra
n
ge
 
pu
bl
ic
 
ra
n
ge
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
Sc
a
le
 
o
f 
Se
rv
ic
e 
ci
ty 
n
at
io
n
 
ci
ty 
n
at
io
n
 
n
at
io
n
 
 
re
gi
o
n
 
 
st
at
e 
st
at
e 
st
at
e 
po
in
t 
n
at
io
n
 
ci
ty 
ci
ty 
n
at
io
n
 
re
gi
on
 
re
gi
on
 
n
at
io
n
 
re
gi
on
 
Le
n
gt
h 
o
f 
Se
rv
ic
e 
 
m
on
th
s 
in
de
fin
ite
 
m
on
th
s 
in
de
fin
ite
 
in
de
fin
ite
 
m
on
t
hs
 
in
de
fi
n
ite
 
in
de
fin
i
te
 
in
de
fin
ite
 
in
de
fin
ite
 
in
de
fin
ite
 
in
de
fin
ite
 
ye
ar
s 
in
de
fin
it
e 
in
de
fin
it
e 
in
de
fin
it
e 
in
de
fin
ite
 
in
de
fin
it
e 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
Public SAO 
Grant 
public-private 
collaboration 
Facilitated 
collaboration 
Facilitated 
collaboration 
Contract 
Contract 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
TA
B
LE
 
D
.
2:
 
C
a
se
 
St
u
dy
 D
at
a
 F
o
r 
Fu
n
ct
io
n
a
l A
tt
ri
bu
te
s 
  
Pa
rt
n
er
s
hi
p 
N
am
e 
Back to 
Business 
Workshops 
Aid Matrix 
Project 
DNC 
Partnership 
BRT 
BCLC 
Katrina Call 
Center Contract 
Techn. 
Assistance 
Contract 
SPIN 
partnership 
Regional Info 
Sharing Ptnshp 
Local Incident 
Command 
NIPP 
MRC 
ESRI Project 
Impact 
A2H Disaster 
Relief 
Abbot  
Products 
Contributions 
Tyson's 
Disaster Relief 
Red Cross 
CAN 
Office Depot 
Foundation 
Ty
pe
 
o
f 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 
Co
n
fr
o
n
te
d 
 
n
at
u
ra
l 
al
l 
ha
za
r
ds
 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
n
at
u
ra
l 
al
l 
ha
za
r
ds
 
n
at
u
r
al
 
al
l 
ha
za
r
ds
 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
m
an
 
m
ad
e 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
al
l 
ha
za
r
ds
 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
n
at
u
ra
l 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
al
l 
ha
za
rd
s 
G
eo
 
Sc
a
le
 
o
f 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 
 
re
gi
on
 
n
at
io
n
 
ci
ty 
n
at
io
n
 
n
at
io
n
 
 
re
gi
o
n
 
 
st
at
e 
st
at
e 
st
at
e 
po
in
t 
n
at
io
n
 
n
at
io
n
 
ci
ty 
n
at
io
n
 
re
gi
on
 
re
gi
on
 
n
at
io
n
 
re
gi
on
 
St
ag
e 
o
f 
EP
ER
 
R
es
po
n
se
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
pr
ep
ar
ed
n
es
s 
bo
th
 
bo
th
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
pr
ep
ar
ed
n
es
s 
pr
ep
ar
ed
n
es
s 
bo
th
 
bo
th
 
bo
th
 
pr
ep
ar
ed
n
es
s 
re
sp
on
s
e 
re
sp
on
s
e 
re
sp
on
se
 
re
sp
on
se
 
re
sp
on
s
e 
Se
v
er
ity
 
o
f 
H
ar
m
 
 
ca
ta
st
r
op
hi
c 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ca
ta
st
r
op
hi
c 
ca
ta
st
r
op
hi
c 
se
ve
r
e 
se
ve
r
e 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
se
ve
re
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
se
ve
re
 
ra
n
ge
 
Ty
pe
 
o
f H
ar
m
 
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
th
in
gs
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
ra
n
ge
 
th
in
gs
 
pe
op
le
 
ra
n
ge
 
pe
op
le
 
pe
op
le
 
pe
op
le
 
pe
op
le
 
pe
op
le
 
A
ct
iv
at
io
n
 
Pe
rio
d 
o
f P
PP
 
 
e
x-
po
st
 
e
x- po
st
 
e
x-
an
te
 
co
n
tin
u
ou
s 
co
n
tin
u
ou
s 
e
x- po
st
 
e
x- po
st
 
e
x-
an
te
 
e
x-
an
te
 
e
x- po
st
 
co
n
tin
u
ou
s 
co
n
tin
u
ou
s 
e
x-
an
te
 
e
x-
po
st
 
e
x-
po
st
 
e
x-
po
st
 
e
x-
po
st
 
e
x-
po
st
 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
Public SAO 
Grant 
public-private 
collaboration 
Facilitated 
collaboration 
Facilitated 
collaboration 
Contract 
Contract 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
public-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
private-private 
collaboration 
 
TA
B
LE
 
D
.
3:
 
C
a
se
 
St
u
dy
 D
at
a
 F
o
r 
Ev
en
t A
tt
ri
bu
te
s 
        
  
A
PP
EN
D
IX
 
E:
 
U
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
 D
a
ta
 
 
 
 
Pa
rt
n
er
sh
ip
 
Na
m
e 
Back to Business 
Workshops 
Aid Matrix Project 
DNC Partnership 
BRT 
BCLC 
Katrina Call Center 
Contract 
Techn. Assistance 
Contract 
SPIN partnership 
Regional Info Sharing 
Ptnshp 
Local Incident 
Command 
NIPP 
MRC 
ESRI Project Impact 
A2H Disaster Relief 
Abbot  Products 
Contributions 
Tyson's Disaster 
Relief 
Red Cross CAN 
Office Depot 
Foundation 
De
m
an
d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Te
ch
n
ol
og
y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
Sh
ar
in
g 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Po
liti
cs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainties 
Bu
dg
et
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Se
v
er
ity
 o
f E
v
en
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lo
ca
tio
n
 
of
 
Ev
en
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Re
so
u
rc
e 
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
Public SAO 
Grant 
public-private collaboration 
Facilitated collaboration 
Facilitated collaboration 
Contract 
Contract 
public-private collaboration 
public-private collaboration 
public-private collaboration 
public-private collaboration 
public-private collaboration 
public-private collaboration 
private-private collaboration 
private-private collaboration 
private-private collaboration 
private-private collaboration 
private-private collaboration 
 
KE
Y 
 
 
 
Un
ce
rta
in
ty
 
Pr
es
en
t i
n 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 
 
 
Un
ce
rta
in
ty
 
n
ot
 
Pr
es
en
t 
